Exit from Within

Right-wing illiberal movements have enjoyed a run of political success. This manifests in Trump’s capture of the Republican Party and subsequent election; the number of illiberal, right-wing parties that hold or share power in Europe; and the largely right-wing coalition that successfully pushed for the UK to trigger withdrawal from the European Union—and thus sent one of the most stalwart, stable great-power supporters of liberal order and the American system into political chaos. This chapter explores how right-wing populism has emerged as a significant counter-order movement, and how the Kremlin has sought to position itself as a broker among wings of the transnational right. These movements also benefit from highly polarized societies, and piggyback on media environments that cultivate polarization. Because counter-order movements within the core are a major way that hegemonic systems collapse or international orders change, these developments matter to the fate of the American system.

How Hegemonic Orders Unravel

This chapter identifies three drivers of hegemonic unraveling and transformation in international orders: great-power contestation and alternative order building; how the dominant power’s loss of its “patronage monopoly” enhances the bargaining leverage of weaker states; and the rise of counter-order movements, especially transnational ones, that weaken support for existing international arrangements—sometimes within the leading power itself. Because analysts tend to focus their attention on the relationship between power transitions and great-power wars, they have only recently begun to appreciate the significance of these three processes. This chapter shows that these challenges—from above, below, and within—played a key role in past power transitions and transformations in international order, including the decline of Spanish hegemony, challenges to British hegemony before World War I, the rise of fascism and Bolshevism during the interwar period, decolonization, and the collapse of the Soviet system.

Introduction

Analysts have pronounced the end of American leadership since at least the 1970s. In the 1980s, some confidently proclaimed that the United States was in decline and Japan was on the rise. But in 1989, Moscow allowed its satellite regimes in Eastern Europe to collapse; in 1991 the Soviet Union fell apart under the pressure of nationalist movements. The resulting American “unipolar moment” was marked by three critical factors: the lack of any great powers both willing and able to challenge US hegemony; the existence of a “patronage monopoly” centered around the United States and its liberal democratic allies; and the development of a transnational civil society composed of liberal nongovernment organizations, international institutions, and activist networks. However, great powers and regional players now challenge US power; Washington has lost its patronage monopoly; and illiberal transnational movements are on the offensive against a retreating liberal international civil society.

Heading for the Exit

After two decades, American global hegemony is almost certainly reaching its expiration date. America will remain a great power, if the not greatest power. But, barring a major shock to emerging powers—and especially China—the world will fully transition to a new global order. This chapter sketches out some possible futures. These include a new bipolar system, perhaps with China and the United States locked in a new Cold War; a multipolar system that maintains the veneer of liberal global governance, but in the service of authoritarianism; and an international system characterized by globalized oligarchy and kleptocracy. There is still time to avoid the worst versions of these orders, and to push back against the full hijacking of liberal institutions in the service of worldwide corruption. But on these, and a number of other matters, American policymakers should assume the window of outsized American influence is fast closing.

Exit from Below

The rise of states interesting in altering international order, or with little interest in promoting domestic liberal institutions, broke the post–Cold War “patronage monopoly” enjoyed by the United States and its democratic allies. The emergence of new patrons—including not just Russia and China but also regional powers—allows recipients of international aid to push back against, and attempt to loosen, many of the kinds of conditions and principles demanded by democratic donors. In turn, the possibility of alternative patrons has assisted the rise of illiberal, populist leaders, including within the “core” of the American system. This chapter examines these dynamics regionally, including in Africa and Central America, and in specific countries such as Hungary, the Philippines, Venezuela, and Turkey.

The American Hegemonic System in Theoretical and Historical Perspective

Nearly every recent National Security Strategy of the United States takes for granted that the United States is a hegemonic power, that it constructed a liberal international order after World War II, and that it expanded that order from the 1990s onward. This chapter looks closely at these assumptions. What is international liberalism? What is hegemony? What is international order? How does world history look through the lens of theories of hegemony and hegemonic ordering? We argue that international orders have architectures—norms, rules, and principles—and infrastructures—the interactions, practices, and relationships that undergird them. Overall, international order resembles a dynamic ecosystem, one that structures the behavior of the states and other actors that constitute it. This helps explain not only why post–Cold War liberal enlargement faltered but also how it created conditions for its own unraveling.

Exit from Above

Russia and China are engaged in substantial efforts to contest existing international architecture while building alternative infrastructure. A desire for greater influence and status drives some of these efforts. At the same time, a number of autocratic regimes, including Russia and China, now consider international political liberalism—especially when supported by the United States—as a direct threat to their security. Moscow and Beijing first developed ways of insulating themselves against liberalizing pressure. They next turned to contesting and reversing that international political liberalism. This chapter traces specific ways that Moscow and Beijing have “exited from above,” such as via the New Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It shows how such efforts have already transformed the ecology of international order, creating a parallel “world without the West” and disrupting the jurisdictions and functions of existing, more liberal, international government organizations.

Exit Made in America

Donald Trump and Trumpism are less the cause of the current crisis in the American system than a symptom and accelerant of underlying trends. This chapter examines the continuities and differences between Trump foreign policy and that of his predecessors. It demonstrates that Trump is, in fact, unusual in the scope and scale of his dismissal of multilateralism, ability to raise doubts about American alliance commitments, and rejection of liberal internationalism. These policies magnify the longer-term tendency of the United States to adopt policies that undermine its geopolitical position, such as fiscally irresponsible tax cuts, underinvestment in domestic infrastructure and human capital, democratic backsliding, and overreliance on military instruments. In short, even if Trump had never been elected the United States would still face the erosion of its leadership from inevitable shifts in relative power, and still be failing to pursue domestic policies that might mitigate those shifts.