Emotion and Virtue

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gopal Sreenivasan
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Character Trait ◽  
Full Measure ◽  
Traditional Definition ◽  
Definition Of

What must a person be like to possess a virtue in full measure? What sort of psychological constitution does one need to be an exemplar of compassion, say, or of courage? Focusing on these two examples, this book ingeniously argues that certain emotion traits play an indispensable role in virtue. With exemplars of compassion, for instance, this role is played by a modified sympathy trait, which is central to enabling these exemplars to be reliably correct judges of the compassionate thing to do in various practical situations. Indeed, according to the book, the virtue of compassion is, in a sense, a modified sympathy trait, just as courage is a modified fear trait. While the book upholds the traditional definition of virtue as a species of character trait, it discards other traditional precepts. For example, the book rejects the unity of the virtues and raises new questions about when virtue should be taught. Unlike orthodox virtue ethics, moreover, this account does not aspire to rival consequentialism and deontology. Instead the book repudiates the ambitions of virtue imperialism, and makes significant contributions to moral psychology and the theory of virtue alike.

Character Traits

2020 ◽  
pp. 84-108
Author(s):  
Gopal Sreenivasan
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
Character Trait ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Scientific Psychology ◽  
Traditional Definition ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter defends the traditional definition of virtue against the situationist critique, which is wielded by empirically minded philosophers and originate in the situationist tradition in social psychology. It demonstrates philosophical arguments and position that are consistent with a scientific psychology. It also organizes the use of virtue terms as evaluations of rightness and connect this use to a significant additional way in which exemplars of virtue are relevant. The chapter defines virtue as a species of character trait, which exposes a theory of virtue to what has come to be known as the situationist critique of virtue ethics. It analyses experimental results in social psychology that demonstrate that most people do not have any character traits.

Acts, Agents, and the Definition of Virtue

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gopal Sreenivasan
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Character Trait ◽  
Present Argument ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter discusses the direction of epistemological priority between traits and actions in the definition of virtue. Do we first identify a character trait as kind, say, and only then identify its characteristic expressions as kind acts? Or do we identify various acts as kind acts first, and only then identify the agents who perform them as kind agents? This chapter defends a modest agent-centered view: some kind acts can be identified as kind without reference to any kind agent, while other kind acts cannot be identified as kind except by identifying them as the characteristic expressions of a certain trait (kindness). Many proponents of virtue ethics are committed to a privileged role for agents in the definition of virtue; and they regard this commitment as making their enterprise distinctive. In preserving an indispensable role for virtuous agents in the identification of virtuous actions, the present argument vindicates their aspiration.

scholarly journals Permanent Establishment – New Concept

2019 ◽  
pp. 445-456
Author(s):  
César García Novoa
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
New Economy ◽  
Tax Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Traditional Definition ◽  
Permanent Establishment ◽  
International Tax ◽  
Definition Of

The permanent establishment is an essential concept in International Tax Law. The traditional definition was based on the existence of a fixed place of business. At present, the new economy requires a change in the concept of permanent establishment. The topic of permanent establishment is based today on the so-called sufficient economic presence. The European Union is working on the definition of a permanent digital establishment.

THE MOUFANG LAWS, GLOBAL AND LOCAL

2009 ◽  
Vol 08 (04) ◽  
pp. 477-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. D. PHILLIPS
Keyword(s):  
Present Author ◽  
Inverse Property ◽  
Loop Theory ◽  
Traditional Definition ◽  
Moufang Loops ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Global And Local

There are many possible ways to define Moufang element. We show that the traditional definition is not the most felicitious — for instance, the set of all Moufang elements in an arbitrary loop, qua the traditional definition, need not form a subloop. We offer a new definition of Moufang element that ensures that the set of all Moufang elements in an arbitrary loop is a subloop. Moreover, this definition is "maximally algebraic" with respect to autotopisms. We also give an application of this new definition by showing that a flexible A-element in an inverse property loop is, in fact, a Moufang element, thus sharpening a well-known result of Kinyon, Kunen, and the present author [6]. Finally, we prove that divisible, Moufang groupoids are Moufang loops, thus sharpening a result of Kunen [9], one of the first computer-generated proofs in loop theory.

scholarly journals Anaphora: Text-based or discourse-dependent?

2010 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis Cornish
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Interaction ◽  
Discourse Representation ◽  
Computational Approaches ◽  
Anaphor Resolution ◽  
Language Structure ◽  
Traditional Definition ◽  
On Line ◽  
Full Sense ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Sense And Reference

The traditional definition of anaphora in purely co-textual terms as a relation between two co-occurring expressions is in wide currency in theoretical and descriptive studies of the phenomenon. Indeed, it is currently adopted in on-line psycholinguistic experiments on the interpretation of anaphors, and is the basis for all computational approaches to automatic anaphor resolution (see Mitkov 2002). Under this conception, the anaphor, a referentially-dependent expression type, requires “saturation” by an appropriate referentially-autonomous, lexically-based expression — the antecedent — in order to achieve full sense and reference. However, this definition needs to be re-examined in the light of the ways in which real texts operate and are understood, where the resulting picture is rather different. The article aims to show that the co-textual conception is misconceived, and that anaphora is essentially an integrative, discourse-creating procedure involving a three-way relationship between an “antecedent trigger”, an anaphoric predication, and a salient discourse representation. It is shown that it is only in terms of a dynamic interaction amongst the interdependent dimensions of text and discourse, as well as context, that the true complexity of anaphoric reference may be satisfactorily described. The article is intended as a contribution to the broader debate within the pages of this journal and elsewhere between the formalist and the functionalist accounts of language structure and use.

Virtue Ethics vs. Rule-Consequentialism: A Reply to Brad Hooker

Utilitas ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosalind Hursthouse
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Character Trait ◽  
Human Species ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Virtuous Character ◽  
My Criterion

In On Virtue Ethics I offered a criterion for a character trait's being a virtue according to which a virtuous character trait must conduce to, or at least not be inimical to, four ends, one of which is the continuance of the human species. I argue here that this does not commit me to homosexuality's being a vice, since homosexuality is not a character trait and hence not up for assessment as a virtue or a vice. Vegetarianism is not up for such assessment either, for the same reason, but, as a practice, may well be required by the virtue of compassion, and sacrificing one's life for an animal or alien may be required by courage. The clause about the continuance of the human species in my criterion does not specify a foundational value, because, following McDowell, I reject foundationalism.

The Philosophy of Moral Development

2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-86
Author(s):  
Anna Abram
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Moral Failure ◽  
Personal Interaction ◽  
Interdisciplinary Study

This article presents a view of moral development based on the interdisciplinary study of moral psychology and virtue ethics. It suggests that a successful account of moral development has to go beyond what the developmental psychology and virtue ethics advocate and find ways of incorporating ideas, such as “moral failure” and “unpredictability of life.” It proposes to recognize the concept of moral development as an essential concept for ethics, moral philosophy and philosophy of education, and as a useful tool for anyone who wants to engage constructively in dialogues of religions, cultures and personal interaction.

Would a Virtuous Person Grandstand?

Grandstanding ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 119-138
Author(s):  
Justin Tosi ◽  
Brandon Warmke
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Character Trait ◽  
General Character ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Will To Power ◽  
Slave Revolt ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
Moral Talk ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

This chapter discusses moral grandstanding from the standpoint of virtue ethics. Three common approaches to virtue ethics are considered. A virtuous person would not grandstand according to the classical conception of virtue, on which virtue is doing the right thing for the right reason. People would be disappointed if they found out that a widely admired, historic speech turned out to be grandstanding. Vanity, the general character trait most closely associated with grandstanding, is not plausibly a virtue according to virtue consequentialism. Finally, grandstanding is an abuse of morality, like the one Nietzsche labels the slave revolt in morals, as grandstanders use moral talk as an underhanded shortcut to satisfy their will to power.

Moral psychology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Slote
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Psychological Issues ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Weakness ◽  
Moral Requirements ◽  
Wrong Action

Moral psychology as a discipline is centrally concerned with psychological issues that arise in connection with the moral evaluation of actions. It deals with the psychological presuppositions of valid morality, that is, with assumptions it seems necessary for us to make in order for there to be such a thing as objective or binding moral requirements: for example, if we lack free will or are all incapable of unselfishness, then it is not clear how morality can really apply to human beings. Moral psychology also deals with what one might call the psychological accompaniments of actual right, or wrong, action, for example, with questions about the nature and possibility of moral weakness or self-deception, and with questions about the kinds of motives that ought to motivate moral agents. Moreover, in the approach to ethics known as ‘virtue ethics’ questions about right and wrong action merge with questions about the motives, dispositions, and abilities of moral agents, and moral psychology plays a more central role than it does in other forms of ethical theory.

Compliance within virtual teams

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daphna Shwartz-Asher
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Teams ◽  
Virtual World ◽  
Team Member ◽  
Human Resources Management ◽  
Virtual Team ◽  
Team Members ◽  
Resources Management ◽  
Traditional Definition ◽  
Team Task ◽  
Definition Of

In light of the growing phenomenon of virtual teams as a new concept within the Human Resources Management (HRM) world, the traditional definition of team member 'compliance' should be redefined. In order to measure the influence of the virtuality level on the team member’s reaction to instructions, an experiment was designed, in which a team task with a set of instructions was given to 150 subjects who participated in virtual or non-virtual task solving' meetings. This study’s main finding indicates that while the structured virtual team members complied with the directive to divide the labor between them and to appoint a chairperson, the structured non-virtual team members did not comply. It seems that pertaining to the task of appointing a chairperson, as for the division of labor, the use of the “formality” variable may explain the compliance of the structured virtual team members as opposed to the lack of compliance among members of the structured non-virtual team members. This research contributes to a better understanding of virtual team HRM strategies in the hope of improving the teams’ compliance and management within today’s virtual world.

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