Constitutional Authority for the Transboundary Deployment of Armed Force

2020 ◽  
pp. 471-496
Author(s):  
Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov

This chapter assesses the formal constitutional framework of authorization of foreign deployments of uniformed personnel, both formed units and individual service members. The initial volume of the Fourth Restatement of Foreign Relations Law does not ponder general matters of separation of powers and specifically in the realm of foreign affairs and national security. Apparently, this discussion is left to subsequent installments. The Third Restatement briefly addressed the separation of powers in foreign relations, in particular referring to the “continuing controversy as to whether the President can deploy the forces of the United States on his own authority for foreign policy purposes short of war, and, if so, whether that authority is subject to Congressional control. Nor is it agreed to what extent Congress can control decisions of the President as Commander in Chief in the conduct of wars authorized by Congress.” The United States is not unique in that respect, and similar controversies, whether in law or in practice, may and do occur in other jurisdictions. This chapter offers a comparative perspective, drawing from experiences of the Russian Federation and its predecessor, the Soviet Union and its heirs.

Author(s):  
N. Gegelashvili ◽  
◽  
I. Modnikova ◽  

The article analyzes the US policy towards Ukraine dating back from the time before the reunification of Crimea with Russia and up to Donald Trump coming to power. The spectrum of Washington’s interests towards this country being of particular strategic interest to the United States are disclosed. It should be noted that since the disintegration of the Soviet Union Washington’s interest in this country on the whole has not been very much different from its stand on all post-Soviet states whose significance was defined by the U,S depending on their location on the world map as well as on the value of their natural resources. However, after the reunification of Crimea with Russia Washington’s stand on this country underwent significant changes, causing a radical transformation of the U,S attitude in their Ukrainian policy. During the presidency of Barack Obama the American policy towards Ukraine was carried out rather sluggishly being basically declarative in its nature. When President D. Trump took his office Washington’s policy towards Ukraine became increasingly more offensive and was characterized by a rather proactive stance not only because Ukraine became the principal arena of confrontation between the United States and the Russian Federation, but also because it became a part of the US domestic political context. Therefore, an outcome of the “battle” for Ukraine is currently very important for the United States in order to prove to the world its role of the main helmsman in the context of a diminishing US capability of maintaining their global superiority.


Author(s):  
Alexander N.S. Chang

The Multilateral Force (MLF) was a proposed nuclear sharing arrangement between the United States and a number of its NATO partners. Proposed in 1958, the MLF was debated until about 1965 or 1966 and was often distinguished by its controversial nature and failure to gain traction. This paper examines documents from the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, and various secondary sources to evaluate the extent to which the Soviet Union contributed to the MLF’s failure as an initiative. The Force is often treated as a narrow and highly technical policy debate by existing literature. However, examination of these documents highlighted the necessity of viewing the Force as a topic of distinct political import in American-Soviet nuclear negotiations. While technical disputes over the MLF’s constitution was an immediate cause of its demise, U.S. policymakers also faced strategic incentives not to pursue the treaty. In particular, the documents reflect growing belief within the Johnson administration that exiting the agreement could improve broader bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and ensure that the international community could continue to make progress on the creation of a nuclear non-proliferation agreement.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document