Linkage Politics

2019 ◽  
pp. 290-316
Author(s):  
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Soviet Policy ◽  
Issue Linkage ◽  
Cross Domain ◽  
Political Interests ◽  
The Cold War

Most discussions of cross-domain deterrence focus on variation in the means of coercion, but variation in political ends can be just as consequential. Cross-domain deterrence in the context of linkage politics, in which disparate political interests are tied together to create incentives for favorable outcomes, gives potential adversaries the opportunity to avoid confrontational meeting engagements by playing for time to clarify interests and choosing the means most suited to achieving new goals. A broader diplomatic conception of cross-domain deterrence can also highlight the potential of using financial, institutional, or other nonmilitary actions that render the threat or use of force less attractive. This chapter draws on newly available archival evidence to examine issue linkage politics in the context of changing strategic interests in the case of U.S. efforts to deter Soviet repression in Poland and East Germany at the end of the Cold War. In both cases, U.S. policymakers used diplomatic reassurance and threats of isolation to shape Soviet policy as the United States pressed its new-found political interests in Eastern Europe rather than its traditional preoccupation with military affairs.

“Is This the End of Perestroika?” International Reactions to the Soviet Use of Force in the Baltic Republics in January 1991

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 26-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Una Bergmane
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
State Archives ◽  
The Baltic ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The U.S ◽  
West European

This article examines the official U.S. reaction to the Soviet government's use of force in the Baltic republics in January 1991, not only showing the complexity of the U.S. position but also demonstrating how reactions in Washington became harsher in the space of a week, eroding the previous “Gorbachev first” attitude. The article identifies the main reasons for this shift, especially West European reactions, domestic pressures, and growing concerns that violence in the Baltics marked the end of perestroika. The analysis sheds light on a larger debate between Kristina Spohr and Celeste Wallander about Western attitudes toward the Baltic question at the Cold War endgame. The article is based on newly available archival materials in the United States and France as well as on documents from the archives of the Gorbachev Foundation in Moscow and in the Latvian State Archives.

Cross-Domain Deterrence in American Foreign Policy

2019 ◽  
pp. 27-49
Author(s):  
Michael Nacht ◽  
Patricia Schuster ◽  
Eva C. Uribe
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Korean War ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cross Domain ◽  
The Korean War ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter assesses the role of cross-domain deterrence in recent American foreign policy. Cross-domain deterrence is not a new phenomenon, even if our consciousness of it may be. Prominent cases from the Cold War, such as the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, can be interpreted through the lens of cross-domain deterrence and fruitfully compared with more contemporary cases, such as the Stuxnet attack on Iran. These cases illustrate the variation across domains by the adversary and U.S. responses. Considered together, the United States generally responded to these crises by initially limiting itself to the domain where a crisis started and only later expanding into other domains. The United States has typically been cautious when shifting domains and has tried to escalate in ways that would not produce adversarial retaliation.

Part 1 The Cold War Era (1945–89), 32 The Intervention of the United States and other Eastern Caribbean States in Grenada—1983

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hajjami Nabil
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
International Law ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Organisations ◽  
Caribbean Community ◽  
The Caribbean ◽  
Eastern Caribbean ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter examines the legality of the 1983 American-led intervention in Grenada. It recalls the positions of the main protagonists of the crisis, including international organisations such as the United Nations, the Caribbean Community and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. It then analyses the justifications of the American administration, which are mainly based on three different grounds: the protection of citizens abroad; the activation of regional mechanisms and the intervention by invitation. The conclusion assesses the precedential value of the Operation Urgent Fury. Regarding its wide condemnation, the chapter argues that reactions to the American-led intervention in Grenada can finally be deemed as a strong reaffirmation of the prohibition of the use of force in international law.

The Role of Eastern Europe in America's Containment Policy, 1945–1948

1979 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-92
Author(s):  
Robert Garson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Formative Period ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
The Status ◽  
Containment Policy ◽  
The Cold War

Perhaps the greatest irony in the formative period of the Cold War is that the United States had to resign itself to the Soviets' domination of the very area in which it had at first chosen to challenge them, namely Eastern Europe. Yet America's ultimate acceptance of a Soviet hegemony in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary did not mean, as some histories of the Cold War imply in their omissions, that the status of these countries no longer concerned Washington. In the three years following World War II, American policy makers recognized that while they could not secure democracy or the “ open door ” in Eastern Europe, they could still develop policies for the area that could prove challenging to the Soviet hegemony. Their assumptions and expectations will be the subject of this article. It will show that the Truman administration believed that on developments in Eastern Europe depended the ultimate stability of the Soviet State itself. If the United States could arrest the growth of communism in the Soviet satellites, it could test the insistency of Moscow's power.

scholarly journals Yalta Decisions: Was There an Alternative for the West?

2020 ◽  
pp. 71-83
Author(s):  
Vladimir PECHATNOV
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Central And Eastern Europe ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
The West ◽  
The Real ◽  
Common Enemy ◽  
The Cold War

The concluding results of the anti-Hitler coalition meeting in Yalta have long been criticized in the United States by the antagonists of Franklin Roosevelt’s policy. In recent decades, they have raised renewed criticism in Central and Eastern Europe and across the West. Though, the decisions of Yalta Conference were fully determined by the balance of power and the real military situation on the war theatre by spring 1945. Each of the Allies pursued their own interests, but they appeared able to achieve a mutually acceptable compromise of these interests for the sake of final victory over common enemy. The Yalta Conference manifested the last upsurge of the Allied cooperation and in no way it served a prologue to the Cold War as it is now being asserted.

scholarly journals The Condition of National Minorities in Eastern Europe in a Secret Cia Report From 1965

Eminak ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 210-228
Author(s):  
Arthur Tuluș
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Ethnic Minorities ◽  
The United States ◽  
Security Policies ◽  
Detailed Knowledge ◽  
National Minorities ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Intelligence Service

In the context of the Cold War, detailed knowledge of the opponent and espionage were fundamental elements in the security policies of the two antagonistic sides. The CIA, the United States’ foreign intelligence service, identified the condition of ethnic minorities as one of the possible vulnerabilities of the Eastern Camp, judging from the perspective of the restrictive policies that Communist states held regarding rights and freedoms. Our study is based on the analysis of a document prepared by the CIA in 1965, a memorandum that took data from the latest official censuses in Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, and recorded the effects of assimilation policies on national minorities within the Eastern Communist states. The document is all the more interesting as the issue of national minorities rights’ in the Communist world was taboo.

Trust, but Verify

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
East West

This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document