Metasemantics for the Relaxed

2021 ◽  
pp. 108-133
Author(s):  
Christine Tiefensee
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Moral Realist ◽  
Moral Metaphysics ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Integration Challenge ◽  
Evaluative Terms

This chapter discusses how to meet the ‘generalized integration challenge’ as a relaxed moral realist by providing a metasemantics of moral vocabulary which is compatible with relaxing about moral metaphysics and epistemology. Employing normative inferentialism and focussing on evaluative moral terms in particular, it is suggested that evaluative moral terms function to explain proprieties of language exit transitions, where having this function amounts to systematizing language exit transitions through a process of reflective equilibrium. Crucially, this inferentialist take on explanatory function does not engender any substantive metaphysical commitments about moral properties. Moreover, the systematization process on which it is based is undertaken from within moral discourse. As such, understanding evaluative terms as tools that systematize language exits fits perfectly with the relaxed take on moral discourse.

Emotions and Incommensurable Moral Concepts

Philosophy ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-604 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Randel Koons
Keyword(s):  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Moral Concept ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Moral Realist ◽  
Epistemic Role

Many authors have argued that emotions serve an epistemic role in our moral practice. Some argue that this epistemic connection is so strong that creatures who do not share our affective nature will be unable to grasp our moral concepts. I argue that even if this sort of incommensurability does result from the role of affect in morality, incommensurability does not in itself entail relativism. In any case, there is no reason to suppose that one must share our emotions and concerns to be able to apply our moral concept successfully. Finally, I briefly investigate whether the moral realist can seek aid and comfort from Davidsonian arguments to the effect that incommensurability in ethics is in principle impossible, and decide that these arguments are not successful. I conclude that the epistemic role our emotions play in moral discourse does not relativize morality.

Was Reid a Moral Realist?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Graham
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
Moral Realist ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Intellectual Power ◽  
Moral Facts

This chapter argues that, contrary to a very widely held view, Reid’s express disagreement with Hume on the matter of morality cannot satisfactorily be pressed into the “realism versus sentimentalism” dichotomy. Hume is certainly a sentimentalist, but there is good reason to interpret Reid’s use of the analogy between moral sense and sense perception in a way that does not imply the existence of “real” moral properties. Reid makes judgment central to the analogy, and this gives the exercise of an intellectual “power” primacy over passive sensual experience. The analogy thus allows him to apply the concepts “true” and “false” to moral judgments, without any quasi-realist appeal to moral facts.

scholarly journals Expressivism about delusion attribution

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-77
Author(s):  
Sam Wilkinson
Keyword(s):  
Intrinsic Motivation ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
Key Features ◽  
Moral Properties

In this paper, I will present and advocate a view about what we are doing when we attribute delusion, namely, say that someone is delusional. It is an “expressivist” view, roughly analogous to expressivism in meta-ethics. Just as meta-ethical expressivism accounts for certain key features of moral discourse, so does this expressivism account for certain key features of delusion attribution. And just as meta-ethical expressivism undermines factualism about moral properties, so does this expressivism, if correct, show that certain attempts to objectively define delusion are misguided. I proceed as follows. I start by examining different attempts at defining delusion, separating broadly psychiatric attempts from epistemic ones. I then present a change of approach, according to which we question whether the term “delusion” is in the business of (merely) describing reality. I then support this proposal, first, by borrowing standard lines of argument from meta-ethics (including ontological reluctance, intrinsic motivation, and deep disagreement) but also, by inference to the best explanation of some the features we see when we try to theorise about delusion (namely that it is hard to define, and that our delusion attributions are elicited by a plurality of norms).

Eurasian Economic union: Prospects and challenges for Development

2015 ◽  
pp. 87-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Knobel
Keyword(s):  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Economic Effects ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Gas Transfer ◽  
Eurasian Economic Union ◽  
Economic Union ◽  
Food Imports ◽  
Cis Countries ◽  
Integration Problems ◽  
Integration Challenge

The paper is devoted to the analysis of development prospects and problems of Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Armenia. It considers integration problems inside EAEU, interactions of EAEU with other CIS countries and with countries from the rest of the world. The paper shows that the major integration challenge inside EAEU is the domination of the redistributive motive over the creative one. It estimates the value of the oil and gas transfer from Russia to other EAEU members and the influence of the Russian tax maneuver on this transfer. The paper shows the need in redistribution mechanism inside EAEU as a necessary condition for getting the potential positive economic effects of free trade with other countries. It also assesses the risks for EAEU due to Russian embargo for food imports from countries of the sanctions list and possible application of tariff in the trade with Ukraine.

Process Philosophy and Political Liberalism

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel A. Dombrowski
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Process Philosophy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Nonhuman Animals ◽  
Static View ◽  
Process Oriented ◽  
The Right ◽  
Political Right

In this work two key theses are defended: political liberalism is a processual (rather than a static) view and process thinkers should be political liberals. Three major figures are considered (Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne) in the effort to show the superiority of political liberalism to its illiberal alternatives on the political right and left. Further, a politically liberal stance regarding nonhuman animals and the environment is articulated. It is typical for debates in political philosophy to be adrift regarding the concept of method, but from start to finish this book relies on the processual method of reflective equilibrium or dialectic at its best. This is the first extended effort to argue for both political liberalism as a process-oriented view and process philosophy/theology as a politically liberal view. It is also a timely defense of political liberalism against illiberal tendencies on both the right and the left.

Sin or Slim?

2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-109
Author(s):  
Hannah Bacon
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Cultural Knowledge ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Unhealthy Lifestyle ◽  
Women's Bodies ◽  
Lifestyle Choices ◽  
Popular Knowledge ◽  
Behavioural Condition ◽  
Fat Bodies ◽  
Theological Language

Is fat a sin? Popular ‘knowledge’ about obesity which frames fat as an avoidable behavioural condition would certainly suggest it can be blamed on the fat person. Discourses of health reproduced within public policy and media reporting assist in the pathologization of fat bodies, insisting that fat is the result of unhealthy lifestyle choices. It is, however, not simply medical interpretations of fat that facilitate this moral discourse. Religion also provides an important source of moral judgment. This paper draws on my qualitative research inside a UK secular, commercial slimming group to consider how the Christian moral language of sin functions within this setting to construct a politics of choice that holds the dieter personally responsible for her fat. Interpreting weight loss and weight gain as a measure of moral character, this theological language assists in the operation of ‘normative conformity’, conforming women’s bodies to cultural knowledge about fat.

On What Matters

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Parfit
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Previous Treatment ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Wide Sense ◽  
Normative Naturalism ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Way ◽  
What Matters

This third volume of this series develops further previous treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. It engages with critics, and shows the way to resolution of their differences. This volume is partly about what it is for things to matter, in the sense that we all have reasons to care about these things. Much of the book discusses three of the main kinds of meta-ethical theory: normative naturalism, quasi-realist expressivism, and non-metaphysical non-naturalism, which this book refers to as non-realist cognitivism. This third theory claims that, if we use the word ‘reality’ in an ontologically weighty sense, irreducibly normative truths have no mysterious or incredible ontological implications. If instead we use ‘reality’ in a wide sense, according to which all truths are truths about reality, this theory claims that some non-empirically discoverable truths — such as logical, mathematical, modal, and some normative truths — raise no difficult ontological questions. This book discusses these theories partly by commenting on the views of some of the contributors to Peter Singer's collection Does Anything Really Matter? Parfit on Objectivity.

The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Lerner
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Property ◽  
Moral Inquiry ◽  
Ordinary People ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
State Of Affairs

People engage in pure moral inquiry whenever they inquire into the moral features of some act, agent, or state of affairs without inquiring into the non-moral features of that act, agent, or state of affairs. The first section of this chapter argues that ordinary people act rationally when they engage in pure moral inquiry, and so any adequate view in metaethics ought to be able to explain this fact. The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation is to provide such an explanation. The remaining sections of the chapter argue that each of the standard views in metaethics has trouble providing such an explanation. A metaethical view can provide such an explanation only if it meets two constraints: it allows ordinary moral inquirers to know the essences of moral properties, and the essence of each moral property makes it rational to care for its own sake whether that property is instantiated.

Reality and Morality

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Billy Dunaway
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Realist View

This book develops and defends a framework for moral realism. It defends the idea that moral properties are metaphysically elite, or privileged parts of reality. It argues that realists can hold that this makes them highly eligible as the referents for our moral terms, an application of a thesis sometimes called reference magnetism. And it elaborates on these theses by introducing some natural claims about how we can know about morality, by having beliefs that are free from a kind of risk of error. This package of theses in metaphysics, meta-semantics, and epistemology is motivated with a view to an explanation of possible moral disagreements. Many writers have emphasized the scope of moral disagreement, and have given compelling examples of possible users of moral language who appear to be genuinely disagreeing, rather than talking past one another, with their use of moral language. What has gone unnoticed is that there are limits to these possible disagreements, and not all possible users of moral language are naturally interpreted as capable of genuine disagreement. The realist view developed in this book can explain both the extent of, and the limits to, moral disagreement, and thereby has explanatory power that counts significantly in its favor.

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