The Strategy of Exclusion and the Problem of Collectives

2019 ◽  
pp. 97-129
Author(s):  
John Basl
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Philosophy Of Biology ◽  
Levels Of Selection ◽  
Units Of Selection

Chapter 4 begins to develop the case against biocentrism. Biocentrism faces a problem of exclusion; it is not possible to adopt the account of welfare defended in chapter 3 in a way that grounds the welfare of nonsentient organisms while excluding biological collectives or artifacts. Chapter 4 develops this problem of exclusion with respect to biological collectives. This requires consideration of an issue within the philosophy of biology: the problem of the levels or units of selection. The chapter argues that the biocentrist is committed to a view about the levels of selection that grounds the view that only individual organisms are teleologically organized. But among the views available concerning which things are ultimately subject to natural selection, none of them will serve as a foundation for biocentrism. The chapter argues that the correct view about the units of selection is one on which biological collectives are sometimes teleologically organized.

Philosophy of Biology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Pradeu
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Molecular Biology ◽  
Genetic Programming ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Life Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Biology ◽  
Selection Problem ◽  
Units Of Selection ◽  
Organismal Development ◽  
Biological Entities

The aim of this chapter is to address the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological questions bearing on the foundations of today’s life sciences. It discusses the main themes of the philosophy of evolutionary biology, asking what is meant by the idea of adaptation and reviewing the various answers to the units of selection problem. The latter considers on which biological entities—genes, genomes, cells, organisms, groups, species, and so forth—natural selection operates and is a nice illustration of how philosophy of biology situates itself at the frontier between philosophy and the most theoretical parts of biology. The chapter also presents recent debates over the notions of genetic programming and organismal development and the reduction of macromolecular biology to molecular biology.

The Causal Structure of Natural Selection

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles H. Pence
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Genetic Drift ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Causal Structure ◽  
Philosophy Of Biology ◽  
Philosophy Of Physics ◽  
Potential Value ◽  
Multi Level ◽  
Evolutionary Explanations

Recent arguments concerning the nature of causation in evolutionary theory, now often known as the debate between the 'causalist' and 'statisticalist' positions, have involved answers to a variety of independent questions – definitions of key evolutionary concepts like natural selection, fitness, and genetic drift; causation in multi-level systems; or the nature of evolutionary explanations, among others. This Element offers a way to disentangle one set of these questions surrounding the causal structure of natural selection. Doing so allows us to clearly reconstruct the approach that some of these major competing interpretations of evolutionary theory have to this causal structure, highlighting particular features of philosophical interest within each. Further, those features concern problems not exclusive to the philosophy of biology. Connections between them and, in two case studies, contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of physics demonstrate the potential value of broader collaboration in the understanding of evolution.

Adaptation and Natural Selection

2021 ◽  
pp. 125-154
Author(s):  
Áki J. Láruson ◽  
Floyd A. Reed
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Allele Frequency ◽  
Levels Of Selection ◽  
Frequency Data ◽  
Selection Coefficient ◽  
Frequency Distributions ◽  
Single Allele ◽  
Selection Strength ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Over Time

Here non-random shifts in allele frequencies over time are introduced, as well as how to incorporate varying levels of selection into a model of a single population through time. This chapter highlights the difference between weak and strong selection, the dynamics of single allele versus genotype-level selection, and how selection strength and population size affect allele frequency distributions over time. Finally the inference of the selection coefficient from allele frequency data is discussed, alongside the concepts of overdominance and underdominance.

Units and levels of selection

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samir Okasha
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Kin Selection ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Levels Of Selection ◽  
Evolutionary Transitions ◽  
Individual Organism ◽  
Selection Processes ◽  
Hierarchical Levels ◽  
The Individual

In a standard Darwinian explanation, natural selection takes place at the level of the individual organism, i.e. some organisms enjoy a survival or reproduction advantage over others, which results in evolutionary change. In principle however, natural selection could operate at other hierarchical levels too, above and below that of the organism, for example the level of genes, cells, groups, colonies or even whole species. This possibility gives rise to the ‘levels of selection’ question in evolutionary biology. Group and colony-level selection have been proposed, originally by Darwin, as a means by which altruism can evolve. (In biology, ‘altruism’ refers to behaviour which entails a fitness cost to the individual so behaving, but benefits others.) Though this idea is still alive today, many theorists regard kin selection as a superior explanation for the existence of altruism. Kin selection arises from the fact that relatives share genes, so if an organism behaves altruistically towards its relatives, there is a greater than random chance that the beneficiary of the altruistic action will itself be an altruist. Kin selection is closely bound up with the ‘gene’s eye view’ of evolution, which holds that genes, not organisms, are the true beneficiaries of the evolutionary process. The gene’s eye approach to evolution, though heuristically valuable, does not in itself resolve the levels of selection question, because selection processes that occur at many hierarchical levels can all be seen from a gene’s eye viewpoint. In recent years, the levels of selection discussion has been re-invigorated, and subtly transformed, by the important new work on the ‘major evolutionary transitions’. These transitions occur when a number of free-living biological units, originally capable of surviving and reproducing alone, become integrated into a larger whole, giving rise to a new biological unit at a higher level of organization. Evolutionary transitions are intimately bound up with the levels of selection issue, because during a transition the potential exists for selection to operate simultaneously at two different hierarchical levels.

Natural Selection Explanation and Origin Essentialism

2001 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Pust
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Philosophy Of Biology ◽  
Individual Organism ◽  
Positive View ◽  
Negative View ◽  
Recent Philosophy ◽  
The Subject

Does natural selection explain why individual organisms have the traits that they do? This question has been the subject of vigorous debate in recent philosophy of biology. Sober and Walsh have defended the thesis that natural selection does not explain why any individual organism has the traits that it does. This thesis, I shall call ‘the Negative View.’ Neander and Matthen have defended the contrary thesis, which I shall call ‘the Positive View,’ according to which natural selection at least sometimes does explain why an individual organism has the traits that it does. In this paper, I will argue that recent arguments for the Positive View fail for a reason hitherto unnoticed and I will demonstrate that other recent defenses of the Negative View depend upon my own for their plausibility.I begin, in Section II, by showing that the issue is whether or not natural selection explains, of an individual, why it has the traits it does.

scholarly journals Experimental evolution of nascent multicellularity: Recognizing a Darwinian transition in individuality

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline J. Rose ◽  
Katrin Hammerschmidt ◽  
Paul B. Rainey
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evolution ◽  
Cell Types ◽  
Life Cycles ◽  
Levels Of Selection ◽  
Group Level ◽  
Evolutionary Transition ◽  
Evolutionary Transitions ◽  
Units Of Selection ◽  
Biological Hierarchy ◽  
Bacterial Groups

AbstractMajor evolutionary transitions in individuality, at any level of the biological hierarchy, occur when groups participate in Darwinian processes as units of selection in their own right. Identifying transitions in individuality can be problematic because apparent selection at one level of the biological hierarchy may be a by-product of selection occurring at another level. Here we discuss approaches to this “levels-of-selection” problem and apply them to a previously published experimental exploration of the evolutionary transition to multicellularity. In these experiments groups of the bacterium Pseudomonas fluorescens were required to reproduce via life cycles involving soma- and germline-like phases. The rate of transition between the two cell types was a focus of selection, and might be regarded as a property of groups, cells, or even genes. By examining the experimental data under several established philosophical frameworks, we argue that in the Pseudomonas experiments, bacterial groups acquired Darwinian properties sufficient to allow the evolution of traits adaptive at the group level.

The Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anya Plutynski
Keyword(s):  
Developmental Biology ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Evolutionary Genetics ◽  
Philosophy Of Biology ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Levels Of Selection ◽  
Values In Science ◽  
Selection Mechanisms ◽  
Conceptual Foundations

Philosophy of evolutionary biology is a major subfield of philosophy of biology concerned with the methods, conceptual foundations, and implications of evolutionary biology. It also concerns relationships between evolutionary biology and neighboring fields, such as biochemistry, genetics, cell and molecular biology, developmental biology, and ecology. Initially, many of the questions of central concern to philosophy of biology grew out of general philosophy of science. For instance, one long-standing debate in philosophy of science concerns the matter of what is distinctive of scientific inquiry. Various criteria have been proposed, and much of the early work in philosophy of biology concerned whether evolutionary biology meets these criteria. Another long-standing debate in philosophy of science concerns whether there is any legitimate role for values in science. The study of the evolution of human behavior and cognition has been scrutinized as an instance of both potentially pernicious and positive influence of values in science. More recently, philosophers of biology both collaborate with and draw upon evolutionary biology to either address broader philosophical concerns, such as the nature of consciousness, or engage directly with debates internal to evolutionary biology. For example, philosophers have engaged in conceptual and methodological debates within evolutionary biology over the appropriate conditions for testing hypotheses about adaptation, the units, targets, or levels of selection, mechanisms and measures of inheritance, modes of phylogenetic inference, and classification and systematics. In this category, the line between science and philosophy blurs; participants in many of these debates include both philosophers and biologists. This entry will focus on philosophers’ contributions. To be sure, evolutionary biologists have contributed far more. Please see the Oxford Bibliographies on these topics for scientific contributions to all of these topics. I also urge readers to review the excellent Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries on topics including but not limited to “Evolution,” “Natural Selection,” “Teleological Notions in Biology,” “Units and Levels of Selection,” “Adaptationism,” “Evolutionary Genetics,” “Evolutionary Psychology,” and “Developmental Biology.”

scholarly journals El mecanismo evolutivo de Margulis y los niveles de selección

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Suárez Rodríguez
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Philosophy Of Biology ◽  
Units Of Selection ◽  
Research Tradition ◽  
Core Concepts ◽  
Biological Concepts ◽  
New Research

RESUMENLa teoría evolutiva de Margulis implica una auténtica revisión de algunos de los conceptos fundamentales de la biología tradicional. Uno de tales cambios tiene que ver con el controvertido debate acerca de las unidades de selección. Este trabajo considera la propuesta de Margulis como una nueva tradición de investigación (TI) y trata de evaluar sus consecuencias para la citada disputa. Se sugieren tres ideas: una, que su teoría supone la revisión de conceptos tradicionales de la biología; dos, que su estudio supone una reevaluación de debates tradicionales de la filosofía de la biología; tres, que estudiarlo desde los presupuestos de Lakatos y Laudan sobre las TI nos permite iluminar la utilidad de su teoría. AbstractMargulis’ evolutionary theory entails a revision of certain core concepts of traditional biology. One of these changes is related to the hot debate about units of selection. This paper considers Margulis’ proposal as a new research tradition (RT) and evaluates its consequences to the mentioned issue. Certain evidence strongly suggests: first, that her theory supposes the revision of many classical biological concepts; second, that her position yields a reappraisal of many traditional issues in philosophy of biology; third, that its study from Lakatos and Laudan’s ideas about RT allows us to light the richness of her theory.

scholarly journals Bucket thinking:the future framework for evolutionary explanation

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Telmo Pievani ◽  
Emanuele Serrelli
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Homo Sapiens ◽  
Philosophy Of Biology ◽  
Hierarchy Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Explanation

ABSTRACTThe hierarchical interplay between ecology and genealogy is a fundamental ingredient for the most compelling current explanations in evolutionary biology. Yet philosophy of biology has hardly welcomed a classic fundamental intuition by palaeontologist Niles Eldredge, i.e. the non-coincidence and interrelation between ecology and genealogy, and their interaction in a Sloshing Bucket fashion. Hierarchy Theory and the Sloshing Bucket need to be made precise, developed and updated in light of an explosion of new discoveries and fields and philosophical issues. They also suggests re-thinking concepts such as natural selection, species, and speciation that have always been part of evolutionary theory.KEYWORDSEVOLUTION, ECOLOGY, HIERARCHY THEORY, SLOSHING BUCKET, HOMO SAPIENSRESUMENLa interacción jerárquica entre ecología y genealogía es un ingrediente fundamental de las más convincentes explicaciones de la biología evolucionista en la actualidad. Sin embargo, la filosofía de la biología apenas ha acogido una intuición fundamental y clásica debida al paleontólogo Niles Eldredge, a saber: la no-coincidencia e interrelación entre la ecología y la genealogía, y su interacción a modo de cubeta rebosante. La Teoría de la Jerarquía y la de la Cubeta Rebosante necesitan mayor precisión, así como un ulterior desarrollo y acutalización a la luz de la explosión de nuevos descubrimientos y campos y de cuestiones filosóficas. Siguieren asimismo la necesidad de repensar conceptos tales como selección natural, especie y especiación, que han formado siempre parte de la teoría evolucionista.PALABRAS CLAVEEVOLUCIÓN, ECOLOGÍA, TEORÍA DE LA JERARQUÍA, CUBETA REBOSANTE, HOMO SAPIENS

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