scholarly journals Employing AI to Better Understand Our Morals

Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 10
Author(s):  
Luís Moniz Pereira ◽  
The Anh Han ◽  
António Barata Lopes
Keyword(s):  
Group Dynamics ◽  
Statistical Models ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Counterfactual Reasoning ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Systems ◽  
Fair Distribution

We present a summary of research that we have conducted employing AI to better understand human morality. This summary adumbrates theoretical fundamentals and considers how to regulate development of powerful new AI technologies. The latter research aim is benevolent AI, with fair distribution of benefits associated with the development of these and related technologies, avoiding disparities of power and wealth due to unregulated competition. Our approach avoids statistical models employed in other approaches to solve moral dilemmas, because these are “blind” to natural constraints on moral agents, and risk perpetuating mistakes. Instead, our approach employs, for instance, psychologically realistic counterfactual reasoning in group dynamics. The present paper reviews studies involving factors fundamental to human moral motivation, including egoism vs. altruism, commitment vs. defaulting, guilt vs. non-guilt, apology plus forgiveness, counterfactual collaboration, among other factors fundamental in the motivation of moral action. These being basic elements in most moral systems, our studies deliver generalizable conclusions that inform efforts to achieve greater sustainability and global benefit, regardless of cultural specificities in constituents.

Moral collectivism

2019 ◽  
pp. 37-56
Author(s):  
Paul Spicker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Moral Agents

Moral collectivism is the idea that social groups can be moral agents; that they have rights and responsibilities, that groups as well as individuals can take moral action, that the morality of their actions can sensibly be assessed in those terms, and that moral responsibility cannot simply be reduced to the actions of individuals within them. This position is not opposed to individualism; it is complementary.

scholarly journals Moral Ecology in Nursing: A Pluralistic Approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 237796081983389
Author(s):  
Darcy Copeland
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Ecological Model ◽  
Social Systems ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Moral Sensitivity ◽  
Ethical Frameworks ◽  
Moral Ecology ◽  
Ethical Systems

Moral dilemmas are present in all settings in which nurses work. Nurses are moral agents who must make moral decisions and take moral action in very complex social systems. Nurses are accountable for their actions, and it is therefore imperative that they have a solid foundation in ethics. There are multiple ethical frameworks nurses can utilize to justify their actions. A theory of moral ecology is presented here as a way to conceptualize the relationships between these frameworks. The first two steps of moral action, moral sensitivity and moral judgment, are explored in a pluralistic context. Specifically, multiple ethical frameworks that inform the practice of nursing are presented using an ecological model. Nurses work in a variety of practice environments, with different populations, across a spectrum of situations. An ecological model acknowledges that nurses are influenced by the complex social, and ethical, systems in which they find themselves taking moral action. When faced with ethical issues in practice, a nurse's moral sensitivity and moral judgment may be guided by ethical systems most proximal to the situation. Nurses bring individual moral beliefs to work and are influenced by the ethical directives of employers, the discipline's code of ethics, principles of bioethics, and various approaches to normative ethics (virtue, consequential, deontological, and care). Any of the frameworks presented may justifiably be applied in various nursing circumstances. I propose that the multiple ethical frameworks nurses utilize exist in a relationally nested manner and a model of moral ecology in nursing is provided.

Kant, Garve, and the Motives of Moral Action

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernd Ludwig
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Physical Explanation ◽  
Natural Religion ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Kantian Morality ◽  
De Officiis

AbstractKant's comments `against Garve' constitute his reaction to the latter's remarks on Cicero's De Officiis . Two related criticisms of Kant's against Garve are discussed in brief in this paper. A closer look is then taken at Garve's claim that `Kantian morality destroys all incentives that can move human beings to act at all'. I argue that Kant and Garve rely on two different models of human action for their analyses of moral motivation; these models differ in what each takes to be salient for the explanation of human action. I show that Samuel Clarke's analogy of physical explanation in the framework of Newtonianism (in his Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion ) usefully illuminates the difference between Kant and Garve in these respects.

Ethics, Motivation, and Egoism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Newlands
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Ethical Egoism ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Other Regarding

To show how this metaphysical machinery intersects with Spinoza’s ethics, chapter seven begins with a fresh account of what the author calls Spinoza’s psychological ethics, a series of descriptive claims about human desires that underwrites his metaethics. It is further argued that moral motivation for Spinoza is based on an agent’s intrinsic, appetite-based motivation for fundamental desire satisfaction. Most importantly, when this account of moral motivation is combined with his conceptualist metaphysics, Spinoza has a distinctive way of showing how moral agents can have self-interested, non-prudential moral motives to pursue the interests of others. This proposed reconciliation of Spinoza’s ethical egoism with other-regarding interests turns on his conceptualist account of how moral agents are individuated, thereby revealing just how deeply his ethics draws on his conceptualist metaphysics.

Could God Love Cruelty?

2021 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-44
Author(s):  
Laura Frances Callahan
Keyword(s):  
God's Will ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Systems ◽  
Logical Constraints ◽  
Theological Voluntarism ◽  
Moral Facts

One of the foremost objections to theological voluntarism is the contingency objection. If God’s will fixes moral facts, then what if God willed that agents engage in cruelty? I argue that even unrestricted theological voluntarists should accept some logical constraints on possible moral systems—hence, some limits on ways that God could have willed morality to be—and these logical constraints are sufficient to blunt the force of the contingency objection. One constraint I defend is a very weak accessibility requirement, related to (but less problematic than) existence internalism in metaethics. The theological voluntarist can maintain: Godcouldn’t have loved cruelty, and even though he could have willed behaviors we find abhorrent, he could only have done so in a world of deeply alien moral agents. We cannot confidently declare such a world unacceptable.

Moralities and Characters as Moral Agents

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Plantinga
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Ethical Criticism ◽  
Engagement Theory ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Systems ◽  
Political Morality ◽  
Sociocultural Processes ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Critical Interest ◽  
Rule Out

Estrangement theories, in relation to ethical criticism, favor attention to the political over the personal, to ideology rather than morality, to the systemic and institutional rather than the individual. Engagement theory would consider both the personal and the political, morality and ideology. This chapter rehabilitates a critical interest in morality and in individual characters in the context of screen stories. It discusses how to think about morality in the context of moral systems and discusses the relationships among morality, politics, and ideology. It shows how an attention to characters as moral agents does not rule out attention to broader sociocultural processes, but may in fact enable a better understanding of them. The chapter also notes that much of the interest in screen stories, and in stories generally, stems from a human interest in, and tendency to judge, the behavior of others. Finally, the chapter defends character-centered criticism against its critics.

John Gay and the Birth of Utilitarianism

Utilitas ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
GETTY L. LUSTILA
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
John Stuart Mill ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
John Gay

This article concerns John Gay's 1731 essay ‘Preliminary Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality’. Gay undertakes two tasks here, the first of which is to supply a criterion of virtue. I argue that he is the first modern philosopher to claim that universal happiness is the aim of moral action. In other words: Gay is the first utilitarian. His second task is to explain the source of moral motivation. He draws upon the principles of association to argue (a) that we develop benevolent motives by associating the idea of our happiness with that of others and (b) that we come to approve of benevolence by recognizing that our happiness is inextricably connected with the general happiness. While some scholars have taken an interest in Gay's essay, a sustained treatment of its contents does not exist, despite its acknowledged influence on Hume, Hartley, James Mill, and John Stuart Mill.

Rational Feelings and Moral Agency

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ido Geiger
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Inner Life ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Effective Force ◽  
Moral Feeling

AbstractKant's conception of moral agency is often charged with attributing no role to feelings. I suggest that respect is the effective force driving moral action. I then argue that four additional types of rational feelings are necessary conditions of moral agency: (1) The affective inner life of moral agents deliberating how to act and reflecting on their deeds is rich and complex (conscience). To act morally we must turn our affective moral perception towards the ends of moral action: (2) the welfare of others (love of others); and (3) our own moral being (self-respect). (4) Feelings shape our particular moral acts (moral feeling). I tentatively suggest that the diversity of moral feelings might be as great as the range of our duties.

scholarly journals Moral Animals and Moral Responsibility

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-59
Author(s):  
Albert W. Musschenga
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Subject ◽  
Moral Behaviour ◽  
Moral Rules ◽  
Moral Competences

The central question of this article is, Are animals morally responsible for what they do? Answering this question requires a careful, step-by-step argument. In sections 1 and 2, I explain what morality is, and that having a morality means following moral rules or norms. In sections 3 and 4, I argue that some animals show not just regularities in their social behaviour, but can be rightly said to follow social norms. But are the norms they follow also moral norms? In section 5, I contend, referring to the work of Shaun Nichols, that the basic moral competences or capacities are already present in nonhuman primates. Following moral rules or norms is more than just acting in accordance to these norms; it requires being motivated by moral rules. I explain, in section 6, referring to Mark Rowlands, that being capable of moral motivation does not require agency; being a moral subject is sufficient. Contrary to moral agents, moral subjects are not responsible for their behaviour. Stating that there are important similarities between animal moral behaviour and human, unconscious, automatic, habitual behaviour, I examine in section 7 whether humans are responsible for their habitual moral behaviour, and if they are, what then the grounds are for denying that moral animals are responsible for their behaviour. The answer is that humans are responsible for their habitual behaviour if they have the capacity for deliberate intervention. Although animals are capable of intervention in their habitual behaviour, they are not capable of deliberate intervention.

Videogames and Moral Pedagogy

2010 ◽  
pp. 35-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Staines
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Mass Effect ◽  
Component Model ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Moral Competence ◽  
Moral Functioning ◽  
Moral Content ◽  
Four Component Model ◽  
Commercial Off The Shelf

The Four Component Model of Moral Functioning is a framework for understanding moral competence originally developed by James Rest and subsequently revised with Darcia Narvaez. It posits that moral competence can be broken up into four distinct components: moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral action. The purpose of the present chapter is to demonstrate, via an examination of three commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) videogames (Ultima IV, Fallout 3, and Mass Effect), how this model can function as a blueprint for the design of moral content in games intended for pedagogy and entertainment.

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