Politics as Morality Pageant

This chapter argues that grandstanding contributes to significant problems for politics in democracies. Politicians are notorious for grandstanding, likely because they have strong incentives to do so. Many voters choose candidates for their perceived character traits, so politicians grandstand to give the people what they want. Because people associate morality with taking unyielding stands, politicians who grandstand have strong incentives not to compromise with the opposing party. If they do, voters will treat them as flip-floppers. The same is true for activists, who risk being seen as having a weak commitment to the cause by other activists. Political grandstanders also tend to support expressive or symbolic policies, which seem to straightforwardly address a problem, but are actually ineffective. Finally, grandstanders sometimes have reason not to solve social problems at all, as doing so may eliminate opportunities to advance their interests.

Would a Virtuous Person Grandstand?

This chapter discusses moral grandstanding from the standpoint of virtue ethics. Three common approaches to virtue ethics are considered. A virtuous person would not grandstand according to the classical conception of virtue, on which virtue is doing the right thing for the right reason. People would be disappointed if they found out that a widely admired, historic speech turned out to be grandstanding. Vanity, the general character trait most closely associated with grandstanding, is not plausibly a virtue according to virtue consequentialism. Finally, grandstanding is an abuse of morality, like the one Nietzsche labels the slave revolt in morals, as grandstanders use moral talk as an underhanded shortcut to satisfy their will to power.

The Social Costs of Grandstanding

This chapter presents some consequentialist considerations against moral grandstanding. Grandstanding contributes to group polarization. Relatedly, grandstanding leads people to hold false beliefs, and to be overconfident about their beliefs. Grandstanding also threatens to undercut the effectiveness of moral talk. It makes people increasingly cynical about moral discourse, and it may cause outrage exhaustion—an insensitivity to expressions of outrage by others, and an inability to muster outrage oneself. When grandstanding becomes too common in public discourse, moderates avoid discussions of morality and politics. In spite of these costs, the possibility that grandstanding may be socially beneficial is also considered.

Grandstanding: A Field Guide

Drawing on empirical research from psychology, this chapter shows what grandstanding looks like in public discourse and why it often takes the forms it does. When grandstanders pile on, they contribute to public moral discourse to proclaim agreement with something that has already been said or to join in a shaming brigade. When grandstanders ramp up, they make increasingly strong claims about the matter under discussion to impress others with their moral qualities. Grandstanders trump up when they try to show off their moral credentials by making up moral problems that don’t really exist. Grandstanders use expressions of strong emotions such as moral outrage to show off how good they are. Finally, grandstanders are often dismissive of others’ views, treating disagreement as a sign of moral disorder. The chapter concludes by explaining why there is no simple, foolproof way to tell whether someone is grandstanding.

What to Do About Grandstanding

How can we cut down on grandstanding and all the damage it causes? Drawing from empirical research in psychology, this chapter explains how individuals can avoid grandstanding and help change social norms so others grandstand less, too. People can reduce their grandstanding by altering their situations, forming implementation intentions about how to talk about morality and politics, and satisfying their desires for moral recognition with activities that are more likely to do good. One tempting and obvious way to get others to stop grandstanding is to call them out and criticize them. But this is a bad idea for moral, epistemic, and practical reasons. A more promising route is to change social norms so that grandstanding becomes embarrassing. This can be done by correcting peoples’ beliefs about grandstanding and moral talk, setting a good example in public discourse, and withholding from suspected grandstanders the praise and attention they seek.

Moral Talk Is Not Magic

Moral talk is our primary means of bringing morality to bear on practical problems. It is an incredibly valuable tool for making the world a better place. Moral talk can be used well, but it can also be abused. Instead of using moral talk for morally worthy aims, many use it to humiliate, intimidate, and threaten people they dislike, impress their friends, feel better about themselves, and make people less suspicious of their own misconduct. This chapter introduces one common way of abusing moral talk: moral grandstanding, the use of moral talk for self-promotion.

Grandstanding and Respect

This chapter presents several ways that moral grandstanding can involve a failure to show appropriate respect for persons. Grandstanders often use the putative moral failings of others as opportunities to showcase their own moral qualities. This phenomenon is common in cases of viral outrage and online shaming. Grandstanders also deceive other people by encouraging inaccurate impressions of their own moral credentials, thus gaining trust they do not deserve, and sometimes greater leeway to behave immorally. Grandstanding is also presented as a form of free-riding. If everyone engaged in grandstanding all the time, it would not impress anyone, and moral talk would not work. Grandstanders get the best of both worlds, while others restrain themselves to avoid abusing moral talk.

What Is Moral Grandstanding?

Drawing on empirical research from psychology, this chapter gives an account of moral grandstanding. Grandstanding is a contribution to public moral discourse that is significantly motivated by the desire that others think one is morally respectable. This chapter then answers several important questions about moral grandstanding. Must grandstanders think they are morally great? Do grandstanders always know that they are trying to impress others? Can grandstanders speak the truth? Does grandstanding work? Is grandstanding just a left-wing problem? And are the authors themselves grandstanding? The chapter concludes by explaining the differences between moral grandstanding and virtue signaling.