Zavedovat’ or zavedyvat’?

The purpose of the article is to provide a historical explanation of how the spelling rule of the verb zaveduyu – zavedovat’ arose. The main research method is analytical, involving the analysis of the morphemic and word-forming structure of the verb, as well as the method of observing the historically variable practice of using the verbs zavedovat’ and zavedyvat’, as well as verbs with other prefixes that are of the same root with them. The study found that the normative spelling of zaveduyu – zavedovat’ is not etymological, which arose due to the peculiarities of Russian stressed vocalism and the analogical influence of nominative, not verbal verbs. The results obtained will contribute to the conscious attitude of teachers and students to the spelling norms of the Russian language.

The Gramscian Moment of the Spanish Crisis

One of the surprising outcomes of the 2008 economic crisis in Spain has been the emergence of Antonio Gramsci as a fashionable figure. This “all-purpose Gramsci” forces us to regain some historical perspective on the Spanish reception of his ideas. In the 1970s, different clans within the camp opposing Franco's regime came up with their own self-serving—liberal, Leninist, autonomist, Eurocommunist—versions of Gramsci. The theoretical discussion about these uses and abuses of Gramsci gravitated around the Italian communist's idealist epistemology and the role of “ideology” and “culture” within it. Since 2008, we find two different approaches to this same Gramscian issue: one that peddles a political theory of discursive rearrangement of a semi-emptied and adjustable social landscape; and a second one that embraces a movementist, horizontal, and anti-state organizational work on the ground. The political efficiency of these two approaches is significantly impaired by the lack of a sober historical explanation of why the rapprochement with Gramsci only during times of economic turmoil and political rupture is highly paradoxical.

Introduction

This chapter introduces the concerns and the argument of this volume. It situates the volume in relation to the previous three volumes. The chapter suggests this volume will explore the content and coherence of God as an agent. Theology raises deep questions about the central concepts we use in our thinking about God. Occasionally we need to step back and analyze the concepts that are so central to theological discourse. This volume will do this by attending to the concept of God as an agent as it appears in different traditional problems in systematic theology, like the relationship of freedom and grace as well as divine revelation and historical explanation. It argues that seeking the concept of God as an agent and looking at issues of divine agency and divine action should form the basis of a research agenda to extend beyond the author’s own work.

Externalism about Moral Responsibility: Modification of A. Mele’s Thought Experiment

The author modifies A. Mele’s thought experiment for externalism about moral res­ponsibility, which suggests that the agent’s history partially determines whether the agent is morally responsible for particular actions, or the consequences of actions. The original thought experiment constructs a situation in which the individual is not morally responsible for the killing because of manipulation, that is, for a reason external to the agent. A. Mele’s theory was criticized by A.V. Mertsalov, D.B. Volkov, and V.V. Vasiliev at the seminar orga­nized by the Moscow Center for Consciousness. The arguments against A. Mele's theory had the following structure: A.A. Mele does not show that the historical explanation is the best explanation, because there are competing explanations, no less convincing, which are in­compatible with A. Mele’s externalism. The author explicates and analyzes the expla­nations offered by philosophers from the Moscow Center for Consciousness: the explanation from identity, the explanation from self-identification, the explanation from the condition of knowledge, the explanation from future states. Although these explanations apply to Mele’s original thought experiment, they cannot explain the absence of moral responsibility in the modified thought experiment proposed by the author: the explanations from identity and self-identification are excluded by the gradual change in the agent structure of personality; the explanation of knowledge conditions is refuted by including knowledge of manipulation in the conditions of the thought experiment; the explanation of future states is excluded by removing relevant future states from the thought experiment.