Ethics, Motivation, and Egoism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Newlands
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Ethical Egoism ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Other Regarding

To show how this metaphysical machinery intersects with Spinoza’s ethics, chapter seven begins with a fresh account of what the author calls Spinoza’s psychological ethics, a series of descriptive claims about human desires that underwrites his metaethics. It is further argued that moral motivation for Spinoza is based on an agent’s intrinsic, appetite-based motivation for fundamental desire satisfaction. Most importantly, when this account of moral motivation is combined with his conceptualist metaphysics, Spinoza has a distinctive way of showing how moral agents can have self-interested, non-prudential moral motives to pursue the interests of others. This proposed reconciliation of Spinoza’s ethical egoism with other-regarding interests turns on his conceptualist account of how moral agents are individuated, thereby revealing just how deeply his ethics draws on his conceptualist metaphysics.

Evolution and Moral Motivation in Economics

2019 ◽  
pp. 115-137
Author(s):  
Geoffrey M. Hodgson
Keyword(s):  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Economic Man ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Preference Functions ◽  
Recent Addition ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences ◽  
Descent Of Man

Adam Smith argued that humans were motivated by both self-interest and moral concerns. Economics has since moved towards a contrasting utilitarian view where behavior is understood in terms of unifying preference functions. Also most economists have presumed that these preferences are “self-regarding.” Two major treatises in economics were published in 1871, with self-seeking economic man at their center. In the same year Darwin published The Descent of Man, which emphasized sympathy and cooperation as well as self-interest, and argued that morality has evolved in humans by natural selection. This stance is supported by modern research. This article reconciles Darwin’s view that developed morality requires language and deliberation (and is thus unique to humans), with his other claim that moral feelings have a long-evolved and biologically inherited basis. It also questions whether the recent addition of “other-regarding” preferences is adequate, and whether morality and altruism are reducible to preferences or utility maximization.

scholarly journals Moral Animals and Moral Responsibility

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-59
Author(s):  
Albert W. Musschenga
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Subject ◽  
Moral Behaviour ◽  
Moral Rules ◽  
Moral Competences

The central question of this article is, Are animals morally responsible for what they do? Answering this question requires a careful, step-by-step argument. In sections 1 and 2, I explain what morality is, and that having a morality means following moral rules or norms. In sections 3 and 4, I argue that some animals show not just regularities in their social behaviour, but can be rightly said to follow social norms. But are the norms they follow also moral norms? In section 5, I contend, referring to the work of Shaun Nichols, that the basic moral competences or capacities are already present in nonhuman primates. Following moral rules or norms is more than just acting in accordance to these norms; it requires being motivated by moral rules. I explain, in section 6, referring to Mark Rowlands, that being capable of moral motivation does not require agency; being a moral subject is sufficient. Contrary to moral agents, moral subjects are not responsible for their behaviour. Stating that there are important similarities between animal moral behaviour and human, unconscious, automatic, habitual behaviour, I examine in section 7 whether humans are responsible for their habitual moral behaviour, and if they are, what then the grounds are for denying that moral animals are responsible for their behaviour. The answer is that humans are responsible for their habitual behaviour if they have the capacity for deliberate intervention. Although animals are capable of intervention in their habitual behaviour, they are not capable of deliberate intervention.

Cognitive adaptations to criminal justice lead to “paranoid” norm obedience

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr M. Patrzyk ◽  
Martin Takáč
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Agent Based Model ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

People often cooperate and obey norms in situations where it is clear they cannot be caught and punished. Such behavior does not serve their self-interest, as they are foregoing opportunities to exploit others without any negative consequences. Hence, it is not clear how this behavior could have evolved. Some previous explanations invoked the existence of other-regarding preferences, moral motivation, or intrinsic concern for social norms. In this study, we develop an agent-based model illustrating that none of these is necessary for the emergence of norm-abiding behavior. Our model suggests evolutionary pressure against norm violators may lead to the emergence of a bias, causing agents to be extremely sensitive to the probability of being caught. Because of this, they often incorrectly classify anonymous situations as non-anonymous ones and obey social norms due to the fear of being punished. In our simulations, we show that cooperation is promoted by (1) the number of interactions actually observed, (2) the strength of punishments against norm violators, and most importantly, (3) the uncertainty in agent classifications.

scholarly journals Employing AI to Better Understand Our Morals

Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 10
Author(s):  
Luís Moniz Pereira ◽  
The Anh Han ◽  
António Barata Lopes
Keyword(s):  
Group Dynamics ◽  
Statistical Models ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Counterfactual Reasoning ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Systems ◽  
Fair Distribution

We present a summary of research that we have conducted employing AI to better understand human morality. This summary adumbrates theoretical fundamentals and considers how to regulate development of powerful new AI technologies. The latter research aim is benevolent AI, with fair distribution of benefits associated with the development of these and related technologies, avoiding disparities of power and wealth due to unregulated competition. Our approach avoids statistical models employed in other approaches to solve moral dilemmas, because these are “blind” to natural constraints on moral agents, and risk perpetuating mistakes. Instead, our approach employs, for instance, psychologically realistic counterfactual reasoning in group dynamics. The present paper reviews studies involving factors fundamental to human moral motivation, including egoism vs. altruism, commitment vs. defaulting, guilt vs. non-guilt, apology plus forgiveness, counterfactual collaboration, among other factors fundamental in the motivation of moral action. These being basic elements in most moral systems, our studies deliver generalizable conclusions that inform efforts to achieve greater sustainability and global benefit, regardless of cultural specificities in constituents.

In the Thick of Moral Motivation

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation
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