Pursuing Ends as the Fundamental Given Attitude

Author(s):  
Sergio Tenenbaum

The extended theory of instrumental rationality (ETR) takes the intentional pursuit of ends to be the only relevant attitude for the theory of instrumental rationality, and takes the principle of instrumental reasoning, a non-comparative principle, to be the only principle of derivation. However, it seems that if the agent has more than one end, we’ll need to introduce comparative or graded attitudes, such as the preference orderings in orthodox decision theory, in order to explain the rationality of choices among competing ends. In fact, ETR can provide a significantly better account of how a rational agent pursues multiple indeterminate ends through time than theories that make use of comparative and graded attitudes. ETR proposes that in the pursuit of such ends a rational agent must inevitably “satisfice” rather than maximize. At the same time, the chapter explains how some comparative attitudes, such as preferences, can be incorporated into ETR.

2020 ◽  
pp. 205-230
Author(s):  
Sergio Tenenbaum

Formal theories of instrumental rationality, such as orthodox decision theory, often provide a powerful account of the rationality of choice under risk. Can the extended theory of instrumental rationality (ETR) be similarly extended to contexts of risk and uncertainty? Chapter 9 argues that ETR can provide a satisfactory account of rationality in these contexts and that it can actually co-opt the resources of decision theory exactly in the cases in which the theory seems most plausible; namely, the pursuit of what I call “general means” (such as the pursuit of health or wealth). Moreover ETR plausibly renders coherent certain ubiquitous choice dispositions (such as the ones manifested in the Allais paradox) that seem incompatible with orthodox decision theory.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Geanakoplos

Abstract Decision theory and game theory are extended to allow for information processing errors. This extended theory is then used to reexamine market speculation and consensus, both when all actions (opinions) are common knowledge and when they may not be. Five axioms of information processing are shown to be especially important to speculation and consensus. They are called nondelusion, knowing that you know (KTYK), nested, balanced, and positively balanced. We show that it is necessary and sufficient that each agent's information processing errors be (1) nondeluded and balanced so that the agents cannot agree to disagree, (2) nondeluded and positively balanced so that it cannot be common knowledge that they are speculating, and (3) nondeluded and KTYK and nested so that agents cannot speculate in equilibrium. Each condition is strictly weaker than the next one, and the last is strictly weaker than partition information.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Brunero

R. Jay Wallace argues that the normativity of instrumental rationality can be traced to the independent rational requirement to hold consistent beliefs. I present three objections to this view. John Broome argues that there is a structural similarity between the rational requirements of instrumental rationality and belief consistency. Since he does not reduce the former to the latter, his view can avoid the objections to Wallace’s view. However, we should not think Broome’s account explains the whole of instrumental rationality since agents with consistent intentions can still fail in their instrumental reasoning. This consideration makes Broome’s approach vulnerable to a line of criticism that both he and Wallace present against Christine Korsgaard’s conception of instrumental rationality.


Author(s):  
Sergio Tenenbaum

Chapter 2 presents the main tenets of the extended theory of rationality (ETR). According to ETR, both the given attitudes (“inputs”) and the conclusion of practical reasoning (“outputs”) are actions (more particularly, the intentional pursuit of ends). The principle of instrumental reasoning, which tells us (roughly) to adopt means to our ends, is the only principle of derivation, and a principle (roughly) requiring agents not to pursue incompatible ends is the only principle of coherence. The chapter also presents one of the main theses of ETR; namely that the rationality of an agent through an interval t1-tn does not supervene on the rationality of the agent at each moment t1-tn (what I call the “non-supervenience thesis”). In other words, someone may be irrational over a period of time without there being any moment during that time at which they were irrational.


Author(s):  
Sergio Tenenbaum

Chapter 1 presents the general structure of a theory of instrumental rationality, as well as laying down some of the main ideas and motivations for the extended theory of instrumental rationality (ETR) developed in the book. It characterizes the content of a theory of instrumental rationality in terms of its given attitudes (the “inputs” for a theory of instrumental rationality), its principles of coherence, its principles of derivation, and what counts as the conclusion of practical reasoning or the exercise of our rational powers (the “outputs”) of instrumental rationality. On ETR, intentional actions are both the given attitudes and the exercises of our instrumental, rational powers.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Raz

The paper distinguishes between instrumental reasons and instrumental rationality. It argues that instrumental reasons are not reasons to take the means to our ends. It further argues that there is no distinct form of instrumental reasoning or of instrumental rationality. In part the argument proceeds through a sympathetic examination of suggestions made by M. Bratman, J. Broome, and J. Wallace, though the accounts of instrumental rationality offered by the last two are criticised.


2020 ◽  
pp. 111-142
Author(s):  
Sergio Tenenbaum

This chapter considers a major alternative to the extended theory of instrumental rationality (ETR): the view, pioneered by Michael Bratman, that future-directed intentions (FDIs) have a fundamental role to play in our understanding of the rationality of extended agency. FDIs come in many flavours; they can be specific intentions, plans, policies, or projects. I argue in this chapter that ETR naturally classifies some of these “flavours” as instances of extended actions, and therefore they are structurally identical and subject to the exact same basic instrumental requirements as other instances of extended actions. Once we see this point, it turns out that purported norms and principles governing FDIs are either superfluous or invalid.


Author(s):  
Paul Weirich

Decision theory is multidisciplinary and treats all aspects of choice. It is the foundation of the behavioral and social sciences. Philosophical decision theory examines and refines decision theory’s philosophical claims. Its primary subject is rational choice. Thus, it treats normative matters and is allied with branches of philosophy such as epistemology and ethics. Decision theory assists epistemology in its study of rational belief and assists ethics in its study of good acts, goals, and character traits. The behavioral and social sciences use decision theory to construct models of human behavior. Often a theory of rationality yields a good first approximation of human behavior. A general theory of rationality covers individuals and groups of people and shows how the rationality of individuals leads to the collective rationality of groups. It offers a fruitful foundation for the behavioral and social sciences. Decision theory’s main normative question concerns the nature of rationality. What principles of rationality govern choice? Principles of instrumental rationality counsel adoption of means appropriate to one’s ends. A large body of literature explicates this advice. It elaborates the view that instrumental rationality requires maximization of subjective utility: that is, acting to maximize achievement of one’s goals. An instrumentally rational act is rational conditional on the rationality of the ends the act serves and the agent’s processing of evidence about appropriate means. Other principles of rationality govern adoption of ends. Philosophical decision theory has its roots in studies of practical reasoning going back to Aristotle. It blossomed in the 20th century because of the work of Frank Ramsey, Bruno de Finetti, Leonard Savage, Richard Jeffrey, and many others. It thrives because of its intrinsic intellectual interest and because it supports traditional areas of philosophy such as epistemology and ethics. Philosophical decision theory unifies normative studies of belief, desire, and action. Its method distinguishes it from other investigations of choice. Although it draws on the behavioral and social sciences, its task is to advance foundational studies of choice rather than empirical investigations of it. Philosophy has the freedom to adopt perspectives on choice that experiments and surveys do not attempt. The normative assessment of choice is its principal exercise of this liberty. It also investigates the introspective side of choice and interpersonal comparisons of mental states, which experimentalists find insufficiently accessible to serve as the basis of public science.


2020 ◽  
pp. 168-186
Author(s):  
Sergio Tenenbaum

Chapter 7 argues that (non-trivial) principles of rationality cannot fully capture the nature of our instrumentally rational powers. A fully rational agent not only complies with the principle of instrumental rationality but also exhibits a number of instrumental virtues of character. An agent suffers a defect of rationality insofar as she fails to have one of these virtues, or insofar as she manifests one of its corresponding vices. However, an agent can manifest instrumental vices without violating any principle of rationality. This chapter proposes that courage is one of the instrumental virtues, and shows how one of its corresponding vices, cowardice, must be understood as a defect of our rational powers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Dayan

Abstract Bayesian decision theory provides a simple formal elucidation of some of the ways that representation and representational abstraction are involved with, and exploit, both prediction and its rather distant cousin, predictive coding. Both model-free and model-based methods are involved.


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