The Neoliberal Corporation

2019 ◽  
pp. 273-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Ciepley
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Value Creation ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Shareholder Returns ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Post War ◽  
Short Termism ◽  
Theoretic Version

The neoliberal corporation is a novel theoretical and organizational construct that treats the pecuniary interests of shareholders as the sole end of the corporation and gears corporate governance toward maximizing shareholder returns against the assumed opportunism of managers and workers. This construct originated in the post-war neoliberal effort to revive free market principles, which the rise of the monopolistic corporation appeared to have rendered obsolete. First, neoliberals declared the problem of monopoly a non-problem. Then, to marketize the corporation, they cast it as a glorified private partnership. Finally, they applied to it a game theoretic version of agency theory, with the shareholders as the “principal” and management (and workers) as their opportunistic agent. This chapter critiques both the descriptive cogency of this account and its practical consequences, which include exploding executive pay, short-termism, institutionalized irresponsibility, worker surveillance and coercion, and vampire management focused on value extraction rather than value creation.

scholarly journals Shifting Paradigm? Long-Term Value Creation as a Normative Principle in a Hostile Takeover: Evidence from the Netherlands

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 91
Author(s):  
N.T. Pham T.L.M Verdoes ◽  
J. Nijland
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
Value Creation ◽  
Sustainable Growth ◽  
Hostile Takeover ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Business World ◽  
World Government ◽  
Short Termism

This article provides additional insight on the effectiveness of long-term value creation as a legally enforceable norm in the corporate governance system and provides a framework to anchor long-term value creation in takeover decisions. Since the 2008 financial crisis, a growing number of voices in the business world, government and academia, have urged Western economies to move towards a long-term sustainable growth agenda. Boards have a vital part to play in the development of responsible companies. Corporate governance should encourage boards to do so. This could be viewed as a reaction to the negative effects of capital markets and the resulting short-termism. One key method to encourage sustainable value creation in companies is by incorporating long-term value creation as an open norm in corporate governance systems. In the case of a hostile takeover, the risk of short-termism is exacerbated. As a guiding principle, long-term value (LTV) creation should prevent hostile takeovers that could harm the success of the company concerned. In this research paper, we argue that the recent shift in Dutch case law and revision of the Corporate Governance Code in the Netherlands may serve as an important catalyst for ‘sustainable’ takeover decisions. Through ground-breaking judgments by the Dutch Supreme Court and Enterprise Court, Cancun and Akzo Nobel, LTV has acquired the status of an enforceable norm. We investigated whether this legal norm is empirically substantiated. The research results allow us to make well-grounded statements about the effectiveness of enforcing LTV in future hostile takeover situations.

Agricultural Vehicle Positioning and its Integration with a Large-Scale Land Information System

1991 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-36
Author(s):  
Fraser MacLeod
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Public Awareness ◽  
New Technology ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Price Support ◽  
Agricultural Vehicle ◽  
Post War ◽  
Land Information System ◽  
Vehicle Positioning

Agriculture in the U.K. has, since the late 1940s, enjoyed government subsidy and insulation from free market forces. However, the post-war philosophy of ‘every acre counts’ no longer holds true in the face of surplus production and a growing public awareness of the countryside and environmental issues. Legislation relating to water pollution, public rights of way and price support mechanisms are all contributory factors to the radical changes which agriculture is undergoing at the present time. Investigations have shown a need within agriculture for the efficient use and handling of data relating to the land, and a need for new technology to exploit the inherent spatial variability of, for example, the soil. This paper will discuss the development of an agricultural vehicle positioning instrument and future research which will address the needs which have been identified.

Pay-performance sensitivity and corporate governance mechanisms: evidence from Tunisia

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Meriem Ghrab ◽  
Marjène Gana ◽  
Mejda Dakhlaoui
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Simultaneous Equation ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Estimation Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Ceo Pay

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze the CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance, termed as the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the Tunisian context and to test the robustness of this relationship when corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are considered. Design/methodology/approach The consideration of past executive pay as one of the explanatory variables makes this estimation model a dynamic one. Furthermore, to avoid the problem of endogeneity, this study uses the system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). For robustness check, this study aims to use a simultaneous equation approach (three-stage least squares [3SLS]) to estimate the link between performance and CEO pay with a set of CG mechanisms to control for possible simultaneous interdependencies. Findings Using a sample of 336 firm-years from Tunisia over the 2009–2015 periods, this study finds strong evidence that the pay-performance relationship is insignificant and negative, and it becomes more negative or remains insignificant after introducing CG mechanisms consistently with the managerial power approach. The findings are robust to the use of alternative performance measures. This study provides new empirical evidence that CEOs of Tunisian firms abuse extracting rents independently of firm performance. Originality/value This study contributes to the unexamined research on PPS in a frontier market. This study also shows the ineffectiveness of the Tunisian CG structure and thus recommends for the legislator to impose a mandatory CG guide.

Welfare and Punishment in a ‘Stark Utopia’ (1979–2015)

2021 ◽  
pp. 13-26
Author(s):  
Ian Cummins
Keyword(s):  
Political Development ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Direct Result ◽  
Human History ◽  
Global System ◽  
System A ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Stage Development ◽  
Post War ◽  
Market Economics

Polanyi (1957) described the notion of a self-regulating global system a “stark Utopia.” This chapter uses this as a starting point to examine the broad themes in the development of welfare and penal policy in a period dominated by free market economics Fukuyama (1992) presents the triumph of free market economics as an inevitable conclusion of trends in human history. It is also presented as the final stage development has ceased or is complete. Polanyi’s analysis is presented a counterpoint to this analysis. Polanyi asserts the primacy of politics. Thus, it is impossible to separate economic and political development. Prosperity of the post war period can thus be viewed as a direct result of the advances in politics and civil society that occurred in the period.

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