Attention and salience in preference reversals

We investigate the implications of Salience Theory for the classical preference reversal phenomenon, where monetary valuations contradict risky choices. It has been stated that one factor behind reversals is that monetary valuations of lotteries are inflated when elicited in isolation, and that they should be reduced if an alternative lottery is present and draws attention. We conducted two preregistered experiments, an online choice study ($$N=256$$ N = 256 ) and an eye-tracking study ($$N=64$$ N = 64 ), in which we investigated salience and attention in preference reversals, manipulating salience through the presence or absence of an alternative lottery during evaluations. We find that the alternative lottery draws attention, and that fixations on that lottery influence the evaluation of the target lottery as predicted by Salience Theory. The effect, however, is of a modest magnitude and fails to translate into an effect on preference reversal rates in either experiment. We also use transitions (eye movements) across outcomes of different lotteries to study attention on the states of the world underlying Salience Theory, but we find no evidence that larger salience results in more transitions.

Microfoundations of Discounting

An important question in economics is how people choose between different payments in the future. The classical normative model predicts that a decision maker discounts a later payment relative to an earlier one by an exponential function of the time between them. Descriptive models use nonexponential functions to fit observed behavioral phenomena, such as preference reversal. Here we propose a model of discounting, consistent with standard axioms of choice, in which decision makers maximize the growth rate of their wealth. Four specifications of the model produce four forms of discounting—no discounting, exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting, and a hybrid of exponential and hyperbolic discounting—two of which predict preference reversal. Our model requires no assumption of behavioral bias or payment risk.

The Color of Money: Threshold Effects in Quantum Economics

Many cognitive phenomena of the sort studied by behavioral psychologists show evidence of a threshold effect, where a certain minimum impulse is required in order to produce a change. An example is the phenomenon of preference reversal, where a change in context affects a decision, but only if the effect on perceived utility is sufficiently large. Similar threshold effects play a role in the endowment effect, where the change of context from owning to buying something induces a step change in its perceived value, or the ultimatum game, where people demand a certain minimum threshold amount before a deal can be accepted. The situation is similar to the photoelectric experiment in physics, where a minimum threshold of energy from a photon is required in order to dislodge an electron from an atom. In physics, this quantum of energy is written as the product of Planck’s constant and frequency. This paper uses the concept of entropic force to derive a similar expression for quantum economics. The theory is applied to a range of cognitive and economic phenomena exhibiting a threshold effect.