scholarly journals Human Rights in the zones of non-being: Lessons on [not] speaking about and on behalf of “others” from J.M. Coetzee’s Foe

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ndumiso Ncube

One of the modern dictates of freedom is a human’s right to free speech as enshrined in the United Nations’ (2015) Universal Declaration of Humans Rights (UDHR) of 1948. The very concept of “universal” rights foregrounds the question on what and who is human. Following this universal doctrine, all freedoms, including the freedom to free speech translates ultimately to “beings” that are critically self-conscious, or at least beings who are regarded as human-beings, who are allowed to exist, to live, and to be free. Indeed, to examine what has happened to those who exist in Fanon’s (2008) zones of non-being who are denied their right to free speech even after the “universal” pronouncements of 1948 is equally important. In fact, all along and even today (and because of coloniality) the Third World citizens may still be denied their right to free speech, their right to be free from economic bondage or otherwise – which are, after all, their natural rights to be human. To be “free”, to be “human” or to “live” denotes that one has the ability to speak as the universal declaration accords. The voice (an ability to be heard) or its lack creates beings that are not regarded as human. Indeed, the effects of talking or not talking of the anthropos, or on behalf of them is explored, somewhat as the unreliability and the corruptibility of the authority of language and authorship. This is to say, the meaning and intentions (of the voice) that belongs to those in the zones of non-being are most often misunderstood, mistranslated and sometimes misread and unheard – stripping them of one of their essential human rights to be heard. This way, I seek to investigate the dilemma of the right to free speech in J.M. Coetzee’s novel Foe (1986) as well as challenge the UDHR declaration that all humans are born equal with a right to freedom of speech. I argue that the possession of language in the world where there are two zones, as illustrated in John Maxwell Coetzee’s Foe (1986) does not guarantee one to be heard or liberated.

2009 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-8
Author(s):  
David Robie

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart informa tion and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.- Article 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights When military strongman Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama staged his creeping coup d’état on 5 December 2006—Fiji’s fourth in two decades—he was quick to declare: ‘We will uphold media freedom’ (cited in Foster, 2007). Barely two and a half years later, when he finished off the job with a putsch—dubbed ‘coup 4.5’ by some—and after having expelled three publishers, two New Zealand diplomats and five journalists over the intervening period, he told Radio New Zealand freedom of speech ‘causes trouble’ and must be curbed to allow the military government do its work (Bainimarama: Free speech ‘causes trouble’, 15 April 2009).


1975 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rupert Emerson

The new Asian and African states have laid much stress on human rights, but have often not lived up to them. The basic right of self-determination has been limited to colonies only. Democratic institutions have generally given way to authoritarian regimes, often run by the military, with popular participation denied rather than encouraged. The right to life, liberty, and security of person has been grossly violated in the cases of millions of refugees, temporary and permanent, in Africa and the Asian subcontinent. Many hundreds of thousands have been killed in domestic conflicts, as in Indonesia, Nigeria, and Burundi. One of the results is the emergence of a double standard: an all-out African and Asian attack upon the denial of human rights involved in colonialism and racial discrimination, but a refusal to face up to massive violations of human rights in the Third World itself.


2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naomi Sakr

AbstractThere is more to the denial of freedom of expression than outright censorship. The right to freedom of expression is interdependent with, and indivisible from, other rights guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To discuss freedom of expression narrowly as if it were self-contained, and to conceal the issues, processes, and conflicts implicit in its achievement, can be seen as a hegemonic strategy that serves relations of domination. Three sets of public exchanges analyzed here, conducted on and about Arab television against a background of growing international intolerance for free speech, arguably contributed to a narrow, reified understanding of freedom of expression. The first centered on a television drama serial, the second on cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, and the third on the ambitions of a privately owned television station in Egypt. Since freedom of expression was repeatedly referred to in all three cases, it might be said that Arab television increased awareness on this topic. Evidence shows, however, that instead of illuminating ways in which the rights and duties inherent in freedom of expression could benefit the viewing public, each set of exchanges helped to sustain power relations by obscuring them.


1987 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 296-322 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Waldron

There is talk today of a ‘new generation’ of human rights. An idea which was associated in the first instance with civil and political liberties (‘first generation’ rights), and which was used after the Second World War to express popular aspirations to economic and social well-being (‘second generation’ rights), is now being invoked as a vehicle for claims about the importance of the environment, peace, and economic development, particularly in the Third World. No one doubts that these are worthy aims. But instead of merely saying that Third World countries need to develop their economies, instead of saying simply that peace is essential in a nuclear world, and that we must maintain and respect the eco-systems on which human life depends, the proclamation is being made that these are human rights —things to which people are entitled in the same way that they are entitled to democratic freedom or the right not to be tortured.


Al-Duhaa ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (02) ◽  
pp. 95-112
Author(s):  
Dr. Burhan Uddin ◽  
Arsala Khan ◽  
Abdur Rahim Khan

The history of slavery is very old. In which three types are very famous. Sell a freelance person, making slavery to a person resulting in a loss, and the prisoners arrested in the war were enslaved. Islam eliminated the first two types and the third case as an option left. On December 10th, 1948 UN passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which includes the right to human rights with other rights. Any type of slavery was prohibited. In the light of this universal charter, objections to Islam's concept of slavery began to be raised. What is the validity of the objections in the light of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948  raised against the Islamic concept of slavery? the methodology adopted for this research is to examine the contents of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from an Islamic point of view. In the same way, a true Islamic, rational and logical examination of the concept of slavery of Islam has been presented. There is also a wise law about slaves in the universal system that Islam has given to the world. Slavery in the name is left, otherwise, all their rights are in no way less than free human beings.   In case of any kind of abuse, they could have approached the Islamic court and got justice.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paulo André Stein Messetti ◽  
Dalmo De Abreu Dallari

Introduction: Human dignity, as coined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR / 1948), is an expression social solidarity, which should cement the relations between people. Human dignity is the foundation of all rights, such as freedom, equality, justice and peace in the world, and in Brazil, human dignity was deemed a fundamental pillar of the country’s post-1988 constitutional order. Objective: This article seeks to a deeper investigation about the social nature of human dignity and its definition over time.     Methods: This is an exploratory research meant to unpack the concepts of "human dignity", "bioethics", "human rights" and "constitution". After describing the conceptual evolution of human dignity and the facts relevant to its conceptual formation in world history - as a normative standard and a legal rule -, we address the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR/1948), the Declaration of Helsinki (DH/1964), the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR/2005), and the definition adopted in the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil (CFRB/1988). The study was carried out without temporal limitation, and included a review of referenced books, legal doctrines, as well as articles and books in the SciELO database. Results and discussion: The findings ratify that human dignity is the foundation of all rights, including those of freedom, equality, justice and peace in the world, and must also guide the rights and duties of social regulation. Human dignity has changed from a criterion of power attributed to the social position of individuals to a value of the right to freedom, which now goes beyond the right of freedom and is the basis of modern constitutional democracy, which makes possible the realization of solidarity, as well as the duty and purpose of the state and the community. The will of the subject, of society, of the science and of the state, as well as the rules of domination and regulation, must have a limit on human dignity, and human dignity is not just fundamental right, in the sense of the Constitution, and must prevail over the exclusive will of science, the State and society. Therefore, in the making of power decisions and in realization of possible innovations of science involving human beings, human dignity demands the explicit consideration of respect and promotion of it. Conclusion: Human dignity is enshrined in Brazilian constitutional law, as well as in bioethics and in human rights, and it constitutes all the fundamental rights of the human person. It is not merely a rule of autonomy and liberty, and it is an obligatory and non-derogable precept in the making of power decisions, a true main foundation of constitutional democracies.  


1962 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 234-251
Author(s):  
P. O'Higgins

On November 4, 1950, at Rome, thirteen member nations of the Council of Europe signed a Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The purpose of the Convention was to give practical effect to some of the ideals embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948. In contrast to the Universal Declaration, which is a statement of long-term ideals having no binding force in law, the European Convention guarantees to everyone within the jurisdiction of the signatory states certain rights and freedoms defined in Section I of the Convention. Chief among these are the right to life; the right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman punishment; the right not to be held in slavery or servitude; the right not to be deprived of personal liberty save in certain specified circumstances; freedom of religion, thought and conscience; freedom of assembly and association; the right to marry, and the right to respect for private and family life. By a Protocol signed on March 20, 1953, three further rights were added, namely the right to property; the right to educate one's children in conformity with one's conscience, and the right to free elections. As one of the architects of the Convention, Sean MacBride S.C., former Irish Minister for External Affairs and subsequently counsel for the applicant in the Lawless case, has said:“In effect, the Convention of Human Rights is a supranational constitution which binds the states accepting it to secure to all human beings within their jurisdiction the rights defined in the Convention.”


2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Perry

AbstractIn another essay being published contemporaneously with this one, I have explained that as the concept “human right” is understood both in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in all the various international human rights treaties that have followed in the Universal Declaration's wake, a right is a human right if the rationale for establishing and protecting the right—for example, as a treaty-based right—is, in part, that conduct that violates the right violates the imperative, articulated in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration, to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood.” Each of the human rights articulated in the Universal Declaration and/or in one or more international human rights treaties—for example, the right, articulated in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration and elsewhere, not to be subjected to “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”—is a specification of what, in conjunction with other considerations, the imperative—which functions in the morality of human rights as the normative ground of human rights—is thought to forbid (or to require). A particular specification is controversial if and to the extent the supporting claim—a claim to the effect that the “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood” imperative forbids (or requires)X—is controversial. My aim in this essay is to elaborate and defend a particular specification: the right, internationally recognized as a human right, to freedom of conscience—to freedom, that is, to live one's life in accord with the deliverances of one's conscience.


2019 ◽  
Vol 76 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 180-188
Author(s):  
Bianca Nicla Romano

Art. 24 of the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights recognises and protects the right of the individual to rest and leisure. This right has to be fully exercised without negative consequences on the right to work and the remuneration. Tourism can be considered one of the best ways of rest and leisure because it allows to enrich the personality of the individual. Even after the reform of the Title V this area is no longer covered by the Italian Constitution, the Italian legal system protects and guarantees it as a real right, so as to get to recognize its existence and the consequent compensation of the so-called “ruined holiday damage”. This kind of damage has not a patrimonial nature, but a moral one, and the Tourist-Traveler can claim for it when he has not been able to fully enjoy his holiday - the essential fulcrum of tourism - intended as an opportunity for leisure and/or rest, essential rights of the individual.


2019 ◽  
Vol 76 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 138-148
Author(s):  
Francesco Zammartino

Seventy Years after its proclamation, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, despite not having a binding force for the states, still provides at international level the fundamental text from which the principles and the values for the preservation of liberty and right of people are taken. In this article, the author particularly underlines the importance of Declaration’s article 1, which states: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. With these words the Declaration presses states to undertake economic policies aimed at achieving economic and social progress for all individuals. Unfortunately, we also have to underline the lack of effective social policies in government programs of the E.U. Member States. The author inquires whether it is left to European judges to affirm the importance of social welfare.


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