Jus ad vim

Author(s):  
Daniel R. Brunstetter

Jus ad vim is the set of moral principles governing the decision to use limited force. This chapter interrogates the moral permissions and restraints of these principles by recalibrating the traditional jus ad bellum criteria (just cause, last resort, proportionality, probability of success, right intention, and legitimate authority) and delineating the novel probability of escalation principle. The chapter begins with an illustration of just cause for vim, which is more permissive than for bellum, meaning there are more moral reasons to use limited force than to go to war. The concern that this view of just cause would lower the threshold for violence too far is called the permissiveness critique. The remainder of the chapter charts a course of restraint ad vim. Recalibrating last resort yields the moral independence thesis, the view that acts of limited force should not be conceived as part of the actions leading to war but rather should be thought of as an alternative set of options, while the Rubicon assessment is the deliberation process to discern what level of force is justified. The restrictive core of jus ad vim lies in satisfying a new criterion—the probability of escalation principle, which blends elements of the jus ad bellum proportionality and probability of success criteria to conceive the risks of using limited force. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how right intention and legitimate authority can be reinterpreted in a limited force context to curtail acting too easily on just cause.

Author(s):  
Cian O'Driscoll

In what circumstances, if any, would the recourse to war be justified? What restraints should be binding on any such use of force? The pre-eminent framework for addressing these questions is the just war tradition. Boasting a history that can be traced back to ancient Rome, this corpus has been distilled over time into a set of principles that bear on two poles, the jus ad bellum, the norms that govern the resort to war, and the jus in bello, the constraints binding on its prosecution. Scholars dispute the composition of these poles, but all concur that the former turns on “just cause,” “proper authority,” and “right intention,” while the latter includes “proportionality” and “discrimination.” This chapter discusses the prizes and pitfalls that attend the study of the ethics of war in light of the historical just war tradition.


Author(s):  
Daniel Schwartz

This chapter addresses some of the major just war questions engaged by late scholastic theologians such as Francisco de Vitoria, Gabriel Vázquez, Francisco Suárez, and Luis de Molina. The chapter starts by presenting their favored judicial model of war and then focuses on three ius ad bellum requirements: just cause, legitimate authority, and right intention. This section also discusses the positions of the late scholastics on the possibility of wars that are just on both sides, the moral equality of soldiers, and the moral gravity of the subject’s refusal to fight in his country’s morally doubtful wars. The following section explores ius in bello. It examines the principle that innocents in war are immune from direct targeting and exceptions to this principle, the moral rules governing the side-effect killing of innocents in war, and the morally permitted defensive means available to potential victims of such side-effect harms.


2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-427 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hurka

This paper discusses the novel versions of the right intention and proportionality conditions in the ius ad bellum proposed in Chapter 3 of Frances Kamm’s Ethics for Enemies. It argues that Kamm is right to weaken the right intention condition to require, not positively intending a war’s just cause, but only having that cause’s presence be a necessary condition for war, but wrong to place no limits on why one makes a just cause necessary. It then argues that the weakening she proposes of Jeff McMahan’s very strict interpretation of proportionality does not go far enough. She argues that “conditional just aims” such as disarming an aggressor and deterring future aggression can count toward a war’s proportionality only if they will follow from harms needed to achieve the war’s initial just cause but not if they require additional harms. The paper argues that such aims can justify additional harms.


2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uwe Steinhoff
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Natania Meeker ◽  
Antónia Szabari

Radical Botany uncovers a long speculative tradition of plant fiction that conjures up new languages to grasp the life of plants—their vegetality—in all its specificity and vigor. The first part of the book reaches back to seventeenth-century materialisms to show how plants, rather than being systematically excluded from human deliberation, have in fact participated in modernity. The French authors with whom the work begins turn to plants to think through the problems and paradoxes that face all forms of life considered first as matter. Within this framework, plants are ascribed an agency and vitality that might otherwise seem foreign to them, but they are also envisioned as beings that resist incorporation into human contexts and thus have something to teach humans about their limitations and vulnerabilities. Classically, the botanical sciences that develop over the course of the long eighteenth century function as a project for ordering, visualizing, labeling, and classifying life. In Radical Botany, the authors unearth an alternative set of engagements with the plant as a life form—a tradition that conceives of vegetal life as resisting representability even as it participates in the production of new representational modes—including the novel, early cinema, and contemporary virtual reality—and new affects—including queer desires, feminist affinities, and ecological solidarities. The radical botanical works this book explores not only prioritize plants as active participants in “their” world but suggest that the apparent passivity of plants can function as a powerful destabilizing force in its own right.


Author(s):  
Daniel R. Brunstetter

Jus in vi is the set of moral principles governing how limited force is used. Taking the traditionalist jus in bello principles as a starting point, this chapter interrogates what necessity, proportionality, and distinction look like in a limited force context and makes the case for the novel psychological risk principle by evaluating how concepts such as “excessive,” “military advantage,” and “harms” and “goods” fit into our thinking about vim. The keystone of jus in vi is the predisposition toward maximal restraint maxim. The chapter thus begins by making the case for why jus in vi principles should be more restrictive than their jus in bello counterparts. It continues by exploring how a circumscribed view of necessity sets the groundwork for constraining proportionality calculations and shaping the way we think about distinction in more restricted ways. The notion of jus in vi proportionality is then explored, with concerns about escalation and psychological risk driving the analysis. Drawing insights from revisionist just war theory to consider jus in vi distinction, the chapter concludes by making the case for affording greater protections to both combatants and non-combatants compared to standard just war accounts. Unlike war, in which almost any soldier can be targeted, in a context of limited force only those who are an active threat can be justly targeted. Both innocent non-combatants and non-threatening combatants should be preserved from the more predictable harms of limited force, though this differs depending on whether the use of limited force is protective, preventive, or punitive.


2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 280-294
Author(s):  
Manina Jones

Abstract Giles Blunt’s Cardinal police-procedural novels and their recent television adaptations evidence the noir genre’s sombre aesthetic, focus on a morally tainted hero, are preoccupied with seemingly irrational violence, and fixate on unresolved past injustices. In doing so, they reflect Canada’s aesthetic and ethical relationship to questions of national and transnational culture, colonial territoriality, and the moral principles at stake in the representation of violence. This Canadian ‘re-branding’ of noir features is haunted by deep-seated historical dissension and the present-day repercussions that are at the heart of the country’s national identity. Focusing on the first season of Cardinal (2017) and the novel from which it was adapted, Forty Words for Sorrow (2002), this essay examines the series’ stylish – if conflicted – reworking of noir’s roots in American crime fiction and film, and its use of contemporary Nordic influences, which work to salvage a form of Canadian cultural authenticity from the cultural dominance of US television and film crime dramas.


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