Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review

1976 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fritz Nova

The Watergate controversies and especially the recent decision in Richard M. Nixon versus the United States on July 24, 1974 have again raised in the United States the problem of the political limits to judicial policy making and the need to strike a new balance among the three branches of government for preserving and maintaining a democratic policy. In this paper, which is based on largely primary judicial, political, and academic German sources up to the year 1972, the development of jurisprudence of the West German Federal Constitutional Court is analyzed and discussed, particularly the Court's experience with judicial review. The article is geared toward the student of comparative constitutionalism and comparative government, offering possible lessons to the United States and other Common Law constitutional courts. Less concerned with the practical work of the Court, except for brief comments on actual performance, the paper focuses on such problems as past and present German approval and disapproval of the notion of judicial review, the often erudite disputation on the merits of constitutional—especially “creative”—jurisprudence; the discussion on the political limits of judicial review; and trends in particular philosophical positions of the Court in contemporary West Germany.

Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-296
Author(s):  
Nils Grosche

Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit steht im Zentrum der Auseinandersetzung über die Kompetenzabgrenzung durch die Verfassungsgerichte im europäischen Verfassungsverbund. Auf den ersten Blick wirkt seine Heranziehung schlicht als fortgesetzte Proliferation eines gleichermaßen tradierten wie profilierten öffentlich-rechtlichen Maßstabs in einem unionseigenen Kontext, dem Vorgaben für die Kompetenzabgrenzung einfach entnommen werden können. Der Beitrag behandelt die Möglichkeit einer hiervon abzugrenzenden Verständnisweise des Abstellens auf den Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz seitens des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Hiernach soll die Anknüpfung an den Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz lediglich dazu dienen, spezifische Anforderungen an eine effektive Kompetenzabgrenzung einzulösen, ohne diese notwendig selbst zu enthalten. Die in Rede stehenden Anforderungen sind Antworten auf ein bestimmtes Problem: die Fähigkeiten des Normadressaten, durch geschickte Konstruktionen Kompetenzbindungen abzustreifen. The principle of proportionality is at the center of the judicial controversy concerning the question of EU institutions exceeding their respective competences. At first glance the reference to the principle of proportionality simply marks a new use case of a ubiquitously utilized standard of judicial review entailing specific requirements for the delimitation of competences. The article argues for a different perception of the application of the principle of proportionality by the German Federal Constitutional Court. According to this perception the principle of proportionality serves as a proxy in order to incorporate certain requirements for the effective delimitation of competences. These requirements are triggered by a specific problem: the capabilities of an addressee of a rule to circumvent it via smart design.


Author(s):  
Tobias Lock

The inclusion of this title by the ToL can be seen as a reaction to the debate around an alleged democratic deficit of the EU. Some, including the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), rely on the controversial so-called ‘no demos thesis’ to demonstrate a lack of democracy at the EU level. The no demos thesis contends that in the absence of a European people there cannot be full democracy so that the EU’s democratic legitimation must ultimately come from the MS. Others are less categorical in their criticism, but point to a missing political contest over political authority and a ‘lack of direct democratic input legitimation in the form of elections and representation together with majoritarian decision-making.’ This contributes to a disconnection between the political preferences of voters and policy outcomes at the EU level. Moreover, many of the key actors—most importantly members of the EU Commission—cannot be removed from office by means of a popular vote.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 185-195
Author(s):  
Matthias Hartwig

In January 2003, two Yemeni citizens were arrested by German police forces at the airport of Frankfurt. The arrest took place pursuant to the request of an American judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The action was considered to be a blow against international terrorism and should have demonstrated the functioning of the German-American cooperation in the war against this scourge. However, due to general considerations as well as the concrete circumstances of the case, the extradition of the two persons took more time than would be expected from a smoothly running cooperation. All legal remedies were exhausted in the Yemenis’ efforts to avoid extradition to the United States, and even now, an individual complaint has been brought before the European Court on Human Rights in Strasbourg. The two Yemeni citizens were finally extradited more than ten months after their arrest in November 2003.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 1297-1335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mher Arshakyan

The central purpose of this paper is to show that there are no major differences in the methods of constitutional interpretation in countries with varying degrees of judicial review. Despite the fact that legal culture and traditions, underlying political theories, and values all affect methods of interpretation, there is no big gap in constitutional interpretation in practice in view of wide interpretive discretion. Obviously all legal systems require compliance with some fundamental interpretive standards irrespective of the legal system, and in a democratic society judicial decisions should be justified at least to avoid arbitrariness. The question is what are the limits beyond which judges cannot go in constitutional democracies? Hence, the style and method of legal argumentation that are used to justify the decision may differ in the countries belonging to different legal systems. Whether there are significant differences between the common law and civil law, constitutional interpretation will be assessed through the comparative analysis of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (66) ◽  
pp. 85-129
Author(s):  
Mher Arshakyan ◽  
Jacopo Paffarini ◽  
Márcio Ricardo Staffen

The central purpose of this paper is to show that there are no major differences in the methods of constitutional interpretation in countries with varying degree of judicial review. Despite the fact that legal culture and traditions, underlying political theories, and values all affect methods of interpretation, there is no big gap in constitutional interpretation in practice in view of wide interpretive discretion. Obviously all legal systems require compliance with some fundamental interpretive standards irrespective of the legal system, and in a democratic society judicial decisions should be justified at least to avoid arbitrariness. The question is what are the limits beyond which judges cannot go in constitutional democracies? Can the foreign law be a parameter for judicial review of legislation? Hence, the style and method of legal argumentation that are used to justify the decision may differ in the countries belonging to different legal systems. Whether there are significant differences between the common law and civil law constitutional interpretation will be assessed through the comparative analysis of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court.


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