Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation

2021 ◽  
pp. 247-260
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Motivating Reasons ◽  
Practical Reality ◽  
Theory Of Motivation

This paper (a forerunner of the author’s Practical Reality) considers in detail the distinction between the reasons we have to act in certain ways, often known as justifying reasons, and the reasons for which we act when the time comes, often known as motivating reasons. It argues that it must be possible for one and the same reason to play both roles. It warns accordingly against the popular version of that distinction which understands the reasons we have to act in certain ways with relevant features of the situation and reasons for which we act as certain psychological states of our own, combinations of beliefs and desires. Any such distinction makes it impossible to act for a good reason. The paper also offers some suggestions about what a better account of the distinction would look like.

Two Ways of Explaining Actions

2004 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 25-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
The World ◽  
Practical Reality

In my Practical Reality I argued that the reasons for which we act are not to be conceived of as psychological states of ourselves, but as real (or maybe only supposed) states of the world. The main reason for saying this was that only thus can we make sense of the idea that it is possible to act for a good reason. The good reasons we have for doing this action rather than that one consist mainly of features of the situations in which we find ourselves; they do not consist in our believing certain things about those situations. For instance, the reason for my helping that person is that she is in trouble and I am the only person around. It is not that I believe both that she is in trouble and that I am the only person around. Give that the (good) reason to help is that she is in trouble etc., it must be possible for my reason for helping to be just that, if it is indeed possible for one to act for a good reason. In fact, this sort of thing must be the normal arrangement. The reasons why we act, therefore, that is, our reasons for doing what we do, are not standardly to be conceived as states of ourselves, but as features of our situations.

Reason, Value and Desire

Dialogue ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-335
Author(s):  
Jan Narveson
Keyword(s):  
Current Trend ◽  
Motivating Reasons ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Theory Of Motivation

The general subject of Professor Bond's book, Reason and Value, is, as the title implies, the relation between reason and value, or more precisely the connections between concepts of motivation and value, with reasons as the contested notion in between. Bond offers a thesis that at least appears to go very much against the current trend on these matters. Whereas most recent theorists of note have tied justificatory reasons as well as explanatory reasons to desire, thus holding, in effect, that values are somehow a function of desire, Bond wishes to cut the link between value and desire altogether. The first three chapters are devoted to developing this argument, mainly negatively. He distinguishes between “motivating” and “grounding” (or “justifying”) reasons in the customary way (e.g., Baier distinguishes “explanatory” from “justificatory” reasons to much the same effect'), and argues that “whereas desire or wanting and the reasons tied to it belong to the theory of motivation, where they are central, reason, in the sense of the reason(s) that a person has for or against doing a thing, is tied essentially to value, and the two are not to be confused” (9). “… The existence of grounding reasons (though not of motivating reasons) has no internal or necessary connection with desires of any kind” (37). “… All value is necessarily objective, in the sense that it is never a function of desire (or will); nothing is ever valuable or desirable in virtue of being desired” (84). “Value is not to any extent whatever a function or product of desire” (155).

Imaginative Motivation

Utilitas ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-196
Author(s):  
FREDERICK KROON
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Sharp Contrast ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Moral Agents

This article argues for a certain picture of the rational formation of conditional intentions, in particular deterrent intentions, that stands in sharp contrast to accounts on which rational agents are often not able to form such intentions because of what these enjoin should their conditions be realized. By considering the case of worthwhile but hard-to-form ‘non-apocalyptic’ deterrent intentions (the threat to leave a cheating partner, say), the article argues that rational agents may be able to form such intentions by first simulating psychological states in which they have successfully formed them and then bootstrapping themselves into actually forming them. The article also discusses certain limits imposed by this model. In particular, given the special nature of ‘apocalyptic’ deterrent intentions (e.g. the ones supposedly involved in nuclear deterrence), there is good reason to think that these must remain inaccessible to fully rational and moral agents.

Reconciliation in Business Ethics: Some Advice from Aristotle

2008 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edwin M. Hartman
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Corporate Culture ◽  
Ethical Decision ◽  
Ethical Decision Making ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Strategic Decisions ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Ethical Decisions ◽  
Close Relationship ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

It may be nearly impossible to use standard principles to make a decision about a complex ethical case. The best decision, say virtue ethicists in the Aristotelian tradition, is often one that is made by a person of good character who knows the salient facts of the case and can frame the situation appropriately. In this respect ethical decisions and strategic decisions are similar. Rationality plays a role in good ethical decision-making, but virtue ethicists emphasize the importance of intuitions and emotions as well.Virtue ethics suggests a reconciliation of the factual and the normative. Virtues may explain as well as justify actions. The same is true of other psychological states and events. That psychological terms have normative implications does not render them useless in explanation. As Aristotle does not distinguish cleanly between the normative and empirical, so many moral philosophers today reject the is-ought dichotomy. They are prepared to learn from economists, psychologists, and other empirical scientists who offer information about the nature of the good life and of values. Social psychologists who study community or corporate culture suggest a close relationship between organizational and ethical features, much as Aristotle saw a close relationship between politics and ethics. We should infer from all this that in business ethics there is good reason for philosophers and organization scholars to work closely together.

scholarly journals The matter of motivating reasons

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. J. Cunningham
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Normative Structure ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Motivating Reasons

AbstractIt is now standard in the literature on reasons and rationality to distinguish normative reasons from motivating reasons. Two issues have dominated philosophical theorising concerning the latter: (i) whether we should think of them as certain (nonfactive) psychological states of the agent—the dispute over Psychologism; and (ii) whether we should say that the agent can ϕ for the reason that p only if p—the dispute over Factivism. This paper first introduces a puzzle: these disputes look very much like merely verbal disputes about the meaning of phrases like ‘S’s reason’ in motivating reasons ascriptions, and yet charity requires us to think that something substantive is afoot. But what? The second aim of the paper is to extract substantive theses from certain natural argument for Psychologism and Anti-Factivism—theses which are versions of a Cartesian view of the nature and normative structure of rationality. The paper ends by arguing against these substantive theses on phenomenological and ethical grounds. The upshot is that proponents of Psychologism and Anti-Factivism are either engaged in the project of defending merely verbal theses or they’re engaged in the project of defending false substantive ones.

Academic centers for prevention research: Making prevention a practical reality.

1991 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 525-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Price Connor ◽  
John R. Livengood
Keyword(s):  
Prevention Research ◽  
Practical Reality

Analisis Kemampuan Penalaran Matematis Mahasiswa Calon Guru Matematika Sebagai Kajian Evaluasi

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanifah Nurus Sopiany
Keyword(s):  
High School Students ◽  
Secondary School ◽  
Mathematical Reasoning ◽  
Mathematics Learning ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
School Level ◽  
Real Analysis ◽  
Reasoning Ability ◽  
School Students ◽  
Secondary School Level

Penalaran matematis menggunakan pola pikir logis dalam menganalisa suatu masalah yang nanti pada akhirnya akan ditandai dengan aktivitas menyimpulkan atas masalah tersebut. Seseorang yang memiliki penalaran yang baik, tentunya akan berhati-hati dalam bertindak dan memutuskan sesuatu. Materi-materi pada kalkulus merupakan materi yang ada pada tingkat sekolah menengah yang nantinya menjadi lahan mengajar mahasiswa calon guru matematika S-1. Kemampuan penalaran yang dikaji mempengaruhi pembelajaran mahasiswa kedepannya karena berlaku pada matakuliah lanjut, contohnya pada kemampuan pembuktian akan selalu digunakan pada matakuliah persamaan diferensial, struktur aljabar, analisis  vektor, analisis real, dll. Sedangkan sebagai calon guru yang nantinya mengajar pada tingkat sekolah menengah, maka kemampuan penalaran ini menjadi salah satu capaian pembelajaran matematika bagi siswa sekolah menengah, maka oleh karena itu guru yang mengajarnya haruslah memiliki kemampuan penalaran yang baik. Analisis kesalahan sangat penting untuk melakukan evaluasi dan refleksi pada struktur soal maupun pada perlakuan dalam pembelajaran dalam upaya memperbaiki kemampuan penalarannya.   Mathematical reasoning uses a logical mindset in analyzing a problem that will eventually be marked by concluding activity on the problem. Someone who has good reason, will certainly be careful in acting and deciding something. The material content on the calculus is the material that exists at the secondary school level which will become the field of teaching the prospective master of math teacher bachelor. The reasoning ability studied influences student learning in the future as it applies to advanced courses, for example in the ability of proof will always be used in the course of differential equations, algebraic structure, vector analysis, real analysis, etc. While as a teacher candidate who will teach at the secondary school level, then this reasoning ability becomes one of the achievements of mathematics learning for high school students, therefore teachers who teach it must have good reasoning ability. Error analysis is very important to evaluate and reflect on the problem structure as well as on the treatment in learning in order to improve the reasoning ability.

King William and the Brecc Bennach in 1211: reliquary or holy banner?

2015 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Sharpe
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
National Museum ◽  
The Real ◽  
Real Nature

In his Rhind Lectures of 1879 Joseph Anderson argued for identifying the Monymusk Reliquary, now in the National Museum of Scotland, with the Brecc Bennach, something whose custody was granted to Arbroath abbey by King William in 1211. In 2001 David H. Caldwell called this into question with good reason. Part of the argument relied on different interpretations of the word uexillum, ‘banner’, taken for a portable shrine by William Reeves and for a reliquary used as battle-standard by Anderson. It is argued here that none of this is relevant to the question. The Brecc Bennach is called a banner only as a guess at its long-forgotten nature in two late deeds. The word brecc, however, is used in the name of an extant reliquary, Brecc Máedóc, and Anderson was correct to think this provided a clue to the real nature of the Brecc Bennach. It was almost certainly a small portable reliquary, of unknown provenance but associated with St Columba. The king granted custody to the monks of Arbroath at a time when he was facing a rebellion in Ross, posing intriguing questions about his intentions towards this old Gaelic object of veneration.

From Brigit to Bailegangaire : The Development of Tom Murphy's Mommo Trilogy

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 324-339
Author(s):  
Shaun Richards
Keyword(s):  
Causal Chain ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Irish Famine ◽  
Abbey Theatre ◽  
Relationship Of

Tom Murphy's Bailegangaire, premiered by Druid Theatre, Galway, in 1985 has its origins in a three-part TV drama which Murphy started planning in 1981. Of the three scripts only one, Brigit, was screened by RTÉ in 1988, The Contest became A Thief of a Christmas which was staged by the Abbey Theatre, Dublin, in 1988, and Mommo, the last of the projected trilogy, became Bailegangaire. In 2014, nearly 30 years after its premiere, Druid staged Bailegangaire in tandem with Brigit which Murphy had reworked for the theatre, a pairing which, in bringing the fraught relationship of Mommo and her husband, Seamus, to the fore, helped clarify the grounds of the trauma informing her endless, but never completed narrative. This essay uses Murphy's notebooks and drafts, along with a comparison of Brigit in both its TV and theatre forms, to show how Murphy progressively refined Bailegangaire into a drama whose causal chain stretches back to psychological states forged under the stresses of the Irish Famine.

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