This monograph considers the nature of Belief, based on evidence and rational thought, as well as various other kinds of Belief. Sometimes the evidence is not available. However, our main perspective is the widespread irrationality that can be manifest, despite the availability of what may be seen as contrary evidence that is simply ignored (‘unknown knowns’). We largely eschew matters of faith and spiritual aspects, and also semantics. A variety of Belief systems exist, including those based on genuine (‘philosophical’) logic, typically involving a perceived causality, those based on co-occurrences, on experience, on probability, and on the extent to which a belief increases our knowledge and vice versa. Beliefs can also be based on cultural inheritances or ‘received wisdom’, as well as institutional (authoritative) entrenchment, and may be held simply because it is easiest or convenient to do so. Beliefs may also be held, and/or promulgated, for reasons of self-interest; this is a cause of much trouble. Beliefs about future events (predictions) are another important subset of Belief. Part 1 covers these and takes a brief look at some historical aspects and some of the methods of evidence-based Belief as used by working scientists. Part 1 ends with a look at elements of modern psychology and the workings of the mind, often starting with perspectives taken from what we know of ‘artificial intelligence’. There is a focus on situations where Beliefs are clearly wrong or irrational (‘misbeliefs’), based in part on the fact that humans are highly suggestible (and also that natural evolution once selected for that).Part 2 of the book applies the above learnings to three main areas, in which we consider that mainstream thinking – partly fuelled by self-interests – has come to focus on areas that are not the most relevant to the solution of the problems typical of their respective domains. These topics include medicine (very brief and truncated in this preprint version), the nature of money in (macro)economics, and the relationship between individual voting activities and political outcomes in typical Western democracies, such as the UK and the USA. This part ends with a chapter on the roles and causes of Belief (and misbelief) following the UK’s 2016 ‘advisory referendum’ on whether to ‘leave’ the EU (commonly referred to as Brexit).Part 3 takes the form of an epilogue, in which we enquire, if one accepts that misbeliefs of the above kinds underpin many and various social ills, what might rationally be done to change the thinking on such things for the better.
A Vague Theory of Choice over Time
