Acts, Agents, and the Definition of Virtue

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gopal Sreenivasan
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Character Trait ◽  
Present Argument ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter discusses the direction of epistemological priority between traits and actions in the definition of virtue. Do we first identify a character trait as kind, say, and only then identify its characteristic expressions as kind acts? Or do we identify various acts as kind acts first, and only then identify the agents who perform them as kind agents? This chapter defends a modest agent-centered view: some kind acts can be identified as kind without reference to any kind agent, while other kind acts cannot be identified as kind except by identifying them as the characteristic expressions of a certain trait (kindness). Many proponents of virtue ethics are committed to a privileged role for agents in the definition of virtue; and they regard this commitment as making their enterprise distinctive. In preserving an indispensable role for virtuous agents in the identification of virtuous actions, the present argument vindicates their aspiration.

Emotion and Virtue

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gopal Sreenivasan
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Character Trait ◽  
Full Measure ◽  
Traditional Definition ◽  
Definition Of

What must a person be like to possess a virtue in full measure? What sort of psychological constitution does one need to be an exemplar of compassion, say, or of courage? Focusing on these two examples, this book ingeniously argues that certain emotion traits play an indispensable role in virtue. With exemplars of compassion, for instance, this role is played by a modified sympathy trait, which is central to enabling these exemplars to be reliably correct judges of the compassionate thing to do in various practical situations. Indeed, according to the book, the virtue of compassion is, in a sense, a modified sympathy trait, just as courage is a modified fear trait. While the book upholds the traditional definition of virtue as a species of character trait, it discards other traditional precepts. For example, the book rejects the unity of the virtues and raises new questions about when virtue should be taught. Unlike orthodox virtue ethics, moreover, this account does not aspire to rival consequentialism and deontology. Instead the book repudiates the ambitions of virtue imperialism, and makes significant contributions to moral psychology and the theory of virtue alike.

Character Traits

2020 ◽  
pp. 84-108
Author(s):  
Gopal Sreenivasan
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
Character Trait ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Scientific Psychology ◽  
Traditional Definition ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter defends the traditional definition of virtue against the situationist critique, which is wielded by empirically minded philosophers and originate in the situationist tradition in social psychology. It demonstrates philosophical arguments and position that are consistent with a scientific psychology. It also organizes the use of virtue terms as evaluations of rightness and connect this use to a significant additional way in which exemplars of virtue are relevant. The chapter defines virtue as a species of character trait, which exposes a theory of virtue to what has come to be known as the situationist critique of virtue ethics. It analyses experimental results in social psychology that demonstrate that most people do not have any character traits.

Virtue Ethics vs. Rule-Consequentialism: A Reply to Brad Hooker

Utilitas ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosalind Hursthouse
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Character Trait ◽  
Human Species ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Virtuous Character ◽  
My Criterion

In On Virtue Ethics I offered a criterion for a character trait's being a virtue according to which a virtuous character trait must conduce to, or at least not be inimical to, four ends, one of which is the continuance of the human species. I argue here that this does not commit me to homosexuality's being a vice, since homosexuality is not a character trait and hence not up for assessment as a virtue or a vice. Vegetarianism is not up for such assessment either, for the same reason, but, as a practice, may well be required by the virtue of compassion, and sacrificing one's life for an animal or alien may be required by courage. The clause about the continuance of the human species in my criterion does not specify a foundational value, because, following McDowell, I reject foundationalism.

Would a Virtuous Person Grandstand?

Grandstanding ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 119-138
Author(s):  
Justin Tosi ◽  
Brandon Warmke
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Character Trait ◽  
General Character ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Will To Power ◽  
Slave Revolt ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
Moral Talk ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

This chapter discusses moral grandstanding from the standpoint of virtue ethics. Three common approaches to virtue ethics are considered. A virtuous person would not grandstand according to the classical conception of virtue, on which virtue is doing the right thing for the right reason. People would be disappointed if they found out that a widely admired, historic speech turned out to be grandstanding. Vanity, the general character trait most closely associated with grandstanding, is not plausibly a virtue according to virtue consequentialism. Finally, grandstanding is an abuse of morality, like the one Nietzsche labels the slave revolt in morals, as grandstanders use moral talk as an underhanded shortcut to satisfy their will to power.

scholarly journals Naturalistic Moral Realism and Evolutionary Biology

Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 2
Author(s):  
Paul Bloomfield
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Philippa Foot ◽  
Present Argument ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Empirical Foundation ◽  
True Claim ◽  
Evolutionary Fitness

Perhaps the most familiar understanding of “naturalism” derives from Quine, understanding it as a continuity of empirical theories of the world as described through the scientific method. So, it might be surprising that one of the most important naturalistic moral realists, Philippa Foot, rejects standard evolutionary biology in her justly lauded Natural Goodness. One of her main reasons for this is the true claim that humans can flourish (eudaimonia) without reproducing, which she claims cannot be squared with evolutionary theory and biology more generally. The present argument concludes that Foot was wrong to reject evolutionary theory as the empirical foundation of naturalized eudaimonist moral realism. This is based on contemporary discussion of biological functions and evolutionary fitness, from which a definition of “eudaimonia” is constructed. This gives eudaimonist moral realism an empirically respectable foundation.

Hume and Virtue Ethics

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter shows how Hume’s “sentimentalist” moral theory can be a version of virtue ethics and elaborates the kind of virtue ethics that best describes Hume’s moral philosophy. To accomplish this task, we need a definition of virtue ethics, an account of types of virtue ethical theory, and to place Hume’s ethics within this taxonomy. Three types of virtue ethics, are outlined. Hume is located within a pluralistic virtue ethics where virtue notions are central and a variety of features make traits “naturally fitted” to be approved as virtues. Hume’s virtue ethics is understood as response-dependent, being grounded in an emotional kind of “moral sense” as suitably objective and as conforming to his basic empiricism.

Excellence V. Effectiveness: Macintyre’s Critique of Business

1995 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 499-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles M. Horvath
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Behavior ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Business Managers ◽  
Internal Standards ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Meaningful Definition ◽  
Ethical Systems

Abstract:Alasdair Maclntyre (1984) asserts that the ethical systems of the Enlightenment (formalism and utilitarianism) have failed to provide a meaningful definition of “good.” Lacking such a definition, business managers have no internal standards by which they can morally evaluate their roles or acts. Maclntyre goes on to claim that managers have substituted external measures of “winning” or “effectiveness” for any internal concept of good. He supports a return to the Aristotelian notion of virtue or “excellence.” Such a system of virtue ethics depends on an interrelationship of the community, one’s roles in that community, and the virtues one needs to perform that role well. This article develops Maclntyre’s concept of virtue ethics and shows how this paradigm fits well with existing theories about organizational behavior.

Super Soldiers (Part 2)

2014 ◽  
pp. 139-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Lin ◽  
Max Mehlman ◽  
Keith Abney ◽  
Shannon French ◽  
Shannon Vallor ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Human Enhancement ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Health It ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Improve Performance ◽  
Working Definition ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Domestic Law

This is the second chapter of two on military human enhancement. In the first chapter, the authors outlined past and present efforts aimed at enhancing the minds and bodies of our warfighters with the broader goal of creating the “super soldiers” of tomorrow, all before exploring a number of distinctions—natural vs. artificial, external vs. internal, enhancement vs. therapy, enhancement vs. disenhancement, and enhancement vs. engineering—that are critical to the definition of military human enhancement and understanding the problems it poses. The chapter then advanced a working definition of enhancement as efforts that aim to “improve performance, appearance, or capability besides what is necessary to achieve, sustain, or restore health.” It then discussed a number of variables that must be taken into consideration when applying this definition in a military context. In this second chapter, drawing on that definition and some of the controversies already mentioned, the authors set out the relevant ethical, legal, and operational challenges posed by military enhancement. They begin by considering some of the implications for international humanitarian law and then shift to US domestic law. Following that, the authors examine military human enhancement from a virtue ethics approach, and finally outline some potential consequences for military operations more generally.

Super Soldiers

2015 ◽  
pp. 1527-1548
Author(s):  
Patrick Lin ◽  
Max Mehlman ◽  
Keith Abney ◽  
Shannon French ◽  
Shannon Vallor ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Human Enhancement ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Health It ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Improve Performance ◽  
Working Definition ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Domestic Law

This is the second chapter of two on military human enhancement. In the first chapter, the authors outlined past and present efforts aimed at enhancing the minds and bodies of our warfighters with the broader goal of creating the “super soldiers” of tomorrow, all before exploring a number of distinctions—natural vs. artificial, external vs. internal, enhancement vs. therapy, enhancement vs. disenhancement, and enhancement vs. engineering—that are critical to the definition of military human enhancement and understanding the problems it poses. The chapter then advanced a working definition of enhancement as efforts that aim to “improve performance, appearance, or capability besides what is necessary to achieve, sustain, or restore health.” It then discussed a number of variables that must be taken into consideration when applying this definition in a military context. In this second chapter, drawing on that definition and some of the controversies already mentioned, the authors set out the relevant ethical, legal, and operational challenges posed by military enhancement. They begin by considering some of the implications for international humanitarian law and then shift to US domestic law. Following that, the authors examine military human enhancement from a virtue ethics approach, and finally outline some potential consequences for military operations more generally.

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