The general-relativistic case for super-substantivalism

Super-substantivalism (of the type we’ll consider) roughly comprises two core tenets: (1) the physical properties which we attribute to matter (e.g. charge or mass) can be attributed to spacetime directly, with no need for matter as an extraneous carrier “on top of” spacetime; (2) spacetime is more fundamental than (ontologically prior to) matter. In the present paper, we revisit a recent argument in favour of super-substantivalism, based on General Relativity. A critique is offered that highlights the difference between (various accounts of) fundamentality and (various forms of) ontological dependence. This affords a metaphysically more perspicuous view of what super-substantivalism’s tenets actually assert, and how it may be defended. We tentatively propose a re-formulation of the original argument that not only seems to apply to all classical physics, but also chimes with a standard interpretation of spacetime theories in the philosophy of physics.

The Causal Structure of Natural Selection

Recent arguments concerning the nature of causation in evolutionary theory, now often known as the debate between the 'causalist' and 'statisticalist' positions, have involved answers to a variety of independent questions – definitions of key evolutionary concepts like natural selection, fitness, and genetic drift; causation in multi-level systems; or the nature of evolutionary explanations, among others. This Element offers a way to disentangle one set of these questions surrounding the causal structure of natural selection. Doing so allows us to clearly reconstruct the approach that some of these major competing interpretations of evolutionary theory have to this causal structure, highlighting particular features of philosophical interest within each. Further, those features concern problems not exclusive to the philosophy of biology. Connections between them and, in two case studies, contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of physics demonstrate the potential value of broader collaboration in the understanding of evolution.

Holism as the empirical significance of symmetries

Not all symmetries are on a par. For instance, within Newtonian mechanics, we seem to have a good grasp on the empirical significance of boosts, by applying it to subsystems. This is exemplified by the thought experiment known as Galileo’s ship: the inertial state of motion of a ship is immaterial to how events unfold in the cabin, but is registered in the values of relational quantities such as the distance and velocity of the ship relative to the shore. But the significance of gauge symmetries seems less clear. For example, can gauge transformations in Yang-Mills theory—taken as mere descriptive redundancy—exhibit a similar relational empirical significance as the boosts of Galileo’s ship? This question has been debated in the last fifteen years in philosophy of physics. I will argue that the answer is ‘yes’, but only for a finite subset of gauge transformations, and under special conditions. Under those conditions, we can mathematically identify empirical significance with a failure of supervenience: the state of the Universe is not uniquely determined by the intrinsic state of its isolated subsystems. Empirical significance is therefore encoded in those relations between subsystems that stand apart from their intrinsic states.

MODIFIED STRUCTURE-NOMINATIVE RECONSTRUCTION OF PRACTICAL PHYSICAL THEORIES AS A FRAME FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS

Physical theories are complex and necessary tools for gaining new knowledge about their areas of application. A distinction is made between abstract and practical theories. The last are constantly being improved in the cognitive activity of professional physicists and studied by future physicists. A variant of the philosophy of physics based on a modified structural-nominative reconstruction of practical theories is proposed. Readers should decide whether this option is useful for their understanding of the philosophy of physics, as well as other philosophies of particular sciences.The article is written within the theme “Communicative transformations in modern science” of “Program-targeted and competitive topics of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine”.

Philosophy of Physics: towards new Principles of Scientific Knowledge

The author analyzes a number of key problems of modern physics and cosmology, offers original interpretations and solutions, and also discusses the prospects for the development of science in the context of attempts to create a "theory of everything". The monograph pays special attention to the physical theories of the multiverse, the new principles of scientific knowledge resulting from these theories, and the connection between consciousness and concrete physical reality. It is intended both for those who are just discovering the world of philosophy of science in the most fundamental field — physics, and for specialists who are professionally engaged in the topic and are interested in the most relevant research.

A Preliminary Case for Wave Function Realism

This chapter explains the use of wave functions in quantum mechanics in order to develop a preliminary argument for wave function realism, one that is commonly found in the physics and philosophy of physics literature. It distinguishes ontological questions about the status of the wave function from the more discussed measurement problem for quantum mechanics, and explains how wave function realism is an approach to ontology that is compatible with several rival solutions to the measurement problem. The chapter then presents an initial, but not ultimately decisive, argument for wave function realism based on the ubiquity of wave function representations in quantum physics.

Edgar Wind on Experiment and Metaphysics

The paper presents a detailed interpretation of Edgar Wind’s Experiment and Metaphysics (1934), a unique work on the philosophy of physics which broke with the Neo-Kantian tradition under the influence of American pragmatism. Taking up Cassirer’s interpretation of physics, Wind develops a holistic theory of the experiment and a constructivist account of empirical facts. Based on the concept of embodiment which plays a key role in Wind’s later writings on art history, he argues, however, that the outcomes of measurements are contingent. He then proposes an anti-Kantian conception of a metaphysics of nature. For him, nature is an unknown totality which manifests itself in discrepancies between theories and experiment, and hence the theory formation of physics can increasingly approximate the structure of nature. It is shown that this view is ambiguous between a transcendental, metaphysical realism in Kant’s sense and an internal realism in Putnam’s sense. Wind’s central claim is that twentieth century physics offers new options for resolving Kant’s cosmological antinomies. In particular, he connected quantum indeterminism with the possibility of human freedom, a connection that Cassirer sharply opposed.

Philosophy of Physics: A Very Short Introduction

Philosophy of Physics: A Very Short Introduction explores the core topics of philosophy of physics through three key themes: the nature of space and time; the origin of irreversibility and probability in the physics of large systems; how we can make sense of quantum mechanics. Central issues discussed include: the scientific method as it applies in modern physics; the distinction between absolute and relative motion; the way that distinction changes between Newton’s physics and special relativity; what spacetime is and how it relates to the laws of physics; how fundamental physics can make no distinction between past and future and yet a clear distinction exists in the world we see around us; why it is so difficult to understand quantum mechanics, and why doing so might push us to change our fundamental physics, to rethink the nature of science, or even to accept the existence of parallel universes.

Introduction

This introductory chapter provides an overview of philosophy of physics, which is an interdisciplinary field sitting between physics proper, mainstream philosophy, and the general philosophy of science, and communicating ideas and insights between them. Philosophy of physics is mostly concerned not with physics as a whole but with particular areas within it. Given a field in physics, one can consider the conceptual—that is, philosophical—questions that arise in that field, and the problems in each sub-field are distinctive. The chapter briefly discusses many of these, including some in cutting-edge areas of physics like quantum cosmology, black holes, and string theory. But it notes that the bulk of work in philosophy of physics is concerned with three areas where the physics is reasonably well established: the philosophy of spacetime; the philosophy of statistical mechanics; and the philosophy of quantum mechanics.