Schopenhauer’s Understanding of Schelling

2020 ◽  
pp. 48-66
Author(s):  
Judith Norman ◽  
Alistair Welchman
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Intuition ◽  
Thing In Itself

Schopenhauer is famously abusive toward his philosophical contemporary and rival, Friedrich William Joseph von Schelling. This chapter examines the motivations for Schopenhauer’s immoderate attitude and the substance behind the insults. It looks carefully at both the nature of the insults and substantive critical objections Schopenhauer had to Schelling’s philosophy, both to Schelling’s metaphysical description of the thing-in-itself and Schelling’s epistemic mechanism of intellectual intuition. It concludes that Schopenhauer’s substantive criticism is reasonable and that Schopenhauer does in fact avoid Schelling’s errors: still, the vehemence of the abuse is best perhaps explained by the proximity of their philosophies, not the distance. Indeed, both are developing metaphysics of will with full and conflicted awareness of the Kantian epistemic strictures against metaphysics. In view of this, Schopenhauer is particularly concerned to mark his own project as legitimate by highlighting the manner in which he avoids Schelling’s errors.

scholarly journals O problema da intuição intelectual enquanto postulado prático em Fichte [The problem of intellectual intuition as a practical postulate in Fichte]

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (43) ◽  
pp. 131
Author(s):  
Arthur Martins Cecim
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Objective Reality ◽  
Intellectual Intuition ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
The Absolute

Na Modernidade, o idealista alemão Fichte reconstrói o conceito de intuição intelectual não mais em termos de um procedimento teórico-reflexivo que visa o conhecimento da pretensa coisa-em-si, mas em termos de uma intuição de cunho prático, a partir do conceito kantiano de postulado prático, o que acaba por refletir a primazia da liberdade da razão prática sobre a razão teórica, tendo em vista a impossibilidade de conhecermos as realidades absolutas. Não obstante, essa intuição é problemática por não tratar de uma realidade objetiva, mas tão somente de uma subjetividade autorreflexiva.[In Modernity, the German idealist Fichte reconstructs the intellectual intuition not in terms of a theoretical-reflexive procedure that aims at the pretense knowledge of the thing-in-itself, but in terms of a practical-oriented intuition, from the Kantian concept of practical postulate, which ultimately reflects the priority of freedom in the practical reason over the theoretical reason, taking into account the impossibility of knowing the absolute realities. Nevertheless, this intuition is problematic, for it does not concern an objective reality, but only a self-reflected subjectivity]

The Revolutionizing of the Revolution

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. R. Palmer
Keyword(s):  
French Revolution ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
French Government ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The French Revolution ◽  
The Revolution

In 1792, the French Revolution became a thing in itself, an uncontrollable force that might eventually spend itself but which no one could direct or guide. The governments set up in Paris in the following years all faced the problem of holding together against forces more revolutionary than themselves. This chapter distinguishes two such forces for analytical purposes. There was a popular upheaval, an upsurge from below, sans-culottisme, which occurred only in France. Second, there was the “international” revolutionary agitation, which was not international in any strict sense, but only concurrent within the boundaries of various states as then organized. From the French point of view these were the “foreign” revolutionaries or sympathizers. The most radical of the “foreign” revolutionaries were seldom more than advanced political democrats. Repeatedly, however, from 1792 to 1799, these two forces tended to converge into one force in opposition to the French government of the moment.

Force in Nature

2020 ◽  
pp. 146-160
Author(s):  
David Carus
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Core ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
The Will ◽  
Insight Into

This chapter explores Schopenhauer’s concept of force, which lies at the root of his philosophy. It is force in nature and thus in natural science that is inexplicable and grabs Schopenhauer’s attention. To answer the question of what this inexplicable term is at the root of all causation, Schopenhauer looks to the will within us. Through will, he maintains that we gain immediate insight into forces in nature and hence into the thing in itself at the core of everything and all things. Will is thus Schopenhauer’s attempt to answer the question of the essence of appearance. Yet will, as it turns out, cannot be known immediately as it is subject to time, and the acts of will, which we experience within us, do not correlate immediately with the actions of the body (as Schopenhauer had originally postulated). Hence, the acts of will do not lead to an explanation of force, which is at the root of causation in nature. Schopenhauer sets out to explain what is at the root of all appearances, derived from the question of an original cause, or as Schopenhauer states “the cause of causation,” but cannot determine this essence other than by stating that it is will; a will, however, that cannot be immediately known.

The absolute that is not absolute: an alchemical reflection on the caput mortuum, the dark other of logical light

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanton Marlan
Keyword(s):  
Dark Light ◽  
Object A ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
The Absolute

ABSTRACTThis paper challenges Wolfgang Giegerich’s sometimes sophisticated and at other times sophistic notion of absolute negative interiority. In contrast to his uroboric view of ‘psychology proper’, this author resists the successionist ideas of a post-Jungian, trans-human perspective and asserts the notion of an unassimilable and unsurmountable ‘not’. In this paper, the author revisions the traditional divide between Kant and Hegel, taking the ‘thing-in-itself’ as truly other than existing only for consciousness and arguing against privileging theunityof unity and difference. This paper entertains the alchemical ideas of a residue, acaput mortuum, and an archetypally cumbersome object, a real limit, which remains and unhinges the elevating process of spirit on its path to return to itself in absolute interiority. Rather, it acknowledges an abyss ‘behind the back of consciousness’, a non-reified living unconscious – a dark light, an absolute that is not absolute, but rather a gateway back to the beyond, at the root of imagination, wonder, and transformation.

MORAL OBLIGATION AFTER THE DEATH OF GOD: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON CONCERNS FROM IMMANUEL KANT, G. W. F. HEGEL, AND ELIZABETH ANSCOMBE

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Tristram Engelhardt
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Important Change ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
European Continent ◽  
Presence Of God ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
The Status

AbstractOnce God is no longer recognized as the ground and the enforcer of morality, the character and force of morality undergoes a significant change, a point made by G.E.M. Anscombe in her observation that without God the significance of morality is changed, as the word criminal would be changed if there were no criminal law and criminal courts. There is no longer in principle a God's-eye perspective from which one can envisage setting moral pluralism aside. In addition, it becomes impossible to show that morality should always trump concerns of prudence, concerns for one's own non-moral interests and the interests of those to whom one is close. Immanuel Kant's attempt to maintain the unity of morality and the force of moral obligation by invoking the idea of God and the postulates of pure practical reason (i.e., God and immortality) are explored and assessed. Hegel's reconstruction of the status of moral obligation is also examined, given his attempt to eschew Kant's thing-in-itself, as well as Kant's at least possible transcendent God. Severed from any metaphysical anchor, morality gains a contingent content from socio-historical context and its enforcement from the state. Hegel's disengagement from a transcendent God marks a watershed in the place of God in philosophical reflections regarding the status of moral obligations on the European continent. Anscombe is vindicated. Absent the presence of God, there is an important change in the force of moral obligation.

The Kantian Thing-in-Itself as a Philosophical Fiction

1966 ◽  
Vol 16 (64) ◽  
pp. 233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Schaper
Keyword(s):  
Thing In Itself
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