Review of Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations translated by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967)

2021 ◽  
pp. 327-330
Author(s):  
Martin Wight

Wight suggests that Aron’s book, first published in 1962, has not won the recognition it deserves, owing in part to ‘Anglo-American intellectual insularity’ and ‘the massiveness of the book itself’. Wight praises Aron for grounding his work in history: ‘Rich in historical reference, it abounds equally in acute analysis.’ The book raises the questions of preventing and containing nuclear war. ‘Cautiously, tentatively, himself a political Clausewitz, Aron accumulates the considerations which may make it possible that a nuclear war would not expand to its fullest violence.’ Wight shares Aron’s judgement that, ‘if war should come, we can still seek to restrict violence. Aron repeatedly asserts the indeterminacy of politics. Diplomacy is the realm of the contingent and the unforeseen, and the statesman’s supreme virtue is prudence, which means acting in accordance with the concrete data of the particular situation.’

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-206
Author(s):  
Gerard Toal

The book Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space was first published twenty-five years ago. In this article, I briefly discuss the geopolitical and intellectual sources of inspiration for the development Critical Geopolitics as a distinctive approach within Anglo-American political geography. In doing so, I distinguish it from other concurrent critical approached to International Relations and the world-system within English-speaking Geography at this time. Thereafter I consider four lines of critique of Critical Geopolitics. The first is the argument that the approach is too political. A subsidiary argument considers its relationship to violence. The second is the argument that it is neglects embodiment and everyday life and that, consequently, a Feminist Geopolitics is needed as a necessary corrective. The third is that claim that the approach is too textual and operates with a flawed conception of discourse, one that neglects practice. The fourth critique is that Critical Geopolitics has an undeveloped conception of materiality and neglects more-than-human agency. In discuss these criticisms, I make an argument for a continuity of concern with latent catastrophism in Critical Geopolitics from the danger of nuclear war in the mid-nineteen eighties to the climate emergency of today.


1965 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Tucker

In the preface to Paix et Guerre entre les nations Raymond Aron writes that: “Mon but est de comprendre la logique implicite des relations entre collectivités politiquement organisées.” As an effort to comprehend the implicit logic of state relations, Paix et Guerre is clearly one of the most ambitious works to appear in recent years. In terms of sheer scope, it has few—if indeed, any—serious competitors among general treatises on international relations. Moreover, in terms of substantive accomplishments, it is in many respects one of the most impressive works to appear in a long time. It is impressive if only because of the critical function it performs. Few theories of significance directly or indirectly relating to “l'institution belliqueuse” escape Aron's attention and criticism.1Paix et Guerre is impressive for the way in which it seeks to encompass and to organize the disparate materials making up the study of international relations and, in particular, for the manner in which it attempts to comprehend certain behavior— diplomatic-strategic action—from diverse points of view. It is equally impressive for its awareness that the progress of a discipline generally and the utility of comparative study particularly depend on drawing clear and precise distinctions and devising useful classifications. Finally, Paix et Guerre is impressive for the perceptiveness with which it analyzes contemporary international politics. Aron's chapters on the diplomacy and strategy of the nuclear age—“le monde fini”—form a model of political analysis. Not the least of its virtues is the modesty of the conclusions drawn and the disavowal of oracular pretensions. The same modesty characterizes Aron's theoretical endeavors. If a pervasive skepticism is applied to the theories of others, and particularly to “les grandes hypotheses,” Aron is almost as skeptical of his own efforts to lay bare “les conditions des choix historiques.” In large measure, Paix et Guerre is a sustained and often brilliant effort to demonstrate the limits of our present knowledge. That effort performs a much needed service.


Author(s):  
Stephen Bowman

This chapter examines the activities of the Pilgrims Society against the backdrop of official international relations in the immediate post-war years, in particular during the presidency of Warren Harding. It analyses the Pilgrims Society’s role in many of the most pressing issues in the Anglo-American relationship, for example the US refusing to join the League of Nations, the war debt question, and naval disarmament. It focuses on a banquet held in London in 1921 for the US Ambassador George Harvey, whose remarks at the event about the League of Nations caused controversy and resulted in significant levels of press coverage. This chapter also looks at the growing anti-Britishness in the US in this period and examines how this impacted upon the Pilgrims Society. The chapter ultimately establishes that the Pilgrims Society consolidated its position as a semi-official public diplomacy actor while at the same time coming under increasing public scrutiny.


2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 515-516
Author(s):  
John Vasquez

When the intellectual history of international relations in- quiry is written for our time, War and Peace in International Rivalry may very well be seen as a seminal book. Along with Frank Wayman, Diehl and Goertz have been at the forefront of a major conceptual breakthrough in the way peace and war are studied. This book is their major statement of the subject and presents their most important findings.


Author(s):  
Ralph Pettman

International relations (IR) is widely accepted as an academic discipline in its own right, despite the many subdisciplines which hold it together. These disparate subdisciplines, in fact, have come to define international relations as a whole. Establishing systematic matrices that describe and explain the discipline as a whole can show how the subdisciplines that constitute international relations have sufficient coherence to allow us to say that there is a discipline there. To look at the discipline otherwise would be viewing it as a mere collection of insights taken from other disciplines—in short, international relations could not be defined as a discipline at all. Such an argument forms a more heterodox view of international relations—one which does not attempt to engage with traditional debates about what constitutes the subject’s core as compared with its periphery. The “old” international relations was largely confined to politico-strategic issues to do with military strategy and diplomacy; that is, to discussions of peace and war, international organization, international governance, and international law. It was about states and the state system and little more. By contrast the “new” international relations is an all-inclusive account of how the world works. The underlying coherence of this account makes it possible to provide more comprehensive and more nuanced explanations of international relations.


1998 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
DONNA LEE

This article reassesses the preparatory negotiations which launched the Kennedy Trade Round (KTR) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in search of a role for Britain. My purpose is to make two challenges, one theoretical, the other empirical. Theoretically, this study questions the predominant focus on the structural power of major states that characterizes the study of international relations in general, and of the GATT in particular. This is a case-study of middle power influence that focuses on the negotiating skills and experience of state-level actors at the KTR. Empirically, I question the generally accepted view that the Anglo-American special relationship was merely a British myth and had no significance to US foreign policy interests in the 1960s.


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