Ancient Relativity

Author(s):  
Matthew Duncombe

Relativity is the phenomenon that things relate to things: parents to their offspring; doubles to halves; larger things to smaller things. This book is about how ancient philosophers, particularly Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Sextus Empiricus, understood this phenomenon and how their theories of relativity affected, and were affected by, their broader philosophical outlooks. Many scholars have thought that ancient thinkers were either fundamentally confused about the phenomenon of relativity, or held a view that is a trivial variation on a modern view. This book argues that neither is the case. In fact, ancient philosophers shared a close-knit family of views, referred to as ‘constitutive relativity’: a relative is not simply linked by a relation, but is constituted by it. The book shows that this view is present in Plato, and is exploited by him in some key arguments concerning the Forms and the partition of the soul. Aristotle adopts the constitutive view in his discussions of relativity in Categories 7 and the Topics, and retains the constitutive view in his later discussion in Metaphysics 5.15. The Relatives Argument of Aristotle’s lost work On Ideas also involves constitutive relativity. The book moves on to examine a complex report of Stoic relativity and the role relativity played in Stoic philosophy. Finally, the book discusses Sextus Empiricus’ way of thinking about relativity, which does not appeal to the nature of relatives, but rather to how we conceive of things as correlative.

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 40
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Pinto De Brito

<p>Este artigo trata dos seguintes tópicos da filosofia cética de modalidade pirrônica: ética, linguagem e epistemologia, conforme pensados pelo médico alexandrino do século II d.C. Sexto Empírico, seu principal expoente. Recorremos à interpretação de Myles F. Burnyeat, Michael Frede e Jonathan Barnes para elucidar a questão da viabilidade prática da vida cética, problema que tem sido a principal réplica ao ceticismo desde o ataque cético à filosofia da <em>Stoa</em>. Levando então em consideração o acirrado debate ocorrido entre as principais filosofias do período Helenístico, propusemos uma investigação sobre como se articulam o problema do conhecimento e de sua aquisição, da filosofia prática e da atitude discursiva do cético para compreender a réplica de Sexto ao argumento de que o cético se auto-refuta.</p><div class="page" title="Page 1"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><strong>Sextus Empiricus: ethics, language and epistemology of the second century a.C. in Alexandria </strong></p><p><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p><span>This paper deals with the following topics of the sceptical philosophy of the Pyrrhonic kind: ethics, language and epistemology, as thought by the Alexandrian medic of the second century A.C. Sextus Empiricus, which was the main exponent of the Pyrrhonism. We use the interpretations of Myles F. Burnyeat, Michael Frede and Jonathan Barnes to elucidate the problem of the practical viability of the sceptical life, which has been the main reply to the scepticism since the sceptical attack to the Stoic philosophy. Considering then the strained debate happened between the main philosophies of the Hellenistic period, we propose an investigation about how the problem of the knowledge and his acquisition articulates himself with the problems of the practical philosophy and of the sceptical’s discursive attitude, this all is necessary to comprehend the Sextus’ reply to the argument of the sceptical self-refutation. </span></p><p><strong>Keywords: </strong><span>practical philosophy; knowledge; Sextus Empiricus; Pyrrhonism </span></p></div></div></div>


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 188-211
Author(s):  
Anna Tigani

Sextus responds to the Dogmatists’ criticism that the Sceptics cannot investigate Dogmatic theses, formulating his own version of Meno’s puzzle against them. He thus forces them to adopt υοεῐυ ἁπλῶς – a way of thinking that does not carry any commitment to the reality of what someone thinks – as their only solution to the puzzle and as the necessary starting point of their investigation. Nοεῐυ ἁπλῶς avoids Dogmatic assumptions without making use of the Sceptical argumentation that leads to suspension of judgment. It constitutes a novel answer to Meno’s puzzle, Dogmatism- and Scepticism-free, with important consequences both for Dogmatism and for Scepticism.


2015 ◽  
Vol 98 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-24
Author(s):  
P.N. Veropotvelyan ◽  
◽  
T.T. Naritnik ◽  
N.P. Veropotvelyan ◽  
I.V. Guzhevskaya ◽  
...  

2017 ◽  
pp. 53-61
Author(s):  
A.A. Dralova ◽  
◽  
O.V. Usachova ◽  
E.A. Silina ◽  
O.V. Konakova ◽  
...  

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2(16)) ◽  
pp. 106-112
Author(s):  
T. K. Znamenskaya ◽  
T. K. Mavropulo
Keyword(s):  

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