Interventions in Judicial Review Proceedings

Author(s):  
Nathalie Lieven

This chapter examines the growth and value of interventions in judicial proceedings. It argues the exponential growth in interventions is largely attributable not to the CPR, but the introduction of the Human Rights Act. The decision whether or not to allow an intervention, and then whether to give any weight to its content is wholly discretionary. Interventions are part of a wider trend to an increasingly inquisitorial jurisdiction, beyond the adversarial contest between the parties. Two reasons for the growth in interventions are courts’ willingness to take into account broader policy considerations in judicial review proceedings, and relatedly the willingness of the courts to hear international law and comparative law arguments and place weight on them. The Supreme Court, in particular, has encouraged interventions in recent years, and Baroness Hale has made clear in writing how useful she finds them. Although interveners are now subject to the risk of adverse costs orders under the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 for interventions deemed to be unhelpful, to date these provisions do not appear to have been applied, which suggests that that this part of the Government’s efforts to discourage interveners has been unsuccessful.

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
Vera Rusinova ◽  
Olga Ganina

The article analyses the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada on the Nevsun v. Araya case, which deals with the severe violations of human rights, including slavery and forced labor with respect of the workers of Eritrean mines owned by a Canadian company “Nevsun”. By a 5 to 4 majority, the court concluded that litigants can seek compensation for the violations of international customs committed by a company. This decision is underpinned by the tenets that international customs form a part of Canadian common law, companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law, and under ubi jus ibi remedium principle plaintiffs have a right to receive compensation under national law. Being a commentary to this judgment the article focuses its analysis on an issue that is of a key character for Public International Law, namely on the tenet that international customs impose obligations to respect human rights on companies and they can be called for responsibility for these violations. This conclusion is revolutionary in the part in which it shifts the perception of the companies’ legal status under International Law. The court’s approach is critically assessed against its well-groundness and correspondence to the current stage of International law. In particular, the authors discuss, whether the legal stance on the Supreme Court of Canada, under which companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law is a justified necessity or a head start.


Author(s):  
Rabinder Singh

This chapter reflects on the impact of the Human Rights Act (HRA) in its first 10 years on litigation and, in particular, on advocacy. It suggests that the impact has been important but not revolutionary: the HRA has fitted into the existing legal landscape and has not required radical changes to the rules on procedure and evidence. It examines four areas in which its impact can be felt: the nature of the evidence required in human rights cases; disclosure and candour in judicial review proceedings; the increased need for cross-examination of witnesses; and the role of third-party interveners because human rights cases tend to raise issues of importance to the wider public. Finally, it examines the increasing importance of international law in domestic cases, which can be attributed in part to the impact of the HRA.


2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 477-494
Author(s):  
Bríd Ní Ghráinne ◽  
Aisling McMahon

AbstractOn 7 June 2018, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSCt) issued its decision on, inter alia, whether Northern Ireland's near-total abortion ban was compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). This article critically assesses the UKSC's treatment of international law in this case. It argues that the UKSCt was justified in finding that Northern Ireland's ban on abortion in cases of rape, incest, and FFA was a violation of Article 8, but that the majority erred in its assessment of Article 3 ECHR and of the relevance of international law more generally.


2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 220-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eirik Bjorge

AbstractThe protection of human rights through common law principles and values has a greater potential than has been recognised hitherto. First, the adoption at common law of the proportionality test of interferences with rights shows that, when human rights are at issue, the courts will apply an exigent test, allowing interferences only if, amongst other things, a less intrusive measure could not have been used. Secondly, the principle of legality, along with common law constitutionalism as developed recently by the Supreme Court, now means that there is a common law pendant to the rule in s. 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. Thirdly, in cases where the protection offered by the Act is displaced by obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, there is no displacement of common law rights, which continue to operate. Fourthly, common law rights are more open to the influences of the customary international law of human rights than are Convention rights. These factors combine to mean that the future of common law rights is an auspicious one.


2004 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Butler

The paper examines whether there was any basis for Parliament to enact section 3(2) of the Supreme Court Act 2003 in regard to human rights decisions of the Court of Appeal. The paper asks whether the Court of Appeal has indeed been "activist" in its human rights decisions. The discussion focuses on the areas where judicial activism might be suspected, firstly the filling of legislative gaps, and secondly statutory interpretation, with a special focus on implied repeal. Relevant decisions of the House of Lords under the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) are used as a contrast to the decisions of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. The paper comes to the conclusion that the New Zealand Court of Appeal has not been activist in the area of human rights.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-148
Author(s):  
Endri Ismail

Penelitian ini berupaya memaparkan legalitas Qanun Aceh Nomor 6 Tahun 2014 tentang Hukum Jinayat (Qanun Jinayah) dalam konstruksi hukum tata negara Indonesia. Untuk menganalisis hal tersebut, penelitian ini akan meninjau legalitas Qanun Jinayah dari dua sudut pandang, yaitu formalitas pembentukan peraturan perundang-undangan dan konsep negara kesatuan. Qanun Jinayah menuai banyak perdebatan disebabkan kedudukannya sebagai peraturan daerah (perda) namun bermateri muatan pidana Islam (jinayah) yang sama sekali belum diatur dalam peraturan perundang-undangan di level nasional. Tahun 2015, Qanun Jinayah dilakukan uji materiil ke Mahkamah Agung oleh Perkumpulan Masyarakat Pembaharuan Peradilan Pidana (ICJR) namun permohonan uji materiil ini dinyatakan tidak dapat diterima dengan alasan prematur (belum waktunya). Analisis yuridis dari perspektif hukum ketatanegaraan ini penting dilakukan mengingat legalitas sebuah peraturan perundang-undangan menentukan validitas dan kekuatan berlakunya. Yuridical Analysis of the Legality of Qanun Aceh Number 6 Year 2014 on Jinayat Law This research attempts to describe the legality of Qanun Aceh Number 6 Year 2014 on Jinayat Law (Qanun Jinayah) in the construction of Indonesian constitutional law. To analyze it, this study will examine the legality of Qanun Jinayah from two perspectives, those are the formality of the formulation of legislation and the concept of a unitary state. Qanun Jinayah gets  a lot of debate because of its position as a Regional Regulation (Peraturan Daerah), but the material of Islamic criminal content (Jinayah) which has not been regulated in national legislation. In 2015, Qanun Jinayat is subjected to a judicial review to the Supreme Court by the Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR), but this petition is declared unacceptable on a premature reason (unspecified). Judicial analysis from the perspective of constitutional law is important to do due to the legality of a legislation determines the validity and strenght of the law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 99 (5) ◽  
pp. 76-77
Author(s):  
Julie Underwood

The right to an education is guaranteed by international law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Similarly, UNESCO’s Constitution sets out the right to an education as necessary to “prepare the children of the world for the responsibilities of freedom.” No such right is mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, though. Perhaps Congress or the Supreme Court would be sympathetic, however, to an argument for educational rights based on the 14th Amendment’s guarantee of the rights of citizenship.


2014 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 287-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Bakker

In two cases lodged by victims (or their relatives) of the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands has taken a progressive stance on the interpretation of international law on the responsibility of States and international organizations for wrongful acts. The Supreme Court upheld the earlier decisions of The Hague Court of Appeal, confirming that the Netherlands can be held responsible for the death and injuries of these victims, despite the fact that the Dutch troops employed to protect this enclave were part of a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force. By accepting the possibility of dual attribution of an internationally wrongful act to both the UN and the troop-sending State, it has departed from the restrictive approach adopted in current judicial practice, in particular by the European Court of Human Rights. In this note, the Supreme Court’s judgments are discussed, focusing on (i) the question of dual attribution of an international wrongful act, and (ii) the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties. It concludes that, although the Supreme Court’s reliance on two sets of Draft Articles of the International Law Commission without referring to any State practice is surprising, these judgments should be welcomed as significant precedents, which may contribute to the development of a norm of customary international law. They also constitute an important step towards ensuring access to justice and reparation for the victims of gross human rights violations, such as those committed in Srebrenica.


2014 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 665-697 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uta Kohl

AbstractThe almost two decade-long bonanza of civil litigation concerning gross human rights violations committed by corporations under the US Alien Tort Statute 1789 was scaled back by the US Supreme Court in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum in April 2013. The court restricted the territorial reach of human rights claims against transnational corporations by holding that the presumption against extra-territoriality applied to the Act. Thus Shell, the Dutch/British defendant, and the role it played in the brutal suppression by the Nigerian military of the Ogoni peoples' protest movement against the environmental devastation caused by oil exploration, lay outside the territorial scope of the Act. Legal accountability must lie in a State with a stronger connection with the dispute. While this article briefly engages with the Supreme Court decision, its main focus is on the attitude of Western governments to the corporate human rights litigation under the ATS as articulated in their amicus briefs. In these briefs they objected to the statute's excessive extraterritoriality and horizontal application of human rights to artificial non-State actors. In these two respects corporate ATS litigation created significant inroads into the conventional State-centric approach to human rights and thus provided an opportunity for more effective human rights enjoyment. This article tests the validity of the objections of Western governments to corporate human rights obligations under the ATS against the norms of public international law and against the substantive demands arising out of the shortfalls of the international human rights enforcement.


2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 106
Author(s):  
Seno Wibowo Gumbira

Abstrak Permasalahan upaya hukum luar biasa pada Peninjauan Kembali khususnya pada proses peradilan pidana di Indonesia Pasca Putusan judicial review Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 34/PPU-XI/2013 dan SEMA RI No 7 Tahun 2014 yang dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah Agung RI sama-sama memiliki permasalahan yuridis dan bertentangan dengan asas-asas baik dalam lingkup sistem peradilan pidana dan asas ilmu perundang-undangan di Indonesia, asas tersebut meliputi asas ne bis in idem, asas peradilan cepat, sederhana dan biaya ringan, asas litis finiri oportet, dan sedangkan pada ilmu perundang-undangan asas lex superior derogate legi inferior. Dapat juga dikatakan bahwa judicial review Mahkamah Konstitusi berpotensi merusak pilar hukum karena jika menyatakan suatu ketentuan hukum hanya satu undang-undang saja, yang mana peraturan perundang-undangan yang 1 bertentangan dengan peraturan perundang-undang lainnya seperti contoh Putusan MK Nomor 34/PPU-XI/2013 pada Pasal 268 ayat 3 Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1981 dinyatakan tidak memiliki kekuatan hukum tetap tentang Peninjauan Kembali hanya dilakukan 1 kali saja, sedangkan pada Pasal 24 ayat 2 Undang-Undang No. 48 Tahun 2009 tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman dengan Pasal 66 ayat 1 Undang-Undang No. 3 Tahun 2009 tentang Mahkamah Agung, kedua instrument hukum tersebut menyatakan bahwa pengajuan Peninjauan Kembali hanya dapat diajukan 1 kali. Solusi agar tidak menimbulkan problematika adalah bahwa  Mahkamah Agung tidak perlu menerbitkan SEMA RI No 7 Tahun 2014 tersebut, cukup menggunakan Undang-Undang Kekuasaan Kehakiman dan Undang-Undang Mahkamah Agung yang menyatakan Peninjauan kembali hanya 1 kali, selain itu perlu optimalisasi pembuktian dalam proses peradilan pidana oleh semua pihak. Kata Kunci: judicial review, Peninjauan Kembali, Sistem Peradilan Pidana. Abstract Problems of extraordinary legal remedy on Reconsideration, especially in the criminal justice process in Indonesia following the Ruling of judicial review of the Constitutional Court Number 34 / PPU-XI / 2013 and SEMA Decree No. 7 of 2014 issued by the Supreme Court had the same problem  juridical in contradictory with the principles both within the criminal justice system and the principle of the science of law in Indonesia, those principles include the principle of ne bis in idem, the principle of justice which one quick, simple and low cost, the principle of litis finiri oportet, It is on the principle of lex superior derogate legi inferior. It can also be said that the judicial review of the Constitutional Court has the potential to undermine the pillars of legal systems as when stating a legal provision is only base on one law, in which is in fact the legislation is incontracdictory with other laws such as of Constitutional Court Decision No. 34 / PPU-XI / 2013 on Article 268 paragraph 3 of Law No. 8 of 1981 that have no binding legal force, meanwhile in Article 24 paragraph 2 of Law No. 48 Year 2009 regarding Judicial Power with Article 66 paragraph 1 of Law No. 3 of 2009 on the Supreme Court, both legal instrument states that the filing of a judicial review can only be submitted one time. A solution that does not cause the problems is that the Supreme Court did not need to issue SEMA Decree No. 7 of 2014 the court simple use the Law of Judicial Power and the Law of the Supreme Court which states Reconsideration should be only one time in addition to the necessary optimize evidence of proof in the criminal justice process by all Parties. Keywords: judicial review, Reconsideration, the Criminal Justice System


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