Title II Provisions on Democratic Principles

Eu Commission ◽

The Eu

The inclusion of this title by the ToL can be seen as a reaction to the debate around an alleged democratic deficit of the EU. Some, including the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), rely on the controversial so-called ‘no demos thesis’ to demonstrate a lack of democracy at the EU level. The no demos thesis contends that in the absence of a European people there cannot be full democracy so that the EU’s democratic legitimation must ultimately come from the MS. Others are less categorical in their criticism, but point to a missing political contest over political authority and a ‘lack of direct democratic input legitimation in the form of elections and representation together with majoritarian decision-making.’ This contributes to a disconnection between the political preferences of voters and policy outcomes at the EU level. Moreover, many of the key actors—most importantly members of the EU Commission—cannot be removed from office by means of a popular vote.

Core of State Sovereignty and Boundaries of European Union's Identity in the Lissabon – Urteil

German Law Journal ◽

10.1017/s2071832200018605 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 11 (4) ◽

pp. 399-418

Author(s):

Elisabetta Lanza

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

State Sovereignty ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

The European Union ◽

Member States ◽

Treaty Of Lisbon ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

The Eu

In the 2009 judgment dealing with the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Federal Constitutional Court urges to modify a domestic statute in order to guarantee the rights of the internal rule-making power and also provides a reasoning on the role of the European Union (EU) as an international organization, the principle of sovereignty and the relations between European Institutions and Bodies and the EU Member States. According to the German Court the Treaty of Lisbon does not transform the European Union into a Federal State (Staatsverband), but into a Confederation of States (Staatenverbund). In spite of the 1993 landmark judgment, the so-called “Maastricht Urteil”, the Court steps forward and focuses also the subject-matters that necessarily have to pertain to the Member States jurisdiction, the so-called “domain reserve”. The German Federal Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty arouses the reflection on the core of State sovereignty and on the boundaries of the EU legal system and focuses on the force of the right to vote of every citizen, the basis of democracy.Furthermore, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court highlights the well-known issue of the EU's identity and the balancing between EU democracy and Member State sovereignty. In the light of the German Constitutional Court statements, the present work aims to understand which could be actually the EU's identity and how could be approached “democratic deficit” of the EU.

The application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU by the German Federal Constitutional Court with references to the other federal courts

AUC IURIDICA ◽

10.14712/23366478.2018.34 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 2018 (4) ◽

pp. 65-77

Author(s):

Rainer Arnold ◽

Lukas Cerny

Keyword(s):

Federal Courts ◽

Fundamental Rights ◽

The Other ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽

The Eu

Das PSPP-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts: Umfang der Übertragung von Souveränität und Überprüfung von Ermessensgebrauch

IG ◽

10.5771/0720-5120-2021-3-220 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 44 (3) ◽

pp. 220-226

Author(s):

Achim-Rüdiger Börner

Keyword(s):

Member State ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

The Public ◽

Court Of Justice ◽

European Court ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

National Constitution ◽

The Eu

In its judgment of 5 May 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has held that the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank (ECB), which started in 2015, and the relevant decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of 11 December 2018, holding that the programme is compatible with European Union (EU) law, are ultra vires acts. Indeed, this decision is based on a French understanding of discretion which has previously been adopted in the European Treaties and according to which discretion is controlled only for undue, illegal influence. Today, the Treaties have adopted a review of discretion under the aspects of suitability, necessity, and appropriateness. Moreover, criticism at the decision of the FCC neglects that the accession to and the membership in the EU have to observe the thresholds of the respective national constitution, as its violation is not and may not be expected by the Union or any other Member State. Ultra vires acts of the Union, which remain uncorrected by the Union itself, are subject to disapproval and rejection by the constitutional court of any Member State.

Constitutional Supremacy: National Constitutions vs. European Law

Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies ◽

10.30722/anzjes.vol3.iss1.15121 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 3 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Vanessa McGlynn

Keyword(s):

New South ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

The European Union ◽

Liberal Democratic ◽

European Court ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

Democratic Principles ◽

Do So

CESAA 18TH ANNUAL EUROPE ESSAY COMPETITION 2010 - Postgraduate winner: Vanessa McGlynn, University of New South WalesAlmost 50 years after the European Court of Justice clearly established the supremacy of Community law, the question regarding the primacy of law within the European context remains unresolved. By exploring the perspectives of the ECJ and the German Federal Constitutional Court, this article seeks to outline the controversies relating to constitutional supremacy and analyses the theoretical underpinnings of this difference. It will be suggested that by focussing only on select liberal democratic principles, each court not only constructs their respective claims to supremacy, but they do so in opposition to each other. Thus rather than creating constitutional integration throughout the European Union, the supremacy discourse has created fault lines along which further tension may arise. By drawing on Kumm’s theory this paper will conclude by suggesting an alternative lens through which such conflicts may be resolved.

Wohin steuern die Ultra-vires- und die Identitätskontrolle? Eine Zwischenbilanz anhand der Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts im PSPP-Verfahren

IG ◽

10.5771/0720-5120-2021-3-211 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 44 (3) ◽

pp. 211-219

Author(s):

Christian Walter

Keyword(s):

Constitutional Court ◽

Eu Law ◽

The European Union ◽

The Public ◽

German Constitution ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

The Eu

The article takes stock of the consequences which the decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) concerning the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Union (EU) have had on the relation between EU law and the German constitution. The interplay between the PSPP judgment of 5 May 2020 and a follow-up decision on its enforcement reveals a certain degree of back-paddling by the FCC. Irrespective of the infringement procedure, which the European Commission recently initiated against Germany, there are good chances for a respite for both the FCC and the Court of Justice of the EU. It is up to the FCC to use this period to clarify where it is headed with its jurisprudence on controlling the application of EU law in Germany.

German Federal Constitutional Court: Constitutional Ultra Vires Review of European Acts Only Under Exceptional Circumstances; Decision of 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, Honeywell

European Constitutional Law Review ◽

10.1017/s1574019611100085 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 7 (1) ◽

pp. 161-167 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Christoph Möllers

Keyword(s):

European Integration ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

Constitutional Review ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

German Court ◽

The Eu

After the German Federal Constitutional Court's (FCC) issuance of the Lisbon decision, a judgment that is generally considered to be a verdict critical of European integration as well as a measure to widen the scope of constitutional review of EU acts, many observers wondered what would happen next. Would the German court finally begin to look for an open conflict with the EU, or would the court's bark once again be worse than its bite? This had already seemed to be the case after the Maastricht decision, the slimmer and legally more coherent predecessor of the Lisbon judgment, after which the court deliberately missed the opportunity to take a shot at the Banana conflict between the EU and the WTO.

Los Partidos Pollticos Ante El Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemmn Y Otros Casos De Interrs (The Political Parties Before the German Federal Constitutional Court and Other Important Cases)

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.2589110 ◽

2013 ◽

Author(s):

Fernando Simon

Keyword(s):

Political Parties ◽

The Political ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

German Federal Constitutional

Essay: The Integrative Function of a European Constitution (Discussion of Chr. Dorau: Die Verfassungsfrage der Europäischen Union)

German Law Journal ◽

10.1017/s2071832200014760 ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 3 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Jo Eric Murkens

Keyword(s):

Constitutional Court ◽

The European Union ◽

Constitutional Convention ◽

European Constitution ◽

Court Of Justice ◽

European Court ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

The Eu

Why did the European Union (EU) leaders at the Laeken summit in December 2001 agree to a constitutional convention headed by the former French President Valéry Giscard D'Estaing to design a constitution for the EU when, according to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the German Federal Constitutional Court, and many academic commentators, the founding treaties already form a constitution?

Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055400264022 ◽

1976 ◽

Vol 70 (1) ◽

pp. 114-125 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Fritz Nova

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Judicial Review ◽

The United States ◽

West Germany ◽

The Political ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

The West ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

German Federal Constitutional

The Watergate controversies and especially the recent decision in Richard M. Nixon versus the United States on July 24, 1974 have again raised in the United States the problem of the political limits to judicial policy making and the need to strike a new balance among the three branches of government for preserving and maintaining a democratic policy. In this paper, which is based on largely primary judicial, political, and academic German sources up to the year 1972, the development of jurisprudence of the West German Federal Constitutional Court is analyzed and discussed, particularly the Court's experience with judicial review. The article is geared toward the student of comparative constitutionalism and comparative government, offering possible lessons to the United States and other Common Law constitutional courts. Less concerned with the practical work of the Court, except for brief comments on actual performance, the paper focuses on such problems as past and present German approval and disapproval of the notion of judicial review, the often erudite disputation on the merits of constitutional—especially “creative”—jurisprudence; the discussion on the political limits of judicial review; and trends in particular philosophical positions of the Court in contemporary West Germany.

Two Constitutional Cultures, Technological Enforcement and User Creativity: The Impending Collapse of the EU Copyright Regime?

IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law ◽

10.1007/s40319-021-01131-0 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Guido Westkamp

Keyword(s):

Market Integration ◽

Fundamental Rights ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

The European Union ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

Eu Copyright Law ◽

The Eu

AbstractIn Pelham, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the German Federal Constitutional Court reached diametrically opposing conclusions on the relevance of freedom of art in copyright law. The different stances permit a speculative prediction – they can have immediate consequences for the predictable challenges against the new platform liability regime, and its associated dangers of widespread filtering and blocking. The article discusses the numerous constitutional implications, with specific attention given to the respective interests affected by the new regime (authors, exploiters, users, platforms) in light of the divergent approaches from the perspective of what appears to be two rather conflicting constitutional cultures: specific perceptions of fundamental rights and proportionality under German law versus an approach tending to emphasise market integration under the EU legal order. Recent assertions by the German Federal Constitutional Court redistributing the division of competences between national and EU law permit the prediction of a disturbing future collision course between the two systems, with potentially massive implications for EU copyright law by and large.