On the Concept and the Nature of Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 18-35
Author(s):  
Robert Alexy

The central argument of this chapter turns on the dual-nature thesis. This thesis sets out the claim that law necessarily comprises both a real or factual dimension and an ideal or critical dimension. The dual-nature thesis is incompatible with both exclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal positivism. It is also incompatible with variants of non-positivism according to which legal validity is lost in all cases of moral defect or demerit or, alternatively, is affected in no way at all by moral defects or demerits. The dual nature of law is expressed, on the one hand, by the Radbruch Formula, which says that extreme injustice is no law, and, on the other, by the correctness argument, which says that law’s claim to correctness necessarily includes a claim to moral correctness. Thus, what the law is depends not only on social facts but also on what the law ought to be.

1990 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-79
Author(s):  
Andrei Marmor

Of all the various aspects of legal positivism, it is those bearing upon a theory of adjudication which have prompted its critics’ fiercest attacks. Legal positivism is taken to be committed to the thesis that a distinction exists between (so called) ‘easy’ cases—where the law can be identified and applied straightforwardly—and ‘hard’ cases—where the issue is not determined by the existing legal standards. Most critics are united in their rejection of this dichotomy, but divided by the two main routes they follow. The more familiar one, first outlined by Professor R.M. Dworkin, sets out to deny that hard cases are not regulated by legal standards. The other objection, and the one I wish to consider here, strives to show that the distinction itself is illusory since in all relevant respects, there are no easy cases as the positivist presumes.


2009 ◽  
pp. 181-192
Author(s):  
Alfonso Catania

- Enrico Pattaro's volume The Law and the Right features an appreciable finesse of argumentation and an analysis of unusual historical density. The attention paid to psychology absolutely significant when studying an area like that of law, which comprises relationships of expectation and of claim is deserving of recognition as an indispensable, urgent complexification of the conceptual framework of legal positivism and realism, whose reasoning has for some time been manifesting a degree of aridity and, I dare say, poverty. The author identifies the fact that Hart is treated as having espoused the psychologically-inclined realist school as a consequence of the realistic attention to describing normative attitudes as somewhat forced reasoning. These normative attitudes that Hart analyses by drawing a distinction between the internal and the external point of view can hardly be reduced to mere internal experiences that are pregnant exclusively in empirical psychological terms. While the epistemological option in favour of a radical, materialist, psychologist monism expounded in Pattaro's book on the one hand stimulates a valuable investigation into the mental and social dynamic immanent to reality (which must be), no less than the plane of reality that is, on the other hand it runs the risk of casting a shadow on the dimension of designing and transforming reality practised by those who generate norms (marginal in volume compared to the prevalence of believers who make them what they are by the very act of believing in them), thus blacking out the dialectic tension between law and facticity, obedience and effectiveness. This is a classical objection to radical realism that is not overcome by the attention paid by Pattaro to the normative dimension "in the relative sense".


1999 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei Marmor

There are many versions of legal positivism; perhaps as many as there are legal positivists around. All the versions of legal positivism, however, subscribe to the so-called Separation Thesis. This thesis basically maintains that detenriining what the law is, does not necessarily, or conceptually, depend on moral or other evaluative considerations about what it ought to be in the relevant circumstances. Legal positivists differ, however, and quite substantially, over the appropriate interpretation of this thesis. The so-called ‘strong’, or ‘exclusive’ version of legal positivism maintains that moral considerations never determine the legal validity of norms. ‘Soft’ positivists, on the other hand, do maintain that there is a close relation between legal validity and morality, but they hold that this relation is, at best, a contingent matter; it does not derive from the nature of law or legal reasoning as such. Soft-positivists claim that moral considerations determine legal validity only in certain cases, namely, in those cases which follow from the rules of recognition that happen to prevail in a given legal system.


Author(s):  
Francisco M. Mora-Sifuentes

RESUMEN: Este trabajo tiene como finalidad destacar la contribución específica de H.L.A. Hart sobre el problema del positivismo jurídico. A juicio del autor, el tratamiento que Hart dio a la polémica entre positivismo jurídico y Derecho Natural estuvo marcada por dos extremos aparentemente contradictorios. Por una parte, se abocó a clarificar las diversas tesis que anidan tras la etiqueta “positivismo jurídico”, así como las posiciones que suelen referirse como tales. Al hacerlo abrió el camino para mostrar en qué sentido no resulta ilógico defender algunas tesis asociadas al mismo o negar otras. Por otra parte, y si bien no asumió una posición que afirmase la conexión necesaria entre Derecho y moral, se ocupó también de mostrar en qué sentido tal conexión existe y es importante. Con dicho objetivo, en el primer apartado se ofrece una reconstrucción detallada sobre el tratamiento que Hart hizo sobre el problema del positivismo jurídico. En el segundo se expone el tratamiento del autor sobre el iusnaturalismo, con la intención de comprender el lugar preciso e implicaciones de su conocida tesis del “contenido mínimo Derecho Natural”. En la tercera parte se aborda la teoría elaborada por Hart sobre el positivismo jurídico, esto es, el “positivismo jurídico hartiano” y las tesis por él defendidas. Importante aquí será su posición respecto a la posibilidad de que la regla de reconocimiento pueda incorporar criterios materiales para la identificación jurídica que nos introduce en una nueva etapa de la nunca acabada polémica. ABSTRACT: The aim of this work is to address H.L.A. Hart’s contribution to the problem of legal positivism. According to the author, Hart’s approach to the controversy of Natural Law/Legal Positivism was characterized by two apparently opposing ends. On the one hand, he clarified the label “Legal Positivism” as well as other approaches that are usually referred as such. In doing so, he paved the way to show in which sense it is not illogical to defend some theses associated with it and in which sense it is not. On the other hand, despite he did not take a stand for the necessary connection between Law and Morals, he did show in what sense such connection may exist and why it is important. To this end, section one offers a detailed reconstruction of Hart’s approach to the problem of legal positivism. In section two the author’s approach to Natural Law is explained so that his well-known thesis of “The Minimum Content of Natural Law”, and what it implies, is properly understood. Section three is devoted to Hart’s theory of Legal Positivism that is “Hartian Legal Positivism”, where his main claims are presented. Hart’s claim on the possibility for the rule of recognition to incorporate material criteria for legal identification or legal validity is particular relevant because it introduces us to a new stage of the never-ending controversy. PALABRAS CLAVE: H.L.A. Hart, positivismo jurídico, teorías de derecho natural, positivismo jurídico incluyenteKEYWORDS: H.L.A. Hart, legal positivism, natural law theories, inclusive legal positivism. 


Author(s):  
Nimer Sultany

This chapter analyzes concrete Egyptian and Tunisian cases that showcase the interplay between continuity and rupture. These cases illustrate the lack of a systemic relation between law and revolution. On the one hand, the judiciary that interprets and applies the law is part of the very social and political conflicts it is supposed to resolve. On the other hand, the law is incoherent and there are often resources within the legal materials to play it both ways. Thus, the different forces at work use both continuity and rupture to advance their positions. Furthermore, legitimacy discourse mediates the contradictions between law and revolution in the experience of different legal and political actors. This mediation serves an ideological role because it presupposes a binary dichotomy between continuity and rupture, papers over law’s incoherence by reducing it to a singular voice, and reduces revolution to an event rather than a process.


1972 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-410
Author(s):  
Aharon Yoran

It is submitted that even if the hapless outsider cannot bring an action for damages because of the existing state of the law regarding fiduciary duties and breach of statutory duties, he still has an equitable remedy of rescission of the contract based on quasi-contractual principles. The crime of fraud, under secs. 13 and 54, respectively, would be made the basis of setting the contract (of sale or purchase) aside. To support this proposition we shall explore the quasi-contractual principles which enable one contracting party, the victim of a crime committed by the other party in entering the contract, to defeat this contract.In Browning v. Morris, in an oft-quoted statement by Lord Mansfield, the following principle was declared: But, where contracts or transactions are prohibited by positive statutes, for protecting one set of men from another set of men; the one, from their situation and condition, being liable to be oppressed or imposed upon by the other; there, the parties are not in pan delicto; and in furtherance of these statutes, the person injured, after the transaction is finished and completed, may bring an action and defeat the contract.


2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Morse

How to respond justly to the dangers persistent violent offenders present is a vexing moral and legal issue. On the one hand, we wish to reduce predation; on the other, we want to treat predators fairly. The central theme of this paper is that it is difficult to achieve both goals without compromising one of them, and that both are being seriously undermined. I begin by explaining the legal theory, doctrine and practice governing dangerous offenders (DO) and demonstrate that the law leaves a gap in the ability to confine them. Next I explore the means by which the law has overtly or covertly sought to fill the gap. Many of these measures, especially the new form of civil commitment for sexual predators, dangerously conflate moral and medical categories. I conclude that pure preventive detention is more common than we usually assume, but that this practice violates fundamental assumptions concerning liberty under the American constitutional regime.


Al-MAJAALIS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Muhammad Arifin Badri

This study aims to examine the laws of dowry money decoration that are common in the community. The innovation and soul of art that is channeled through décor of dowry money is proven to produce beautiful and unique works, so as to attract the attention and interest of the wider community. However, because to produce beautiful and unique works, a high level of creativity is needed, so not everyone can do it. On the one hand, this phenomenon opens up quite good business opportunities, but on the other hand, it should be watched out, because in some conditions it contains the practice of buying and selling currencies with nominal differences. Through this study, I would like to uncover the law of buying and selling practices decorating dowry money and decorating services. As I also intend to present an applicative solution for the community so that they can still channel their artistic talents without violating Shari’ah law.


De Jure ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hristo Banov ◽  

The article reviews the main differences between the monetary obligation of the employer under Art. 232, para. 2 of the Labour Code and other payments that the same party owes by law in the employment relationship. Thus, the hypotheses are differentiated, on the one hand, of the unilateral termination of the employment contract by the employer against monetary payment on the grounds of Art. 232, para. 2 of the Labour Code, and, on the other hand, the emergence of an obligation to pay certain compensations – in the true sense of the term – under Art. 213, Art. 214, Art. 219, para. 2 and Art. 225 of the Labour Code. Thereby, the thesis regarding the impossibility of incurring of an obligation on the employer to simultaneously execute the various mentioned monetary considerations, is reasoned. In addition, the rules set out in the law are discussed, both for contracting and for the final calculation of the amount of the employer’s monetary payment, which this study focuses on.


Author(s):  
V. Кroitor

The article studies the issue of scientific and practical validity of applying ethical principles of society as regulatory factors of civil law of Ukraine. Taking into account the lack of validity of ethical principles of society as regulatory factors, the author attempts to make a correlation between the content of such principles of civil law as fairness, integrity and reasonableness, on the one hand, and ethical principles of the society, on the other hand. The author of the paper proves that it is inappropriate to apply the provisions of morality as regulatory factors for the regulation of civil relations. The conclusion on the objection to the civil regularity of ethical principles of society is based on several theses. Firstly, moral rules are not formalized, which creates a threat of arbitrary interpretation of their content. Secondly, ethical principles do not have a definite source of origin. Thirdly, the fundamental ethical rules have already been taken into account in the content of the principles of fairness, integrity and reason, which in turn create competition between the two types of regulatory factors. Unreasonable duplication of regulatory requirements reduces the functionality of the law, complicates the perception of its requirements. The competition between the principles of law and the ethical principles of society must be eliminated by refusing to give the latter the function of regulatory factors. The author of the paper does not deny the possibility of taking into account the ethical principles of society while regulating the relations that have been neglected by the "official law".


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