Jersey

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Sanders
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Royal Court ◽  
Statutory Provision ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The key statutory provision in Jersey is the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 (as amended) (the ‘Trusts Law 1984’). The Trusts Law 1984 does not codify the Jersey law of trusts, and accordingly decisions of the Royal Court and Court of Appeal continue to develop Jersey’s customary (common law) in this area. Unless otherwise stated, references in this chapter to ‘Articles’ are to Articles of the Trusts Law 1984.

scholarly journals Privacy, Corrective Justice, and Incrementalism: Legal Imagination and the Recognition of a Privacy Tort in Ontario

2013 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas DC Bennett
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Corrective Justice ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Incremental Development ◽  
Privacy Laws ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This article considers the nature of common law development as exemplified by the recent privacy case of Jones v. Tsige. The author focuses on Jones, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized the novel privacy tort of “intrusion upon seclusion”. Using a detailed analysis of the case as its basis, the article explores issues which have much wider significance for the judicial development of privacy laws: the process of incremental elaboration of the law, the moral impulses at work within it, and the relevance of imagination to its operations. By drawing out these discrete issues and analyzing the role that each plays in Jones, the article offers a framework for examining such questions in future privacy cases. Moreover, this article argues that the judgment in Jones brings valuable clarity to the analysis of the process of common law development. In particular, the essay concludes that the novel privacy tort recognized in Jones is the result of a legitimate incremental development rather than an instance of undue judicial activism.

Proprietary Rights and Insolvency

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Calnan
Keyword(s):  
First Principles ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Reference Source ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Current State ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This book explains how a creditor of an insolvent debtor can take priority over other creditors by claiming a proprietary interest in assets held by the debtor, and concentrates on the circumstances in which proprietary interests are created by operation of law or are implied from the arrangements between the parties. This is a subject of particular importance and difficulty in common law systems because of the changeable nature of equitable proprietary interests, and this book provides a clear and structured explanation of the current state of the law, with detailed reference to case law from England and Wales as well as Commonwealth jurisprudence, and suggests how it might be clarified and simplified by returning to first principles. The new edition considers a number of important developments which pertain to proprietary rights and insolvency. It evaluates the key decision of the Supreme Court in FHR European Ventures v Cedar Capital Partners. Although this has settled the question of whether constructive trusts extend to bribes, it has raised more general issues regarding the approach of the courts to the imposition of proprietary remedies, which the book explores. It also covers recent Privy Council and Court of Appeal decisions concerning constructive notice (Credit Agricole v Papadimitrou, Central Bank of Ecuador v Conticorp, and SFO v Lexi), as well as interesting issues concerning the new status of intangibles (Armstrong v Winnington) and the status of the anti-deprivation rule (Belmont Park v BNY). Proprietary Rights and Insolvency is a lucid and practical reference source on insolvency and property law.

13. Voluntary manslaughter

2021 ◽  
pp. 540-588
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Self Control ◽  
The Other ◽  
Bodily Harm ◽  
Loss Of Self ◽  
Grievous Bodily Harm ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Partial Defences ◽  
Diminished Responsibility

Manslaughter is defined by common law as any unlawful homicide that is not murder. The offence is limited by murder at one extreme and accidental killing at the other. Manslaughter can be either ‘voluntary’ or ‘involuntary’. This chapter deals with voluntary manslaughter: this occurs when someone had the intention to kill or do grievous bodily harm, but relies on a partial defence to murder. The two partial defences considered in this chapter are loss of self- control and diminished responsibility (suicide pact is dealt with in Ch 15). This chapter scrutinizes the defences available to the accused and in particular the developing case law under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 on loss of control and diminished responsibility, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Golds and the series of Court of Appeal cases since that decision.

6 Formal Requirements and Other Possible Bars

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
McFarlane Ben
Keyword(s):  
Social Policy ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Precise Nature ◽  
Statutory Provision ◽  
The Social ◽  
Formal Requirements ◽  
The Impact

This chapter considers more specific statutory and common law rules that may also seem to have the potential to deny, or at least affect, a claim based on proprietary estoppel. It therefore considers the effect of informality, incapacity, ultra vires, and illegality. The chapter focuses in particular on informality, as this is the area of most practical importance. In its interaction with rules as to formality, capacity, vires, or legality, proprietary estoppel is no different from any other legal doctrine: it will not be allowed to operate in such a way as to stultify or undermine the statutory or common law rule. The effect of a particular statutory provision on a proprietary estoppel claim will therefore depend on ‘the nature of the enactment, the purpose of the provision and the social policy behind it’; the same can be said for the impact of a non-statutory rule. The court will also have to consider the conduct of each of A and B and whether it would, overall, be ‘disproportionate’ to deny B’s claim. The precise nature of the claimed estoppel is therefore important.

13 Conclusion

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dickson Brice
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Conference Papers ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This chapter attempts to sum up the conclusions that can be drawn about the Irish Supreme Court from the surveys and analyses in foregoing chapters. It highlights the constraints placed on the Court’s decision-making, especially its lack of power to turn away many appeals. Some of the Court’s principal achievements are reviewed but some of the opportunities it has failed to exploit are also referred to. The future of the Court is considered, especially in light of the creation of the Court of Appeal in 2014. Attention is given to the importance of strong leadership at the Chief Justice level and to the need for more public pronouncements from the judges in lectures and conference papers. Final remarks are made on how the Court compares to supreme courts in other common law countries.

Damages in Equity—A Study of Lord Cairns' Act

1975 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 224-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Jolowicz
Keyword(s):  
Present Status ◽  
Common Law ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Court Of Appeal

When, if ever, may a court award damages to a plaintiff whose case sounds only in equity, not in law? In Hooper v. Rogers an award of damages in respect of a nuisance which had not yet resulted in any relevant damage was upheld by the Court of Appeal. In Wrotham Park Estate Co. Ltd. v. Parkside Homes Ltd. Brightman J. awarded substantial damages for breach of a restrictive covenant to the successors in title of the covenantee against the successors in title of the covenantor. In Wroth v. Tyler damages for the non-performance of a contract for the sale of a house were assessed by reference to the value of the house at the date of the hearing, not the date of breach. In none of these cases could the decisions have been justified on common law principles alone and all are in fact founded upon the Chancery Amendment Act 1858, commonly known as Lord Cairns' Act. Yet in Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris, while the Court of Appeal considered that an elaborate discussion of that Act was necessary and, indeed, differed in opinion as to the result of its application to the circumstances of the case, the House of Lords, through Lord Upjohn, dismissed the matter briefly and categorically with the observation that Lord Cairns' Act had nothing whatever to do with the principles of law applicable to the case. The time seems ripe for an examination of the meaning and present status of the Act.

The Enduring Legacy of ‘Reckless Disregard’

2005 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 316-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McArdle
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Standard Of Care ◽  
Personal Injury ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Canadian Province ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
Appeal Decision ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Personal injury at common law has spawned many cases where sports participants have inflicted injury either upon other participants or upon spectators/bystanders. This paper is not an exhaustive analysis of those ‘sports torts' cases but focuses instead upon the impact of Wooldridge v Sumner, a Court of Appeal decision that was legally sound but based upon highly significant errors of fact, and which has subsequently been advanced before the courts in two jurisdictions as authority for untenable propositions that concern both the standard of care and the duty of care owed by sports participants. While a consideration of the authorities prior to Wooldridge illustrates that there was never a basis at common law for the argument that either the standard or the duty of care differed from that pertaining in non-sporting contexts, the case has been appropriated by counsel in order to argue along those lines even though Wooldridge is not authority for either proposition. On some occasions those arguments have actually received the support of the courts of England and Wales and of the Canadian Province of British Columbia. Despite the existence in both jurisdictions of more recent authorities that ought to have heralded the demise of both concepts, they have proved remarkably tenacious.

Presumption of Marriage in Uganda

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
African Countries ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Living Together ◽  
Law And Legislation ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Abstract Case law, amongst other sources, shows that many people in Uganda are living together as husband and wife although they are not married. Unlike legislation in other African countries such as Tanzania and Malawi, in Uganda, the pieces of legislation governing marriages are silent on the issue of presumption of marriage. Likewise, unlike in Kenya and South Africa where legislation does not provide for presumption of marriage but courts have held that such a presumption exists based on long cohabitation, Ugandan courts, the High Court, and the Court of Appeal, have held that Ugandan law does not recognise marriage based on long cohabitation (marriage by repute). However, courts will presume the existence of a marriage where a marriage ceremony took place. Since 2003, attempts to enact legislation to provide for the presumption of marriage in Uganda have not been successful. In this article, the author argues that there is still room for the Supreme Court to hold, on the basis of common law, that Ugandan law recognises the principle of presumption of marriage. This recognition would also be in line with Uganda’s international law obligation as the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has called upon States Parties to CEDAW to enact legislation giving effect to de facto unions. The author relies on case law and legislation from some African countries to suggest ways in which the Supreme Court could deal with the issue of presumption of marriage.

The King Reports and the common law in South Africa

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-172
Author(s):  
J. Michael Judin
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Task Team ◽  
The Common ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Purpose This paper aims to discuss the King Reports and Codes and the development of South Africa’s common law. The role of developing the common law is explicitly recognised in the Constitution, as is the obligation to give effect to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. With decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal being based on the King Code, the King Code is now an integral part of South Africa’s common law. Design/methodology/approach When the task team drafting King IV commenced their work, one of the important issues raised with Mervyn King, as Chairman, was the challenge to ensure that King IV was aligned to the now firmly entrenched common law principles taken from King I, King II and King III. It is believed that this has been achieved and it is hoped that King IV (and the subsequent King Reports that will inevitably follow because the corporate milieu keeps changing) continues to enrich South Africa’s common law. Findings The King Reports and Codes have been made part of South Africa’s common law. Originality/value This paper fulfils an identified need to study the King Report and Code, as it relates to South Africa’s common law.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document