Supranational Differentiation and Enhanced Cooperation
The ‘unity dogma’ has long characterized European law discourse. In many of its landmark judgments, the European Court of Justice had recourse to the ‘unity argument’—such as in Costa v ENEL, where the Court stated that ‘the executive force of Community law cannot vary from one state to another … without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty’. Unilateral national deviations could not be tolerated without the common rules ‘being deprived of their character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question’. Other expressions of the ‘unity dogma’ include the principle of non-discrimination or the uniform composition of EU institutions. This contribution demonstrates that the asymmetric non-participation of some Member States in selected policy areas can be embedded into the supranational legal order. The main danger seems to be a structural weakening of political legitimacy.