Finding Space in a Non-Spatial World

2021 ◽  
pp. 154-181
Author(s):  
David J. Chalmers
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Functional Role ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Cartesian Skepticism ◽  
Scientific Image ◽  
Emergent Spacetime ◽  
Manifest Image

What is the relation between space in the manifest image of perceptual experience and in the scientific image of physics? I will argue that we have moved from spatial primitivism (on which space is understood as a primitive conception that we are acquainted with) to spatial functionalism (on which space is picked out by its functional role). I investigate different forms of spatial functionalism on which the relevant roles are experiential (involving effects on our experience) and non-experiential (involving patterns of causal interactions). I draw connections to functionalism in the philosophy of mind, to Cartesian skepticism, and to recent literature on spacetime functionalism and emergent spacetime.

Evaluative Perception

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Ethical Perception ◽  
Aesthetic Judgement ◽  
Evaluative Judgement

Evaluation is ubiquitous. Indeed, it isn't an exaggeration to say that we assess actions, character, events, and objects as good, cruel, beautiful, etc., almost every day of our lives. Although evaluative judgement—for instance, judging that an institution is unjust—is usually regarded as the paradigm of evaluation, it has been thought by some philosophers that a distinctive and significant kind of evaluation is perceptual. For example, in aesthetics, some have claimed that adequate aesthetic judgement must be grounded in the appreciator's first-hand perceptual experience of the item judged. In ethics, reference to the existence and importance of something like ethical perception is found in a number of traditions, for example, in Virtue Ethics and Sentimentalism. This volume brings together philosophers in aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, and value theory, to contribute in novel ways to debates about what we call Evaluative Perception. Specifically, they engage with (1) Questions regarding the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are perceptual experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of perceptual experience? (2) Questions about Epistemology: Can evaluative perceptual experiences ever justify evaluative judgements? Are perceptual experiences of values necessary for certain kinds of justified evaluative judgements? (3) Questions about Value Theory: Is the existence of evaluative perceptual experience supported or undermined by particular views in value theory? Are particular views in value theory supported or undermined by the existence of evaluative perceptual experience?

The Metaphysics of Memory

Memory ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 32-56
Author(s):  
Jordi Fernández
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Functional Role ◽  
Narrative Theory ◽  
Causal Theory ◽  
Cognitive Economy ◽  
Proposal A ◽  
The Subject ◽  
In Virtue Of

Chapter 2 offers a proposal about the facts in virtue of which a mental state qualifies as a memory. According to this proposal, a mental state qualifies as a memory in virtue of the functional role that it plays within the cognitive economy of the subject. The chapter outlines two alternative proposals about the nature of memory. According to the causal theory of memory, a mental state is a memory in virtue of the fact that it has been caused by a perceptual experience of some fact. According to the narrative theory of memory, a mental state is a memory in virtue of the fact that the subject is using the mental state to construct a story of their life. It is argued that the functionalist proposal enjoys the virtues of each of the two theories, and it avoids the difficulties which threaten the two theories as well.

The Philosophy of Mind of Kundakunda and Umāsvāti

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Balcerowicz
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
The Self ◽  
Complex Structures ◽  
Important Distinction ◽  
Cognitive Faculty ◽  
Actual Application ◽  
Sensory Apparatus ◽  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
The Way

Kundakunda and Umāsvāti are among the first philosophers in Jainism to lay foundations for of Jaina philosophy of mind. A key concept in their philosophy of mind is that of a cognitive faculty, located in and constitutive of the self. Cognitive faculties should be understood as processes or manners through which the self makes use of the physical sensory apparatus, as well as the actual application of the self’s cognitive potential. This chapter discusses the complex structures of cognitive faculties. Kundakunda takes the self, the cognitive subject, to consist in cognition, a claim which influences the way both thinkers classify cognitive faculties and the important distinction between perceptual experience and cognition.

Functionalism, Computationalism, and Mental Contents

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gualtiero Piccinini
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Functional Role ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Inferential Role ◽  
Functional Relations ◽  
Popular View ◽  
Functional Role Semantics ◽  
Mental Contents

Almost no one cites Sellars, while reinventing his wheels with gratifying regularity. (Dennett 1987, 349)In philosophy of mind, there is functionalism about mental states and functionalism about mental contents. The former — mental State functionalism — says that mentalstatesare individuated by their functional relations with mental inputs, Outputs, and other mental states. The latter — usually called functional or conceptual or inferential role semantics — says that mentalcontentsare constituted by their functional relations with mental inputs, Outputs, and other mental contents (and in some versions of the theory, with things in the environment). If we add to mental State functionalism the popular view that mental states have their content essentially, then mental state functionalism may be seen as a form of functional role semantics and a solution to theproblem of mental content,namely, the problem of giving a naturalistic explanation of mental content. According to this solution, the functional relations that constitute contents are physically realized — in a metaphysically unmysterious way — by the functional relations between mental inputs, outputs, and the mental states bearing those contents.

scholarly journals The Early Modern Origins of Pragmatism

Disputatio ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (59) ◽  
pp. 433-456
Author(s):  
Piotr K. Szalek
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Scientific Images ◽  
Scientific Image ◽  
The World ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Manifest Image

Abstract This paper considers the alleged pragmatism of Berkeley’s philosophy using the two Sellarsian categories of ‘manifest’ and ‘scientific’ images of the world and human beings. The ‘manifest’ image is regarded as a refinement of the ordinary way of conceiving things, and the scientific image is seen as a theoretical picture of the world provided by science. The paper argues that the so-called Berkeleian pragmatism was an effect of Berkeley’s work towards a synthesis of ‘manifest’ and ‘scientific’ images through the creation of one unified synoptic vision of the world and was a part of a new conceptual framework within which these two images could be combined.

The Clash of the Images - Why the Manifest Image and the Scientific Image Are Incompatible

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adem Mulamustafić
Keyword(s):  
Everyday Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
Causal Relationships ◽  
Ordinary Objects ◽  
Scientific Image ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
Scientific Results ◽  
Manifest Image ◽  
The Way

In everyday life, we take there to be ordinary objects such as persons, tables, and stones bearing certain properties such as color and shape and standing in various causal relationships to each other. Basic convictions such as these form our everyday picture of the world: the manifest image. The scientific image, on the other hand, is a system of beliefs that is only based on scientific results. It contains many beliefs that are not contained in the manifest image. At first glance, this may not seem to be a problem. But Mulamustafić shows convincingly that this is a mistake: The world as it is in itself cannot be both the way the manifest image depicts it and the way the scientific image describes it to be.

Philosophy, Science, and Common Sense

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilary Kornblith
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Wilfrid Sellars ◽  
Personal View ◽  
Scientific Image ◽  
The World ◽  
Deliberative Processes ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Manifest Image ◽  
Apparent Conflict

Wilfrid Sellars recognized a conflict between what he called “the scientific image” of our place in the world, and “the manifest image.” Sellars sought, somehow, to join these views together in spite of their apparent conflict. This chapter argues that we should endorse features of the manifest image only to the extent that they are part of the scientific image. It presents a case study in epistemology, showing how these issues play out in discussion of doxastic deliberation. The manifest image of such deliberation is flatly in conflict with the best current scientific theorizing about the nature of deliberative processes. The only reasonable response to such conflict, the chapter argues, is to embrace the scientific account and reject our first-personal view of deliberation as illusory. This case study is suggestive of a broader conclusion about the relationship between the scientific and the manifest image.

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