Lender of Last Resort

2019 ◽  
pp. 136-154
Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

The recent central banking literature often argues that the LOLR function would be the key feature defining a ‘modern’ central bank. This chapter argues that this view may appear too radical (despite the enormous benefits of the LOLR) as the appearance of the LOLR does not change the nature of central banking (which is primarily associated with the issuance of central bank money). After providing an overview of the roles of central banks for financial stability, the chapter focuses on one early LOLR episode, namely the measures of the Hamburger Bank, Bank of Amsterdam and Bank of England in the European debt crisis of 1763. It is shown that in particular the Hamburger Bank acted as systemic lender of last resort, comparable to what modern central banks did in 2008.

Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

The essence of central banking is the issuance of central bank money—being itself defined as dominant financial money used at a large scale for payments and being of the highest possible credit and liquidity quality amongst all financial assets, such that payment through it is accepted as settlement of any other financial claim. This chapter elaborates on the nature of central bank money and reviews the pre-1800 theory and practice of central bank money issuance. It is shown that the nature of central bank money and its benefits were well understood by early authors. Moreover, the 25 central banks that issued (or at least aimed at) issuing central bank money before 1800 are introduced. The types of central bank money (deposits, banknotes, certificates of deposits) are briefly reviewed.


Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

During the 20th century, a view established itself, according to which (a) defining central banking would be difficult, (b) the Sveriges Riksbank (established in 1668) and the Bank of England (established in 1694) would have been the first central banks, (c) although at that time central banks did not have a policy mandate and no concept of central banking would have existed before the 19th century. This book challenges these views and rehabilitates pre-1800 central banking, including the role of numerous other institutions, mainly on the European continent. Central banking should be defined as being associated with the issuance of “central bank money”, i.e. financial money of the highest possible credit quality, that is accepted for settlement of any other financial claim in the same way as species money is accepted as it is considered credit, liquidity and market risk free, to use modern terminology. Issuing central bank money is a natural monopoly, and therefore central banks were always based on public charters regulating them and giving them a unique role in a sovereign territorial entity. Many early central banks were not only based on a public charter but were also publicly owned and managed, and had well defined policy objectives. The book reviews these policy objectives and the financial operations of 25 central banks established before 1800. The book shows that many of the central bank controversies debated today actually date back to the period 1400-1800.


Author(s):  
Morton Guy ◽  
Marsh Andrew

This chapter talks about the Bank of England as the UK's central bank, which was established in 1694 by a Charter granted by King William III and Queen Mary II under the authority of an Act of Parliament. It explains the principal object of the Act in creating the Bank as a vehicle for raising money for the government. It also discusses how the Bank was closely associated with the raising and management of the national debt since its inception, which is a function that the Bank retained until the creation of the UK Debt Management Office (DMO) in 1998. This chapter highlights how the Bank raised money by issuing of banknotes, which became widely used as a convenient means of making large—value payments. It points out that the Bank of England notes were not formally legal tender until 1833.


Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

Chapter 1 first restates the present dominant view on the nature and origin of central banking, which can be summarized as follows: (1) Defining central banking is ‘by no means straightforward’; (2) the Riksens Ständers Bank and the Bank of England would have been the first sort-of central banks; (3) early central banks did not have a policy mandate and the orientation towards public objectives would go back only to the nineteenth century; (4) there has been no concept of central banking before 1800; (5) early central banking developed out of the largest commercial banks; (6) the lender of last resort (LOLR) would have developed only in the second half of the nineteenth century or even later. Second, the chapter reviews a recent literature which started again to question this view. It is explained how this book will take up the challenge to correct the myth about the origins of central banking.


Author(s):  
Pierre L. Siklos

Many central banks took on additional responsibilities. Inadequate self-assessments remain unfinished almost a decade after the crisis erupted. Government-central bank relationships need to be conditioned on whether times are normal versus crisis conditions. Transparency confronts ambiguity when central banks must communicate the outlook and the conditionality of their decisions. Forward guidance was taken too far and ended up being futile. Central bankers simply exhausted their ability to influence behavior through mere words or ambiguous statements. This is a self-inflicted wound for institutions that are seen as overburdened. These forces leave central banking more vulnerable than is commonly acknowledged. Squaring the conventional objectives of monetary policy with the unclear aims of financial stability is difficult. Adequate limitations on the authority of central banks have yet to be thoroughly debated. We are nowhere near resolving the inherent tensions between old and new sets of central bank objectives.


Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil ◽  
Alessio Fotia

AbstractThis chapter introduces the system of accounts of the main sectors of the economy (households; non-financial corporations, the government; banks, and the central bank), describing how these sectors are interrelated through financial claims and liabilities. A financial system, consisting of commercial banks and the central bank, manages flows of funds originating from households, without these flows causing a need for the real sectors to liquidate illiquid real assets. The basic types of assets and liabilities are: real goods, gold, banknotes, deposits, bonds, loans, and equity. We explain how the shortcomings of both IOU and commodity-money based financial systems can be solved via establishing a central bank. A central bank is defined here by its balance sheet and central bank money is the central bank’s basic liability. Both monetary policy implementation and lender of last resort issues relate to liquidity flows within balance sheets. Understanding the logic of basic financial flows is therefore the basis for understanding central banking.


Author(s):  
Francesco Papadia ◽  
Tuomas Vӓlimӓki

The chapter describes the historical process as well as the analytical and empirical factors that, at the end of the twentieth century, led to the dominance, in advanced economies, of a central bank model based on an independent institution devoted to price stability as its overriding objective. The central bank pre-crisis model was elegant, performing, and efficient. However, it could not easily accommodate the pursuit of a traditionally important central bank objective: financial stability. Indeed, since central banks have, in essence, just one tool, that is, the interest rate, the pursuit of a financial stability objective in addition to a price stability objective could create dilemma situations. In the two decades between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s, the economies of advanced economies were very stable, and this period was thus identified as Great Moderation. However, subsequent experience showed that, in this period, the crisis was incubating.


Author(s):  
Patrick Njoroge ◽  
Désiré Kanga ◽  
Victor Murinde

The chapter covers central bank independence broadly and makes use of rich literature to bring out key issues on central bank independence from the inception of central banking in 1668 to the twenty-first century. The chapter identifies four measures of central bank independence mainly focusing on legal characteristics. The findings of the study point to benefits associated with independence of central banks, including management of inflation. Also, it is found that delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank increases debt sustainability and fosters fiscal discipline. It is noted that central bank independence needs to be reconciled with the requirements of institutional and personal accountability of the governors. Further, the financial regulation role should be strengthened in the mandates of central banks as the objective of price stability does not necessarily foster financial stability.


1999 ◽  
Vol 99 (92) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alain Ize ◽  
Arto Kovanen ◽  
Timo Henckel ◽  
◽  
◽  
...  

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 340-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa Maria Lastra

The name “lender of last resort” owes its origins to Sir Francis Barings, who in 1797 referred to the Bank of England as the “dernier resort” from which all banks could obtain liquidity in times of crisis.1 The lender of last resort (“LOLR”) role of the central bank remains a major rationale for most central banks around the world, in both developed and developing countries.2 While other central bank functions have recently come under fire (e.g. banking supervision), the importance of having the LOLR under the umbrella of the central bank is seldom contested.3 It is the immediacy of the availability of central bank credit (the central bank being the ultimate supplier of high-powered money) that makes the LOLR particularly suitable to confront emergency situations.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document