scholarly journals Analisis Yuridis terhadap Legalitas Qanun Aceh No. 6/2014 tentang Hukum Jinayat

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-148
Author(s):  
Endri Ismail

Penelitian ini berupaya memaparkan legalitas Qanun Aceh Nomor 6 Tahun 2014 tentang Hukum Jinayat (Qanun Jinayah) dalam konstruksi hukum tata negara Indonesia. Untuk menganalisis hal tersebut, penelitian ini akan meninjau legalitas Qanun Jinayah dari dua sudut pandang, yaitu formalitas pembentukan peraturan perundang-undangan dan konsep negara kesatuan. Qanun Jinayah menuai banyak perdebatan disebabkan kedudukannya sebagai peraturan daerah (perda) namun bermateri muatan pidana Islam (jinayah) yang sama sekali belum diatur dalam peraturan perundang-undangan di level nasional. Tahun 2015, Qanun Jinayah dilakukan uji materiil ke Mahkamah Agung oleh Perkumpulan Masyarakat Pembaharuan Peradilan Pidana (ICJR) namun permohonan uji materiil ini dinyatakan tidak dapat diterima dengan alasan prematur (belum waktunya). Analisis yuridis dari perspektif hukum ketatanegaraan ini penting dilakukan mengingat legalitas sebuah peraturan perundang-undangan menentukan validitas dan kekuatan berlakunya. Yuridical Analysis of the Legality of Qanun Aceh Number 6 Year 2014 on Jinayat Law This research attempts to describe the legality of Qanun Aceh Number 6 Year 2014 on Jinayat Law (Qanun Jinayah) in the construction of Indonesian constitutional law. To analyze it, this study will examine the legality of Qanun Jinayah from two perspectives, those are the formality of the formulation of legislation and the concept of a unitary state. Qanun Jinayah gets  a lot of debate because of its position as a Regional Regulation (Peraturan Daerah), but the material of Islamic criminal content (Jinayah) which has not been regulated in national legislation. In 2015, Qanun Jinayat is subjected to a judicial review to the Supreme Court by the Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR), but this petition is declared unacceptable on a premature reason (unspecified). Judicial analysis from the perspective of constitutional law is important to do due to the legality of a legislation determines the validity and strenght of the law.


Author(s):  
Adam Shinar ◽  
Barak Medina ◽  
Gila Stopler

Abstract Israeli constitutionalism has long interested comparative constitutional law scholars, whether due to its geopolitical status, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, its internal divisions, or its unique constitutional evolution. Unlike many other countries that have ratified constitutions after the Second World War, Israel was established as a parliamentary democracy, with an explicit intention to ratify a constitution at a later stage. This did not happen. Instead, it underwent a “constitutional revolution” announced by its Supreme Court. Fitting a revolution, much of comparative constitutional law scholarship has focused on this pivotal moment. The articles in this symposium depart from the scholarship focused on that moment. They seek to critically understand what has become of Israeli constitutionalism in the past decade. In this introduction, we highlight several transformations and features which we believe are essential if one is to understand the extant constitutional order in Israel. These should be understood as background conditions against which Israeli constitutionalism is operating. They include the strengthening of judicial review alongside rising political resistance to the Court’s power; populism in political discourse targeting rule of law institutions; the erosion of individual rights alongside the strengthening of nationalist elements; and increasing divisions inside Israeli society. These challenge the idea of a successful constitutional revolution in terms of its inherent promise to better protect individual rights and safeguard the rule of law. In describing these features, we seek to situate the Supreme Court, judicial review, and the legal-constitutional order generally, in the larger sphere of Israeli society and politics.



2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 2102-2117
Author(s):  
Alda Rifada Rizqi

Democracy with integrity will be realized if carried out in accordance with the will of the people as holders of sovereignty, the KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) as the election organizer has the authority to make regulations that support a better democracy. KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) Regulation No. 20 of 2018 as evidence that the KPU is committed to participating in preventing corrupt behavior. It was considered to have been considered as an effort to protect the interests of the people, but the regulation was submitted to a judicial review at the Supreme Court. Then, based on legal-formal considerations and based on the legal positivism of the Supreme Court, the request for the test is granted. The decision distanced itself from progressive legal values that justified the denial of what was regulated in legislation in order to put forward the values of public justice, because basically the law was made to fulfill human interests, accommodating the will of the people for the sake of order.



2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Asep Syarifuddin Hidayat

Abstract.Article 13 paragraph 1 of Act Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power states that all court hearings are open to the public, unless the Act says otherwise. Therefore, a judicial review trial must be open to the public. If the trial process of the judicial review is carried out in a closed manner, it can be considered a legal defect, because it is contrary to Article 13 paragraph (3) of the Law. The Law of the Supreme Court is not regulated that the judicial review is closed, because in the judicial review there is a need for openness or principle of audiences of parties or litigants must be given the opportunity to provide information and express their opinions, including the defendant as the maker of Legislation invitation under the law, so that the impact of the decision will need to be involved.Keywords: Judicial Review, Audi Alteram Et Partem Principle, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court Abstrak.Pasal 13 ayat 1 Undang-Undang Nomor 48 Tahun 2009 tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman menyebutkan semua sidang pemeriksaan pengadilan terbuka untuk umum, kecuali Undang-Undang berkata lain. Oleh karena itu,  judicial review persidangan harus dilakukan terbuka untuk umum. Apabila proses persidangan judicial review ini dilakukan secara tertutup, maka dapat dinilai cacat hukum karena bertentangan dengan Pasal 13 ayat (3) Undang-Undang tersebut. Undang-Undang Mahkamah Agung pun tidak diatur bahwa persidangan judicial review bersifat tertutup, karena dalam judicial review perlu adanya keterbukaan atau asas audi alteram et partem atau pihak-pihak yang berperkara harus diberi kesempatan untuk memberikan keterangan dan menyampaikan pendapatnya termasuk pihak termohon sebagai  pembuat Peraturan Perundang-Undangan di bawah Undang-Undang sehingga akan terkena dampak putusan perlu dilibatkan.Kata Kunci: Judicial Review, Asas Audi Alteram Et Partem, Mahkamah Agung, Mahkamah Konstitusi.



Author(s):  
Gaudreault-DesBiens Jean-François ◽  
Poirier et Johanne

This chapter documents the evolution from a dualist—“watertight compartments”—conception of Canadian federalism, to one that must acknowledge an increased number of intergovernmental cooperative ventures. It first examines Canada’s fundamentally dualist federal architecture before looking at the empirical reality of cooperative federalism which frequently challenges this structural dualism. It then considers how the rise of cooperative federalism influenced the evolution of the interpretive doctrines underpinning the law of Canadian federalism. Finally, it analyses the normative strength and scope of cooperative federalism, concluding that the impact of cooperative federalism in Canadian constitutional law remains tamed by the dualist conception of federalism that still underlies the Supreme Court of Canada’s federalism case law.



Author(s):  
Nancy Woloch

This chapter assesses Muller v. Oregon (1908), its significance, and the law it upheld: Oregon's ten-hour law of 1903. Convicted of violating Oregon's law of 1903 that barred the employment of women in factories and laundries for more than ten hours a day, Curt Muller—the owner of a Portland laundry—challenged the constitutionality of the law, which he claimed violated his right of freedom to contract under the due process of the Fourteenth Amendment. On February 24, 1908, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Oregon law. This decision marked a momentous triumph for progressive reformers and a turning point in the movement for protective laws. At the same time, by declaring woman “in a class by herself,” the Supreme Court embedded in constitutional law an axiom of female difference. The Muller decision thus pushed public policy forward toward modern labor standards and simultaneously distanced it from sexual equality.



2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 169-216
Author(s):  
Brian A. Langille

Judicial review of the decisions of labour relations boards has been a nagging problem for the Supreme Court of Canada for decades. The decision of the Court in Le Syndicat des Employés de Production du Québec et de L’Acadie v. Canada Labour Relations Board et al. provides an opportunity for and indeed provokes review of the work of the Court in dealing with this recurring problem. This essay begins by placing in perspective the concrete issue posed in the L’Acadie decision. But the particular facts of that case are used only as a vehicle to explore the nature of the problem of judicial review of labour decisionmakers and the history of the Court's handling of it. A fundamental thesis of this essay is that the Court's work can be best understood as comprising two distinct periods, the early years (pre-1979) and the new era (1979-1984?). This essay articulates the view that during the early years the Court developed a law of judicial review which was wholly inadequate both in functional and doctrinal terms. In the new era the Court simplified and reformed the law of judicial review of labour boards and labour arbitrators. It is only from the perspective of the Court's previous handling of the issue that the decision in L’Acadie can be truly understood. When so viewed the decision is perfectly inadequate. The case creates a new distinction based upon the old confusion of “jurisdiction”. This essay then develops the view that no theory of judicial review which revolves around the notion of “jurisdiction” can ever satisfactorily deal with the issues presented. In this respect the Court's own cases from the “new era” represent a much more sensible, if still a second best approach. Finally, suggestions for a legislative solution to the problem posed by L’Acadie are briefly explored.



2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 106
Author(s):  
Seno Wibowo Gumbira

Abstrak Permasalahan upaya hukum luar biasa pada Peninjauan Kembali khususnya pada proses peradilan pidana di Indonesia Pasca Putusan judicial review Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 34/PPU-XI/2013 dan SEMA RI No 7 Tahun 2014 yang dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah Agung RI sama-sama memiliki permasalahan yuridis dan bertentangan dengan asas-asas baik dalam lingkup sistem peradilan pidana dan asas ilmu perundang-undangan di Indonesia, asas tersebut meliputi asas ne bis in idem, asas peradilan cepat, sederhana dan biaya ringan, asas litis finiri oportet, dan sedangkan pada ilmu perundang-undangan asas lex superior derogate legi inferior. Dapat juga dikatakan bahwa judicial review Mahkamah Konstitusi berpotensi merusak pilar hukum karena jika menyatakan suatu ketentuan hukum hanya satu undang-undang saja, yang mana peraturan perundang-undangan yang 1 bertentangan dengan peraturan perundang-undang lainnya seperti contoh Putusan MK Nomor 34/PPU-XI/2013 pada Pasal 268 ayat 3 Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1981 dinyatakan tidak memiliki kekuatan hukum tetap tentang Peninjauan Kembali hanya dilakukan 1 kali saja, sedangkan pada Pasal 24 ayat 2 Undang-Undang No. 48 Tahun 2009 tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman dengan Pasal 66 ayat 1 Undang-Undang No. 3 Tahun 2009 tentang Mahkamah Agung, kedua instrument hukum tersebut menyatakan bahwa pengajuan Peninjauan Kembali hanya dapat diajukan 1 kali. Solusi agar tidak menimbulkan problematika adalah bahwa  Mahkamah Agung tidak perlu menerbitkan SEMA RI No 7 Tahun 2014 tersebut, cukup menggunakan Undang-Undang Kekuasaan Kehakiman dan Undang-Undang Mahkamah Agung yang menyatakan Peninjauan kembali hanya 1 kali, selain itu perlu optimalisasi pembuktian dalam proses peradilan pidana oleh semua pihak. Kata Kunci: judicial review, Peninjauan Kembali, Sistem Peradilan Pidana. Abstract Problems of extraordinary legal remedy on Reconsideration, especially in the criminal justice process in Indonesia following the Ruling of judicial review of the Constitutional Court Number 34 / PPU-XI / 2013 and SEMA Decree No. 7 of 2014 issued by the Supreme Court had the same problem  juridical in contradictory with the principles both within the criminal justice system and the principle of the science of law in Indonesia, those principles include the principle of ne bis in idem, the principle of justice which one quick, simple and low cost, the principle of litis finiri oportet, It is on the principle of lex superior derogate legi inferior. It can also be said that the judicial review of the Constitutional Court has the potential to undermine the pillars of legal systems as when stating a legal provision is only base on one law, in which is in fact the legislation is incontracdictory with other laws such as of Constitutional Court Decision No. 34 / PPU-XI / 2013 on Article 268 paragraph 3 of Law No. 8 of 1981 that have no binding legal force, meanwhile in Article 24 paragraph 2 of Law No. 48 Year 2009 regarding Judicial Power with Article 66 paragraph 1 of Law No. 3 of 2009 on the Supreme Court, both legal instrument states that the filing of a judicial review can only be submitted one time. A solution that does not cause the problems is that the Supreme Court did not need to issue SEMA Decree No. 7 of 2014 the court simple use the Law of Judicial Power and the Law of the Supreme Court which states Reconsideration should be only one time in addition to the necessary optimize evidence of proof in the criminal justice process by all Parties. Keywords: judicial review, Reconsideration, the Criminal Justice System



1948 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 1103-1126 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. C. Grant

The 1910 amendments to the Colombian constitution provided:Art. 40. In every case of incompatibility between the Constitution and the law the constitutional provisions shall be applied by preference.Art. 41. To the Supreme Court of Justice is confided the guardianship of the integrity of the Constitution. Consequently, in addition to the powers conferred upon it by this Constitution and the statutes, it shall have the following: To decide definitively as to the enforceability of bills that have been vetoed as unconstitutional by the Government, or as to all laws and decrees accused before it by any citizen as unconstitutional, first hearing the Attorney-General of the Nation.The first function, “to decide definitively as to the enforceability of bills that have been vetoed as unconstitutional,” was merely a restatement of the plan copied from Ecuador in 1886 and still in use, although it has proved a major disappointment.



2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Emma Jane Smith

<p>In 2012 the Supreme Court of New Zealand ruled on Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee. The case was brought by way of application for judicial review, with Right to Life New Zealand Inc arguing that the Supervisory Committee had made an error of law in interpreting its functions under the Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977. A majority of the Court held that the Supervisory Committee does not have the power to review decisions made by certifying consultants in individual cases. However, both the text and the purpose of the Act support the minority view, that the Supervisory Committee must seek information about individual cases in order to fulfil its functions under the Act. It appears that the majority judgment was motivated by policy concerns due to an arguable change in Parliamentary intent since 1977. The majority should have acknowledged the policy values that guided its decision or accorded with the minority view rather than straining the statutory wording. Either of those actions would have better prompted Parliament to reform the law to reflect modern circumstances.</p>



Author(s):  
M. Panchenko

This article is devoted to the research on the concept and features of the advocate's wrongful cooperation with law-enforcement bodies and the circumstances that influence the severity of a disciplinary penalty in the result of such cooperation. A list of certain features is given to distinguish the lawful cooperation of an advocate with law-enforcement bodies from the wrongful one, which leads to bringing the advocate to the disciplinary responsibility. The author ascertains the forms in which the wrongful cooperation of an advocate and law-enforcement bodies may occur. The article determines that law-enforcement bodies often use the information that an advocate possesses due to his/her special professional status in order to perform their functions. Besides, the article examines the possibility for an advocate to be a whistleblower under the Law of Ukraine on Prevention of Corruption. The article also analyzes the decision of the Supreme Court in the administrative case where the decision of the Higher Qualification and Disciplinary Bar Commission (HQDB) on bringing the advocate to the disciplinary responsibility and imposing a disciplinary penalty of depriving him the right to advocacy for a wrongful cooperation with law-enforcement bodies is appealed. In this research the attention is paid to the wrongdoer's arguments and the corresponding legal position of the Supreme Court which, having used the acts of the national legislation, determined advocate's actions to be illegal and denied the claimant's demands. The author defines the category of a "wrongful cooperation of an advocate with law-enforcement bodies", determines its features, and suggests the ways for improving the effectiveness of bringing wrongdoers to the disciplinary responsibility in case of such cooperation. Keywords: a disciplinary offence, a disciplinary penalty, a confidant, a whistleblower, secret investigatory (inquiry) operations, tracking measures.



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