The Epistemic Commitments of Nondiscrimination

2021 ◽  
pp. 156-181
Author(s):  
Deborah Hellman
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Do So

A commitment to nondiscrimination at times appears to require both that one not act in particular ways and that one not believe certain things. This is potentially troubling if one ought to believe what one has warrant to believe, and to the extent that one can take actions that affect what one comes to believe, one ought to do so with the aim of acquiring true beliefs. This article argues that current social controversies—like the debate over the memo by the Google employee which claimed that women are less suited for careers in technology fields—demonstrate that some defenders of norms of nondiscrimination understand these norms as including epistemic commitments. The article articulates what these epistemic commitments are, explores whether they can themselves be epistemically justified and, if not, situates the popular controversy in a philosophical debate about whether moral considerations properly encroach on epistemic norms.

Predictably Misleading Evidence

2019 ◽  
pp. 105-123
Author(s):  
Sophie Horowitz
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Rational Agent ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Misleading Evidence ◽  
Do So ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

Evidence can be misleading: it can rationalize raising one’s confidence in false propositions, and lowering one’s confidence in the truth. But can a rational agent know that her total evidence supports a (particular) falsehood? It seems not: if we could see ahead of time that our evidence supported a false belief, then we could avoid believing what our evidence supported, and hence avoid being misled. So, it seems, evidence cannot be predictably misleading. This chapter develops a new problem for higher-order evidence: it is predictably misleading. It then examines a radical strategy for explaining higher-order evidence, according to which there are two distinct epistemic norms at work in the relevant cases. Finally, the chapter suggests that mainstream accounts of higher-order evidence may be able to answer the challenge after all. But to do so, they must deny that epistemic rationality requires believing what is likely given one’s evidence.

scholarly journals Drones and the Threshold for Waging War

Politik ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezio Di Nucci
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Drone Warfare ◽  
The One ◽  
Do So

If drones make waging war easier, the reason why they do so may not be the one commonly assumed within the philosophical debate – namely, the promised reduction in casualties on either side – but a more complicated one. One that has little to do with the concern for one’s own soldiers or, for that matter, the enemy, but rather one that is embedded in the political intricacies of international relations and domestic politics. This article will utilize the example of the Obama Administration’s drone policies to illustrate this argument. This analysis is also meant to have a wider methodological significance; that philosophy can make an important contribution in analyzing drone warfare. However, philosophy will not help to simplify realities and provide easy solutions. 

Good Questions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Pérez Carballo
Keyword(s):  
North Dakota ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Degrees Of Belief ◽  
Epistemic Utility ◽  
Epistemic States ◽  
Intuitive Idea ◽  
Do So

Pérez Carballo adopts an epistemic utility theory picture of epistemic norms where epistemic utility functions measure the value of degrees of belief, and rationality consists in maximizing expected epistemic utility. Within this framework he seeks to show that we can make sense of the intuitive idea that some true beliefs—say true beliefs about botany—are more valuable than other true beliefs—say true beliefs about the precise number of plants in North Dakota. To do so, however, Pérez Carballo argues that we must think of the value of epistemic states as consisting in more than simply accuracy. This sheds light on which questions it is most epistemically valuable to pursue.

Social Justice and Market Metaphyics

2008 ◽  
pp. 3345-3356
Author(s):  
Bernd Carsten Stahl
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Space ◽  
Unequal Distribution ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Digital Divides ◽  
Access To Technology ◽  
Do So

A book on the topic of information technology and social justice would seem to be based on several implicit assumptions. One of these is that there are unequal distributions of technology and access to technology, which can be called ‘digital divides’. Another one is that these digital divides are a problem for justice. A final one is that a philosophical debate of these issues can be beneficial. This chapter aims to question the validity of these assumptions. It asks what philosophy contributes to the debate about digital divides. In order to do so, it briefly reviews the debates concerning justice and digital divides. It then discusses the question whether markets or states are better suited to overcome the unequal distribution of technology. The purpose of these brief restatements of some of the opinions found in the literature is to show that philosophy alone cannot inform us of what we should do. The chapter concludes by suggesting that, in order to address problems of digital divides, we need to go beyond philosophical debate and enter the political space.

scholarly journals Alfred North Whitehead – Against dualism

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 17-36
Author(s):  
Roger Smith ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Revolution ◽  
English Language ◽  
Process Philosophy ◽  
Alfred North Whitehead ◽  
Modern World ◽  
Theory Of Relativity ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Radical Critique ◽  
Precise Expression ◽  
Do So

English-language philosophical debate about the relation of mind (or soul) and body, and in parallel, cultural debate about the relation of the humanities and the natural sciences in education, drew in the twentieth century, and draws again now, on the writings of Al­fred North Whitehead (1861‒1947). The paper explains this. To do so, it describes White­head’s project in systematic metaphysics (or speculative cosmology), best known from Science and the Modern World (1926). Whitehead required metaphysics to be self-consis­tent, to be informed by and in turn to inform modern scientific knowledge (evolutionary theory, the theory of relativity), and to conform to the intuitions of everyday percep­tion. Trained in mathematics, his style of precise expression requires special comment; the conclusion was a “philosophy of organism” or “process philosophy”. He was a philo­sophical realist. His understanding of what this entailed led to a radical critique of “scien­tific materialism”, with all its philosophical failings, which, in his judgment, had been dominant in Western culture since the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. In four brief sections, the paper provides a background, describes the project in meta­physics, picks out the themes of causal efficacy in perception and of function for special discussion, and concludes with a summary of the importance of Whitehead to public de­bate about the direction of educated culture.

Promising

2019 ◽  
pp. 27-47
Author(s):  
Katherine Hawley
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Strong Norm

This chapter argues that promise-making is governed by a norm of competence, alongside a norm of sincerity. Thus a promise can be criticizable even if it expresses a sincere commitment to act in some admirable way: even if it is neither a false promise nor a wicked promise. The chapter shows how a competence norm is distinct from the norm of keeping one’s promises. Competence norms come in various strengths, from a very weak ‘keepability’ norm of avoiding unkeepable promises to a very strong norm of not making promises unless one knows one will be able to keep the promise. These correspond to the variety of possible epistemic norms on assertion which are more familiar from philosophical debate. Finally, the chapter briefly reviews the relationship between different accounts of why we should keep our promises, and different accounts of what competence norm applies to promise-making.

Social Justice and Market Metaphyics

2011 ◽  
pp. 148-170
Author(s):  
Bernd Carsten Stahl
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Space ◽  
Unequal Distribution ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Digital Divides ◽  
Access To Technology ◽  
Do So

A book on the topic of information technology and social justice would seem to be based on several implicit assumptions. One of these is that there are unequal distributions of technology and access to technology, which can be called ‘digital divides’. Another one is that these digital divides are a problem for justice. A final one is that a philosophical debate of these issues can be beneficial. This chapter aims to question the validity of these assumptions. It asks what philosophy contributes to the debate about digital divides. In order to do so, it briefly reviews the debates concerning justice and digital divides. It then discusses the question whether markets or states are better suited to overcome the unequal distribution of technology. The purpose of these brief restatements of some of the opinions found in the literature is to show that philosophy alone cannot inform us of what we should do. The chapter concludes by suggesting that, in order to address problems of digital divides, we need to go beyond philosophical debate and enter the political space.

On Folk Epistemology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Intuitive Judgments ◽  
Folk Epistemology ◽  
Central Claim ◽  
Do So

On Folk Epistemology is a book about how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk. Since such knowledge ascriptions are central to how we navigate social life, it is important to understand our basis for making them. A central claim of the book is that factors that have nothing to do with knowledge may lead to systematic mistakes in everyday ascriptions of knowledge. These mistakes are explained by an empirically informed account of how ordinary knowledge ascriptions are the product of cognitive heuristics that are associated with biases. In developing this account, the book presents work in cognitive psychology and pragmatics. But it also contributes to epistemology proper. For example, it develops positive epistemic norms of action and assertion. Moreover, it critically assesses contextualism, knowledge-first methodology, pragmatic encroachment theories, and more. Many of these approaches are argued to overestimate the epistemological significance of folk epistemology. In contrast, the book develops an equilibristic methodology according to which intuitive judgments about knowledge cannot straightforwardly play a role as data for epistemological theorizing. Rather, epistemological theorizing is required to interpret empirical findings. Consequently, On Folk Epistemology helps to lay the foundation for an emerging subfield that intersects philosophy and the cognitive sciences: the empirical study of folk epistemology.

Holding replication studies to mainstream standards of evidence

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duane T. Wegener ◽  
Leandre R. Fabrigar
Keyword(s):  
Replication Studies ◽  
Replication Research ◽  
Standards Of Evidence ◽  
Do So

AbstractReplications can make theoretical contributions, but are unlikely to do so if their findings are open to multiple interpretations (especially violations of psychometric invariance). Thus, just as studies demonstrating novel effects are often expected to empirically evaluate competing explanations, replications should be held to similar standards. Unfortunately, this is rarely done, thereby undermining the value of replication research.

Electron Microscopy of a Herpesvirus Isolated from Marek's Disease in Duck and Chicken Embryo Fibroblast Cultures

1968 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 222-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyvan Nazerian
Keyword(s):  
Inclusion Bodies ◽  
Chicken Embryo Fibroblast ◽  
Marek's Disease ◽  
Marek’S Disease ◽  
Duck Embryo Fibroblast ◽  
Multinucleated Cells ◽  
Viral Particles ◽  
Infected Cells ◽  
And Control ◽  
Do So

A herpes-like virus has been isolated from duck embryo fibroblast (DEF) cultures inoculated with blood from Marek's disease (MD) infected birds. Cultures which contained this virus produced MD in susceptible chickens while virus negative cultures and control cultures failed to do so. This and other circumstantial evidence including similarities in properties of the virus and the MD agent implicate this virus in the etiology of MD.Histochemical studies demonstrated the presence of DNA-staining intranuclear inclusion bodies in polykarocytes in infected cultures. Distinct nucleo-plasmic aggregates were also seen in sections of similar multinucleated cells examined with the electron microscope. These aggregates are probably the same as the inclusion bodies seen with the light microscope. Naked viral particles were observed in the nucleus of infected cells within or on the edges of the nucleoplasmic aggregates. These particles measured 95-100mμ, in diameter and rarely escaped into the cytoplasm or nuclear vesicles by budding through the nuclear membrane (Fig. 1). The enveloped particles (Fig. 2) formed in this manner measured 150-170mμ in diameter and always had a densely stained nucleoid. The virus in supernatant fluids consisted of naked capsids with 162 hollow, cylindrical capsomeres (Fig. 3). Enveloped particles were not seen in such preparations.

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