The Weight Formula

2021 ◽  
pp. 154-174
Author(s):  
Robert Alexy

In this chapter the Law of Balancing, one of the two laws in A Theory of Constitutional Law (2002), is transformed into a mathematical formula, the Weight Formula. This formula allows a clear identification of the three factors that pertain to balancing: intensity of interference, abstract weight, and epistemic reliability of the premises standing behind these two classifications, and this on both sides of the principles collision. This is not possible without scaling. A geometric and discrete scale is proposed. Discrete scales are necessary. Geometric scales have advantages with respect to arithmetic scales. Cases are considered, and, in the last part of the text, open questions are presented.

1992 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Troper

It suffices to examine two of the most important texts which form the basis of France's constitutional system, the Declaration of Human Rights of 1789, and the Law of June 3, 1958, in order to become convinced that separation of powers is one of those immutable principles which imposes itself as self-evident on every liberal constituent body. Article 16 of the Declaration of 1789 proclaims that “any society in which the protection of rights is not ensured, nor the separation of powers established, has no constitution”. The constitutional Law of June 3, 1958, for its part, authorizes the government to establish a constitutional project, provided that five principles be respected; among these principles appears, immediately following the necessity of universal suffrage, the separation of powers.


2021 ◽  
pp. 13-16
Author(s):  
Olena HALUS ◽  
Oleksandr BRYHINETS ◽  
Iryna RYZHUK

The paper proves that the realization of the right to a dignified life can be effective only in the framework of legal activities, and the presence of special legal means, which are tools to ensure a dignified human existence, also plays an important role. The analysis revealed that each society has its own standards of understanding the right to a sufficient standard of living, the basis in this case should be the only generally accepted norms and standards, especially those enshrined in international legal instruments. Guarantees of constitutional law and housing and the right to an adequate standard of living are interrelated and represented by a system of political, economic, social conditions, legal means and mechanisms aimed at ensuring the proper exercise of these rights. The system of guarantees of the constitutional right to housing and a sufficient standard of living is represented by general and special (legal) guarantees. The purpose of preventing corruption due to conflict of interest is to form a unified approach of persons authorized to perform state or local government functions and persons equated to them, to understand and comply with the rules of prevention and settlement of conflicts of interest introduced by the Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of Corruption”. Preferential provision of housing for citizens is carried out through certain mechanisms: providing citizens with affordable housing, provided by the Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of the Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the Development of the Construction Industry and Housing Construction”; state, regional and local housing programs for certain categories of the population; providing social housing to socially vulnerable groups of the population of Ukraine.


2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 453-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
András Jakab

A foreign jurist, on looking into the German literature on constitutional law, will soon and suddenly be struck by a peculiarity of this scholarship: the unusually strong emphasis on a marginal area of constitutional law, namely, the state of emergency. The inquiry is, of course, well-known in other countries, but the passion for, and the theoretical effort expended on, this marginal area is unique to Germany.However, this disinterest on the part of other constitutional lawyers, and the recent decline in interest on Germany's part, could yet change, turning the marginal area into a highly current issue. Combating terrorism raises questions for which the German patterns of argumentation, fine-tuned in the academic debate on the law of state of emergency, may provide a useful framework for discussion. The questions arising in the context of the struggle against terrorism test the limits of positive regulations in extreme situations, leading ultimately to the same underlying dilemma as the law on state of emergency, though with different terminology. In this sense, the constellation of legal issues involved in combating terrorism could be considered as the law on state of emergency “incognito.” However, the various argumentative patterns for law on state of emergency have not yet been directly transferred into the very timely legal discourse on counterterrorism (and no such attempt is made here), but such a transfer of argumentation suggests itself. As such, the topic has a “potential currency,” even if traditional issues of state of emergency themselves no longer count among the most current issues.


Grotiana ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 396-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustaaf van Nifterik

AbstractAn important aspect of any constitutional theory is the state's power to punish transgressions of the law, or the ius gladii. Although Grotius never formulated a complete, comprehensive constitutional theory, traces of such a theory can be found in many of his writings not explicitly devoted to constitutional law. Punishment even plays an important role in his books on war (and peace), since to punish transgressions of the law is ranked among the just causes of war.Given the fact that a state may punish transgressions of the law – transgressions by individuals within and even outside the state, but also transgressions of the law by other states – the question may arise concerning the origin of such a right to punish. It will be shown that Grotius did not give the same answer to this question in his various works. As the right to punish is concerned, we find a theory that seems to be akin to the one of John Locke in the De iure praedae (around 1605), one akin to the theories of the Spanish late-scholastics in De satisfactione and De imperio (around 1615), and a theory coming close to what Thomas Hobbes had said on the ruler's right to punish in the De iure belli ac pacis (around 1625).Of course, Grotius can only have been familiar with the theory of the Spanish late-scholastics, since those of Locke and Hobbes were still to be written by the time Grotius had passed away.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörn Griebel

Property protection is provided by national law as well as international law. The study seeks for an explanation regarding the divergent approaches to the protection of shareholders in cases of reflective loss provided for in German constitutional law and various fields of public international law. This is done by way of a comparison of the German approach with those found in the law of aliens, in the European Convention on Human Rights and under international investment law. This results in the finding that approaches of international law partly fail to establish the necessary bonds to recognized concepts of national law.


Author(s):  
Anselm Doering-Manteuffel

Breaking the Law as a Norm: Contours of Ideological Radicalism within the Nazi Dictatorship. This article analyzes the relationship between Nazi legal experts’ efforts to create a canon of constitutional law for the Third Reich and the ideological radicalism characteristic of Hitler and the SS-state. The attempts of legal professionals to establish “völkisch” constitutional law emerged out of the staunch anti-liberalism that had spread throughout Germany since the end of World War I. However, this “völkisch” constitutional law bore no resemblance to rational European legal thought. It not only proved to be ineffective for this reason, but also because the ideological radicalism that reigned supreme in the Third Reich sought to break the law and let lawlessness rule.


2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 897-934 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Wilsher

Fortunately it is still startling, in this country, to find a person held indefinitely in executive custody without accusation of crime or judicial trial. Executive imprisonment has been considered oppressive and lawless since John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man should be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed, or exiled save by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land, (per Jackson J, Shaughnessy v United States ex rel Mezei 345 US 206 (1953))


1966 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-128
Author(s):  
B. E. King

IThe title of this essay refers to the titles of three recent works by Professors of Jurisprudence. It is proposed to use these works to illustrate the problem of Jurisprudence in discovering its own appropriate concepts and making sense of its literature.Jurisprudence, it may be assumed, is what Professors of Jurisprudence write. They write it presumably for the edification of students in the Faculties to which they are attached, to help them to see the coherence and the relevance of the more specialised studies in which they are engaged. These Faculties are Faculties of Law. But what is law? The diverse strange and even paradoxical ways in which this question has been answered by serious thinkers, says Professor Hart in his opening paragraph, constitute “a situation not paralleled in any other subject systematically studied as a separate academic discipline.” If we say, then, that Professors of Jurisprudence write about law, our statement may fail to convey any exact or agreed information. Even if it may correctly be assumed that Professors of Jurisprudence use the word ‘law’ to refer to their basic subject-matter, it cannot be assumed that the precise identity of this subject-matter is universally or even generally agreed. Consider some of the identifications of law quoted by Professor Hart—‘ What officials do about disputes is… the law itself’; ‘The prophecies of what the courts will do… are what I mean by the law’; Statutes are ‘sources of Law… not parts of the Law itself’; ‘Constitutional law is positive morality merely’; ‘One shall not steal; if somebody steals he shall be punished… If at all existent, the first norm is contained in the second norm which is the only genuine norm… Law is the primary norm which stipulates the sanction.’


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