Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Alexander Cooley ◽  
Daniel Nexon
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Critical Factors ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Transnational Civil Society ◽  
Us Hegemony

Analysts have pronounced the end of American leadership since at least the 1970s. In the 1980s, some confidently proclaimed that the United States was in decline and Japan was on the rise. But in 1989, Moscow allowed its satellite regimes in Eastern Europe to collapse; in 1991 the Soviet Union fell apart under the pressure of nationalist movements. The resulting American “unipolar moment” was marked by three critical factors: the lack of any great powers both willing and able to challenge US hegemony; the existence of a “patronage monopoly” centered around the United States and its liberal democratic allies; and the development of a transnational civil society composed of liberal nongovernment organizations, international institutions, and activist networks. However, great powers and regional players now challenge US power; Washington has lost its patronage monopoly; and illiberal transnational movements are on the offensive against a retreating liberal international civil society.

Watching the Soviet Union Decline

2018 ◽  
pp. 99-118
Author(s):  
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Relative Position ◽  
State Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Great Power ◽  
Archival Research ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Union Decline

Chapters 2 and 3 helped confirm that rising states support declining great powers when decliners can help rising states against other great power threats. In contrast, Chapters 4 and 5 assess the logic of rising state predation by examining the United States’ response to the Soviet Union’s decline in the 1980s and early 1990s. Chapter 4 first provides an overview of the Soviet Union’s waning relative position and discusses U.S. efforts to monitor the trend. Next, it reviews existing research on the course of U.S. strategy and relates this work to alternative accounts of rising state policy. The bulk of the chapter then uses extensive archival research to evaluate the factors central to predation theory and predict U.S. strategy given the argument. These predictions are analyzed in Chapter 5.

The New United Nations and the Revision of the Charter

1954 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans J. Morgenthau
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Korean War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Korean War ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
Do So

The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has prevented the United Nations from becoming the international government of the great powers which the Charter intended it to be. That conflict has paralyzed the Security Council as an agency of international government. In the few instances when it has been able to act as an agency of international government, it has been able to do so either, as in the beginning of the Korean War, by the accidental and temporary absence of the Soviet Union or, as on the Indonesian issue, by a fortuitous and exceptional coincidence of interests.

The Political Geometry of the Gulf War

1992 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-209
Author(s):  
Theodore Caplow
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Gulf War ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
The Political ◽  
World War ◽  
The Soviet Union

In the course of World War II, the seven great powers of 1939 – Germany, the Soviet Union. Britain. France, Italy, Japan and the United States – were temporarily reduced to two. each commanding awesome strength, and each posing a realistic threat of world domination. The huge forces of the Soviet Union at the edge of western Europe were positioned to move all the way to the Atlantic, thus achieving the control of the Eurasian heartland that, according to geopolitical doctrine, would confer world domination. There were fifth columns prepared to assist them within most European and Asiatic nations.

Partnership or Predation? How Rising States Contend with Declining Great Powers

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-126
Author(s):  
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Economic Interdependence ◽  
Rising Powers ◽  
The Soviet Union

International relations scholarship overwhelmingly expects that relatively rising states will threaten and challenge declining great powers. In practice, however, rising states can also cooperate with and support declining powers. What explains the rising state's choice of policy? When do rising states support or prey on declining great powers, and why do such strategies vary across time and space? The answer depends on the rising state's broader strategic calculations. All things being equal, a rising state will generally support a declining power when the latter can be used to offset threats from other great powers that can harm the rising state's security. Conversely, when using a declining state to offset such challenges is not a plausible option, the rising state is likely to pursue a predation strategy. The level of assertiveness of support or predation, meanwhile, depends on the declining power's military posture: the stronger the declining state is militarily, the less assertive the rising state tends to be. A review of the strategies adopted by two relatively rising powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, toward a declining Great Britain after 1945, and of a rising United States vis-à-vis a declining Soviet Union in the late Cold War, illustrates how this argument outperforms explanations that focus instead on the importance of economic interdependence and ideology.

Intentions in Great Power Politics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Rosato
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Interwar Period ◽  
The United States ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Great Power Politics ◽  
The Cold War

Can great powers be confident that their peers have benign intentions? States that trust each other can live at peace; those that mistrust each other are doomed to compete for arms and allies and may even go to war. This book offers a theory—intentions pessimism—that says great powers can rarely if ever be confident that their peers have benign intentions, because it is extraordinarily difficult for them to obtain the kind of information that would allow them to reach such a conclusion. Any optimistic assertions to the contrary—and there are many—are wrong. Indeed, even in cases that supposedly involved mutual trust—Germany and Russia in the Bismarck era (1871-90); Britain and the United States during the great rapprochement (1895-1906); France and Germany, and Japan and the United States in the early interwar period (1919-30); and the Soviet Union and the United States at the end of the Cold War (1985-90)—the protagonists were acutely uncertain about each other’s intentions. As a result, they competed for security. The ramifications for the future of U.S.-China relations are profound. Uncertain about the other side’s intentions, but aware of its formidable capabilities, Washington and Beijing will go to great lengths to strengthen their military and diplomatic positions, triggering a competitive action-reaction spiral with the potential for war.

Selling a New Vision of America to the World: Changing Messages in Early U.S. Cold War Print Propaganda

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 3-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew L. Yarrow
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Russian Language ◽  
Soviet Bloc ◽  
Business Executives ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
New Vision

This article examines how U.S. Cold War print propaganda shifted from an emphasis in the late 1940s on America's liberal democratic idealism to an emphasis by the mid-1950s on the country's high and rising living standards and shiny new system of “people's capitalism.” The United States could claim to have beaten the Soviet Union at its own game, providing “classless abundance for all.” These messages echoed those disseminated domestically, in which political leaders, business executives, journalists, and educators increasingly defined America's greatest virtues and identity in economic terms, emphasizing growth and prosperity. This article assesses how the United States—via the U.S. Information Agency and its precursors from the late 1940s to 1960—presented itself to those in the Soviet bloc and globally. The article relies on content analysis of three magazines—Amerika, a Russian-language monthly published for Soviet audiences from 1945 to 1952; Free World, a magazine sent to East Asia that began publishing in English and various Asian languages in 1952; and America Illustrated, a Russian-language monthly published for three-and-a-half decades beginning in 1956—as well as of many pamphlets and other printed material intended for overseas audiences.

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