scholarly journals The Myth of Instrumental Rationality

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Raz

The paper distinguishes between instrumental reasons and instrumental rationality. It argues that instrumental reasons are not reasons to take the means to our ends. It further argues that there is no distinct form of instrumental reasoning or of instrumental rationality. In part the argument proceeds through a sympathetic examination of suggestions made by M. Bratman, J. Broome, and J. Wallace, though the accounts of instrumental rationality offered by the last two are criticised.

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Brunero

R. Jay Wallace argues that the normativity of instrumental rationality can be traced to the independent rational requirement to hold consistent beliefs. I present three objections to this view. John Broome argues that there is a structural similarity between the rational requirements of instrumental rationality and belief consistency. Since he does not reduce the former to the latter, his view can avoid the objections to Wallace’s view. However, we should not think Broome’s account explains the whole of instrumental rationality since agents with consistent intentions can still fail in their instrumental reasoning. This consideration makes Broome’s approach vulnerable to a line of criticism that both he and Wallace present against Christine Korsgaard’s conception of instrumental rationality.


Author(s):  
Sergio Tenenbaum

The extended theory of instrumental rationality (ETR) takes the intentional pursuit of ends to be the only relevant attitude for the theory of instrumental rationality, and takes the principle of instrumental reasoning, a non-comparative principle, to be the only principle of derivation. However, it seems that if the agent has more than one end, we’ll need to introduce comparative or graded attitudes, such as the preference orderings in orthodox decision theory, in order to explain the rationality of choices among competing ends. In fact, ETR can provide a significantly better account of how a rational agent pursues multiple indeterminate ends through time than theories that make use of comparative and graded attitudes. ETR proposes that in the pursuit of such ends a rational agent must inevitably “satisfice” rather than maximize. At the same time, the chapter explains how some comparative attitudes, such as preferences, can be incorporated into ETR.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason D'Cruz

Abstract In making the case that “rationalization is rational,” Cushman downplays its signature liability: Rationalization exposes a person to the hazard of delusion and self-sabotage. In paradigm cases, rationalization undermines instrumental rationality by introducing inaccuracies into the representational map required for planning and effective agency.


2000 ◽  
Vol 629 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Loup Masson ◽  
Peter F. Green

ABSTRACTResearchers have shown that thin, nonwetting, liquid homopolymer films dewet substrates, forming patterns that reflect fluctuations in the local film thickness. These patterns have been shown to be either discrete cylindrical holes or bicontinuous “spinodal-like” patterns. In this paper we show the existence of a new morphology. During the early stage of dewetting, discrete highly asymmetric holes appear spontaneously throughout the film. The nucleation rate of these holes is faster than their growth rate. The morphology of the late stage of evolution, after 18 days, is characterized by a bicontinuous pattern, distinct form conventional spinodal dewetting patterns. This morphology has been observed for a range of film thicknesses between 7.5 and 21nm. The structural evolution of this intermediate morphology is discussed.


Author(s):  
Eric Schliesser

This chapter uses Adam Smith’s obituary of David Hume, “Letter to Strahan,” published jointly with Hume’s brief autobiography, to explore the rewards and purpose of doing philosophy in a commercial society. Smith thinks that philosophers can enjoy the rewards of friendship in this life and immortality after death if they are benefactors to humanity. For Smith, friendship among equals is the most valuable goal. The argument proceeds by way of an analysis of how Hume and Smith understand magnanimity and vanity in light of the evidence surrounding Smith’s description of Hume’s deathbed scene reading of Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead.


Author(s):  
Thomas Douglas

Interventions that modify a person’s motivations through chemically or physically influencing the brain seem morally objectionable, at least when they are performed nonconsensually. This chapter raises a puzzle for attempts to explain their objectionability. It first seeks to show that the objectionability of such interventions must be explained at least in part by reference to the sort of mental interference that they involve. It then argues that it is difficult to furnish an explanation of this sort. The difficulty is that these interventions seem no more objectionable, in terms of the kind of mental interference that they involve, than certain forms of environmental influence that many would regard as morally innocuous. The argument proceeds by comparing a particular neurointervention with a comparable environmental intervention. The author argues, first, that the two dominant explanations for the objectionability of the neurointervention apply equally to the environmental intervention, and second, that the descriptive difference between the environmental intervention and the neurointervention that most plausibly grounds the putative moral difference in fact fails to do so. The author concludes by presenting a trilemma that falls out of the argument.


Author(s):  
Matt Matravers

This chapter argues that neurointerventions, whether in criminal justice or in any other social practice, need to be understood, and can only be evaluated, in light of the context provided by the relevant practice. In the case of criminal justice, the meaning and nature of the practice is contested and so the evaluation of proposed neurointerventions must be preceded by substantive argument about its justification. The chapter considers the retributive context of much criminal justice theory and practice before noting the continued existence—and indeed renaissance—of rehabilitative features of that practice. The argument proceeds by showing that neither retributive considerations, such as proportionality, nor an appeal to independent moral values, such as dignity, can in themselves guide us in deciding on the justification of neurointerventions. It also raises the question of whether, in evaluating alternatives to current practices, we should take as our baseline what we currently do or what we would ideally do in ideal circumstances.


Author(s):  
Thomas Keymer

On the lapse of the Licensing Act in 1695, Thomas Macaulay wrote in his History of England, ‘English literature was emancipated, and emancipated for ever, from the control of the government’. It’s certainly true that the system of prior restraint enshrined in this Restoration measure was now at an end, at least for print. Yet the same cannot be said of government control, which came to operate instead by means of post-publication retribution, not pre-publication licensing, notably for the common-law offence of seditious libel. For many of the authors affected, from Defoe to Cobbett, this new regime was a greater constraint on expression than the old, not least for its alarming unpredictability, and for the spectacular punishment—the pillory—that was sometimes entailed. Yet we may also see the constraint as an energizing force. Throughout the eighteenth century and into the Romantic period, writers developed and refined ingenious techniques for communicating dissident or otherwise contentious meanings while rendering the meanings deniable. As a work of both history and criticism, this book traces the rise and fall of seditious libel prosecution, and with it the theatre of the pillory, while arguing that the period’s characteristic forms of literary complexity—ambiguity, ellipsis, indirection, irony—may be traced to the persistence of censorship in the post-licensing world. The argument proceeds through case studies of major poets and prose writers including Dryden, Defoe, Pope, Fielding, Johnson, and Southey, and also calls attention to numerous little-known satires and libels across the extended period.


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