scholarly journals How Ownership and Corporate Governance Influence Chief Executive Pay in China's Listed Firms

Author(s):  
Michael Firth ◽  
Peter M.Y. Fung ◽  
Oliver M. Rui
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 384-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shamsul Nahar Abdullah

In the aftermath of the Asian Financial crisis in 1997/1998, the Malaysia Securities Commission (SC) issued the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in 2000 (MCCG 2000). It was subsequently revised in 2007 following the Enron and Transmile debacles. In 2012, the SC issued the latest MCCG 2012 which introduced several new recommendations that are in line with developments in other parts of the world. Hence, the purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of the structure of the board and its activities on firm performance post MCCG 2007. The study also aims to shed light on the effectiveness of the board of directors since the issuance of MCCG 2000 and of MCCG 2007. It also aims to reveal the preparedness of listed firms in Malaysia to embrace MCCG 2012. Using a population of non-finance listed firms for the 2009, 2010 and 2011 financial years, it was found that board independence, chief executive officer (CEO) duality, directors’ busyness, nomination committee independence, the establishment of a risk management committee (RMC) and board meetings are not associated with firm performance, i.e. Tobin’s q. However, the market appears to be in favour of a larger board size. As for return on assets (ROA), it is not associated with board independence, board size, directors’ busyness and nomination committee independence. On the other hand CEO duality and the establishment of a RMC improve ROA, while board meetings are detrimental to ROA. It can therefore be concluded that board independence is not associated with either Tobin’s q or ROA. Hence, any corporate governance reforms should not over-emphasize the representation of independent directors on the board, rather the focus might be shifted to board activities, such as board meetings and the establishment of a RMC. With regard to board size, since the market is in favour of a larger board size, firms should increase the board’s size to enable the appointment of women directors to the board. Finally, combining the CEO and board chairman roles should not be disallowed as the market views this favourably. Hence, the ‘one-hat approach’ does not appear to be applicable in the case of CEO duality.


Author(s):  
João Teodósio

This study provides a literature review of the research on the corporate governance mechanisms of Portuguese firms. Based on a sample of 47 articles published, between 2004 and 2019, it is documented that research is predominantly focused on corporate governance mechanisms as determinants of the performance on non-financial listed firms. Literature reports, in its majority, that board size decreases firm performance while CEO (Chief Executive Officer) non-duality promotes it; board size, board independence, and CEO non-duality improve the level of firms' information disclosure; CEO age is positively associated with an increase of CEO pay but CEO duality has an opposite effect; board independence increases firm risk-taking. These results should be of interest to national authorities in the development of future regulation related to firms' corporate governance and to national and international investors that intend to invest in Portuguese companies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 338-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al-Faryan

This paper gauges, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the pertinent variables to corporate governance practices and their relationship to business productivity in the context of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This study was conducted in response to the limited literature in this context. A new code of corporate governance was issued by the Saudi Arabian Capital Market Authority as a direct consequence of the 2006 stock market crash; in 2010, the code was made mandatory for listed firms. Rigorous empirical studies are practical not only for Saudi Arabia and its policy makers but also potentially for solving global investment issues and ensuring security. This study found two variables to have a significant negative relation: chief executive officer turnover and independent board members. Thus, greater rates of chief executive officer turnover are associated with negative firm performance. In addition, independent board directors’ negative value was found to be very close to zero and significant only at the 10% level. Consequently, some caution is required when considering this result.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
Veronica Tibiletti ◽  
Stefano Azzali ◽  
Tatiana Mazza

The research uses regression models and panel data related to audit fees, audit hours and corporate governance. The sample of listed firms yields 751 firms-years observations for the period 2010-2018. We study how gender diversity among audit partners, Chief Executive Officers, and Boards of Directors impact on audit fees and audit hours. We focus on the interaction between auditors and management. We find that female audit partners is associated with lower audit fees and audit hours. Next, we find that female audit partner significantly affects the association with the audit efforts in interaction with management, but when the audit partner is male, audit efforts are also determined by the female representation on the Board of Directors.  We contribute to literature on the effects of gender diversity in auditing and corporate governance. We also enrich the concept of audit efforts by including audit hours as well as audit fees. Finally, the research answers the call for empirical study on the effects of gender diversity in management-auditor interaction.


2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (02) ◽  
pp. 429-454
Author(s):  
Manuel C. Dioquino

The Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. (PSE) was suffering a credibility problem in 2011. Just like the Philippine economy, the PSE was not performing well and the integrity of its leadership and decisions they made was being questioned by the public at large and the business community in particular. Hans Sicat, a retired investment banker, was invited to join the Board of Directors with a tacit agreement that he would be elected Chairman. Events thereafter led to Mr. Sicat's appointment as President and Chief Executive Officer of the bourse. Hans Sicat turns around the stock exchange successfully. How he makes it look seemingly simple is the subject of this case. Hans places all transformative efforts into two “bucket lists”. All of his efforts to increase the volume of trade in the exchange are classified under Liquidity, while all efforts to restore the integrity within the bourse and its listed firms, he refers to as Governance issues. The Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. transformation does not go unnoticed by domestic and foreign investors, and other stakeholders as well. It breaks the 5,000 point barrier.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 412-428
Author(s):  
Tor Brunzell ◽  
Jarkko Peltomäki

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to explicitly focus on the roles of ownership concentration, ownership by the board, the chief executive officer (CEO) and the chairperson in the involvement and capabilities of chairpersons and other governors in their work. Design/methodology/approach – In this study, the authors investigate the impact of the concentration of ownership, the ownership of the board, the CEO and the chairperson on the chairperson’s activity when the roles of the chairperson and the CEO are separated The empirical analysis of this study is based on a survey sent to Nordic listed firms. Findings – The results show that the ownership characteristics of a company are important in determining the chairperson’s working hours, the chairperson’s communication with the CEO and the performance of governance activity. In addition, the authors found that while the ownership of the chairperson and the board of directors and ownership concentration improve governance activity, CEO ownership may undermine governance activity. Research limitations/implications – The primary implication of the study is that both ownership by internal governors and ownership concentration play an important role in determining the involvement of internal corporate governors. Originality/value – The study provides unique evidence that ownership by the chairperson, concentrated ownership and ownership by the board can potentially mitigate the costs of separating the roles of the chairperson and the CEO.


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