scholarly journals ADJUSTMENT SPEED OF DEBT MATURITY: EVIDENCE FROM FINANCIAL CRISES IN EAST ASIA

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-92
Author(s):  
Hasan Tekin ◽  
Ali Yavuz Polat
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
East Asian ◽  
Debt Maturity ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Exogenous Shocks ◽  
Adjustment Speed ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Debt Holders

We investigate the change in adjustment speed of debt maturity for East Asian firms between 1990 and 2017 by including two exogenous shocks: the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998 (AFC) and the Global Financial Crisis 2007-2009 (GFC). We employ the least square dummy variable correction and find that East Asian firms have a slower adjustment of long-term debt over time. Besides, the decrease in adjustment speed of long-term debt after the GFC is more compared to the decrease after the AFC. Further analysis shows the optimal debt maturity differs across countries and industries. Another important implication of our results is that firms in high governance countries are more likely to close the gap between the actual and target debt maturity in time. Overall, debt holders and investors should consider financial uncertainties.

Market differences and adjustment speed of debt, equity, and debt maturity

2020 ◽  
pp. 031289622096826
Author(s):  
Hasan Tekin
Keyword(s):  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Debt Maturity ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Adjustment Speed ◽  
Generalized Methods Of Moments ◽  
Trade Credits ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Methods Of Moments

This article investigates the role of market differences and the global financial crisis 2007–2009 (GFC) on the adjustment speed of debt issuance, equity issuance, and debt maturity. The sample of 9731 firm-years from highly regulated Main Market (MAIN) and slightly unregulated Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the United Kingdom was used. Employing system generalized methods of moments, the findings show that AIM firms have a faster adjustment speed of debt and equity before the GFC than MAIN firms. However, it is vice versa after the GFC because AIM firms face greater problems in accessing finance due to the shrinkage of bank credits during the recession. Besides, MAIN firms have faster adjustments on long-term debt over the time, whereas AIM firms have faster adjustment speed of trade credits. Overall, investors should consider market differences and recessions to take accurate decisions on debt-equity and debt maturity to invest where and when. JEL Classification: C26, G01, G32

Advancing SME Sustainability

2021 ◽  
pp. 159-178
Author(s):  
Meng Kui Hu ◽  
Daisy Mui Hung Kee
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Policy Changes ◽  
Business Environments ◽  
Business Operations ◽  
New Business ◽  
Spanish Flu ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis ◽  
The Impact

The world has been struck by multiple crises that crippled the socio-economy of nations in the past. The impact of these crises was so significant that they initiated numerous policy changes worldwide. The radical crises in this context refer to the Spanish flu, the Asian financial crisis, the global financial crisis, and the current COVID-19 pandemic. Due to their small capital structure with limited resources and fragile nature, SMEs were severely impacted by these crises. Many SMEs were forced to close down their business operations. Somehow, the remaining SMEs managed to persist and survive through the crises. Moving forward, SMEs can better prepare for future crises by understanding and learning from the predicaments of these past crises. Consequently, SMEs must also be adaptive to new business environments and responding promptly to crises by realigning their strategies to achieve business sustainability in the long term.

PATTERNS OF EXCHANGE RATES AND CURRENT ACCOUNTS: THE EAST ASIAN WALTZ

2012 ◽  
Vol 57 (02) ◽  
pp. 1250009 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW SHENG ◽  
KIAN TENG KWEK ◽  
CHO WAI CHO
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Exchange Rates ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
East Asian ◽  
Financial System ◽  
Asian Financial Crisis ◽  
Market System ◽  
Financial Crisis Of 2008 ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 have a common trait, that is any shock to the financial system or market system can cause the system or market to flip from one state to another state.

scholarly journals Comparing The South African Stock Markets Response To Two Periods Of Distinct Instability The 1997-98 East Asian And Russian Crisis And The Recent Global Financial Crisis

2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 427 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anmar Pretorius ◽  
Jesse De Beer
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
South African ◽  
Stock Markets ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
East Asian ◽  
Volatility Spillover ◽  
The South ◽  
Share Prices ◽  
Export Destination ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

This paper compares the South African stock markets response to two periods of distinct instability, namely the East Asian and Russian crisis of 1997-98 and the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Considering share prices, the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) was more severely affected by the earlier crisis, when the domestic fundamentals were weaker. The low levels of foreign reserves were the main cause of concern. The paper further empirically investigates volatility spillover between the JSE and various developed and emerging stock markets during the two crisis periods, employing twelve separate bi-variate GARCH models. The main contributors to volatility spillover during the East Asian and Russian crisis were Mexico, Thailand, Brazil, and Germany predominantly emerging markets. During the second crisis period, Germany, US, Brazil, and UK played the dominant parts predominantly developed markets. The importance of Germany in both periods can be attributed to the countrys role as main export destination of South African goods in Europe.

scholarly journals How to Keep a Promise: Laymen Answers to the Financial Crisis

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kinga Pétervári
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Preventive Measures ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

This article is a case study, providing a possible interpretation of the current Hungarian financial-legal culture.How to apply those terms and conditions in long-term loan agreements in financial crisis, which are favourable or seemingly irrelevant in good times but turn out to be disadvantageous, sometimes even disastrous in bad times. How to calculate and allocate risks, what is acceptable and what is foreseeable to laymen? The focus here is on the laymen attitudes towards long-term contractual obligations and performances in the global financial crisis: whether debtors’ contractual obligations must be fulfilled, what should be construed as an excuse for non-performance, whether there should be measures designed to protect the debtors more, if yes, at whose expense – the creditors (rather preventive measures) or the taxpayers (rather restitutive measures) –, if no, how to allocate ideally the risks and liabilities, is profit-making an evil per se, that needs to be managed?

Indirect Governance in Global Financial Regulation

2020 ◽  
pp. 203-222
Author(s):  
Thomas Rixen ◽  
Lora Anne Viola
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Market ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Policy Reforms ◽  
Regulatory Standards ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis ◽  
And Control

The global financial crisis led G20 states to conclude that stronger regulatory standards and improved compliance were needed to ensure global financial stability. To this end, the G20, as collective governor, granted an institutional intermediary, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), authority to develop and supervise financial market regulations. However, the G20 designed the FSB in ways that stymied its regulatory competence. Why did the G20 design the FSB in ways that were inadequate to meeting its own governance goal? Competence–control theory provides a compelling answer. The G20 faces a tradeoff between a competent intermediary and control over the intermediary; this tradeoff is exacerbated by the G20’s collective nature. While the G20 has a collective long-term interest in an intermediary with the expertise and capacity to promote stability-enhancing regulations, intense short-term distributive conflicts among member states yield strong incentives to control the intermediary. These internal distributive conflicts are more easily overcome during systemic economic crisis, when a competent intermediary is urgently needed. Once the crisis has passed, however, the governor reasserts control, again compromising the intermediary’s competence. The chapter illustrates this argument with an account of reforming the Financial Stability Forum into the FSB, and three case studies of policy reforms after the financial crisis.

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