Financial Stability and Bank Supervision in the Twenty-First Century

Author(s):  
Babak Abbaszadeh

This chapter addresses the challenges and opportunities for financial stability and bank supervision in the twenty-first century. It is argued that one of the major challenges to the vision of achieving a world where the financial systems are stable, reliable, and accessible was the 2008 global financial crisis. The G20 took up an agenda to improve regulation and supervision regimes globally through initiatives such as higher capital requirements and new liquidity regulations. However, challenges have emerged due to advances in technology, financial innovations, climate change, legislative or regulatory barriers and money laundering, organized crime, corruption, and the financing of terrorism. In particular, supervisors in developing economies face the challenge of how to ensure financial stability while at the same time promoting the development of the financial system to sustainable economic growth for poverty reduction and greater equality.

Barely two decades after the Asian financial crisis Asia was suddenly confronted with multiple challenges originating outside the region: the 2008 global financial crisis, the European debt crisis, and, finally developed economies’ implementation of unconventional monetary policies. Especially the implementation of quantitative easing (QE), ultra-low interest rate policies, and negative interest rate policies by a number of large central banks has given rise to concerns over financial stability and international capital flows. One of the regions most profoundly affected by the crisis was Asia due to its high dependence on international trade and international financial linkages. The objective of this book is to explain how macroeconomic shocks stemming from the global financial crisis and recent unconventional monetary policies in developed economies have affected macroeconomic and financial stability in emerging markets, with a particular focus on Asia. In particular, the book covers the following thematic areas: (i) the spillover effects of macroeconomic shocks on financial markets and flows in emerging economies; (ii) the impact of recent macroeconomic shocks on real economies in emerging markets; and (iii) key challenges for the monetary, exchange rate, trade, and macroprudential policies of developing economies, especially Asian economies, and suggestions and recommendations to increase resiliency against external shocks.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
L.T. Stayner ◽  
J.J. Collins ◽  
Y.L. Guo ◽  
D. Heederik ◽  
M. Kogevinas ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Alex Cukierman

The first CBs were private institutions that were given a monopoly over the issuance of currency by government in return for help in financing the budget and adherence to the rules of the gold standard. Under this standard the price of gold in terms of currency was fixed and the CB could issue or retire domestic currency only in line with gold inflows or outflows. Due to the scarcity of gold this system assured price stability as long as it functioned. Wars and depressions led to the replacement of the gold standard by the more flexible gold exchange standard. Along with restrictions on international capital flows this standard became a major pillar of the post–WWII Bretton Woods system. Under this system the U.S. dollar (USD) was pegged to gold, and other countries’ exchange rates were pegged to the USD. In many developing economies CBs functioned as governmental development banks.Following the world inflation of the 1970s and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, eradication of inflation gradually became the explicit number one priority of CBs. The hyperinflationary experiences of the first half of the 20th century, which were mainly caused by over-utilization of the printing press to finance budgetary expenditures, convinced policymakers in developed economies, following Germany’s lead, that the conduct of monetary policy should be delegated to instrument independent CBs, that governments should be prohibited from borrowing from them, and that the main goal of the CB should be price stability. During the late 1980s and the 1990s numerous CBs obtained instrument independence and started to operate on inflation targeting systems. Under this system the CB is expected to use interest rate policy to deliver a low inflation rate in the long run and to stabilize fluctuations in economic activity in the short and medium terms. In parallel the fixed exchange rates of the Bretton Woods system were replaced by flexible rates or dirty floats. The conjunction of more flexible rates and IT effectively moved the control over exchange rates from governments to CBs.The global financial crisis reminded policymakers that, of all public institutions, the CB has a comparative advantage in swiftly preventing the crisis from becoming a generalized panic that would seriously cripple the financial system. The crisis precipitated the financial stability motive into the forefront of CBs’ policy concerns and revived the explicit recognition of the lender of last resort function of the CB in the face of shocks to the financial system. Although the financial stability objective appeared in CBs’ charters, along with the price stability objective, also prior to the crisis, the crisis highlighted the critical importance of the supervisory and regulatory functions of CBs and other regulators. An important lesson from the crisis was that micro-prudential supervision and regulation should be supplemented with macro-prudential regulation and that the CB is the choice institution to perform this function. The crisis led CBs of major developed economies to reduce their policy rates to zero (and even to negative values in some cases) and to engage in large-scale asset purchases that bloat their balance sheets to this day. It also induced CBs of small open economies to supplement their interest rate policies with occasional foreign exchange interventions.


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