Corporate Governance and Firm Performance

2013 ◽  
pp. 490-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anup Agrawal ◽  
Charles R. Knoeber
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Inside Ownership ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Uk

This paper reviews the literature on corporate governance and firm performance in economies with relatively dispersed stock ownership and an active market for corporate control, such as the US and the UK. Section 1 outlines a framework of the basic agency problem between managers and shareholders and the corporate governance mechanisms that have evolved to address this problem. Section 2 deals with the relation between firm performance and inside ownership. Section 3 pertains to the relation between firm performance andmonitoring by large shareholders, monitoring by boards, and shareholder rights regarding takeover of the firm. Section 4 considers the relation between governance regulation and firm performance. Section 5 deals with the relation between governance and firm performance in family firms, and section 6 provides a summary and identifies some remaining puzzles and unresolved issues for future research.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Innovation: Theory and Evidence

2014 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 957-1003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haresh Sapra ◽  
Ajay Subramanian ◽  
Krishnamurthy V. Subramanian
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Innovation Theory ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Private Benefits Of Control ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Ex Ante

AbstractWe develop a theory to show how external and internal corporate governance mechanisms affect innovation. We predict a U-shaped relation between innovation and external takeover pressure, which arises from the interaction between expected takeover premia and private benefits of control. Using ex ante and ex post innovation measures, we find strong empirical support for the predicted relation. We exploit the variation in takeover pressure created by the passage of antitakeover laws across different states. Innovation is fostered either by an unhindered market for corporate control or by antitakeover laws that are severe enough to effectively deter takeovers.

scholarly journals Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and performance of public listed family firms in Malaysia

2011 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 17-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Ibrahim ◽  
F. A. Samad
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Utilization Ratio ◽  
And Performance

We compare corporate governance and performance between family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia from 1999 through 2005 measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. We also examine the governance mechanisms as a tool in monitoring agency costs based on asset utilization ratio and expense ratio as proxy for agency costs. We find that on average firm value is lower in family firms than non-family firms, while board size, independent director and duality have a significant impact on firm performance in family firms as compared to non-family firms. We also find that these governance mechanisms have significant impact on agency costs for both family and non-family firms.

scholarly journals The relationship between corporate governance and financial performance

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zaid Saidat ◽  
Mauricio Silva ◽  
Claire Seaman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Relationship

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to attempt to fill a research gap in the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance of family and non-family firms’ by using a sample of non-financial firms listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) for the period 2009–2015.Design/methodology/approachThis research employs a quantitative method using data that include corporate governance mechanisms, firm characteristics and financial ratios of a sample of Jordanian listed firms in the ASE over the period 2009–2015. The sample covers all companies that have been part of the ASE during the period including both family and non-family firms, part of total of 228 companies listed on the ASE as of 31 December 2015. The study used accounting-based measures such as return on asset (ROA) and market-based measures such as Tobin’sQas proxies for corporate financial performance.FindingsThe study found that board size both in term of Tobin’sQand ROA has a negative relationship with the performance of family firms. In non-family firms, there is no systematic relationship with corporate performance. There is a strong relationship between corporate performance and independent directors in non-family firms. In addition, the authors found some evidence for a relationship between performance and independent directors in family firms. Also, results indicated that ownership concentration has an insignificant correlation with corporate performance and in family firms has a negative and significant correlation with Tobin’sQ. There is a significant relationship between local investors’ ownership and corporate performance as measured by Tobin’sQin family and non-family firms.Originality/valueStudies concerned with the effect of corporate governance on firm performance remains comparatively under-researched in Middle East countries and Jordan in particular (Najib, 2007; Omet, 2004; Marashdeh, 2014). Moreover, studies investigating whether the practice of corporate governance has the same impact on family firm performance are still relatively less well known than those when ownership is distributed widely (non-family firms) (Jaggi, Leung and Gul, 2009; Prencipe and Bar-Yosef, 2011). This research is seeking to fill this current gap in Jordan, which is one of the developing countries with an emerging economics that are very poorly represented in the literature.

Human Rights Disclosures, Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Firm Performance: Directions for Future Research

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 24-33
Author(s):  
Tariq H. Ismail ◽  
Hala Abd-El-Naby Abd-El-Fattah ◽  
Hanan Adel El-Gamal
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Prior Literature

This paper aims at investigating and scrutinizing prior literature of human rights disclosures, corporate governance mechanisms and their effect on firm performance in an attempt to unveil the influence of non-financial disclosures such as human rights on the corporation’s financial performance. We highlighted that the “board of directors” plays a vital role as one of the “corporate governance” mechanisms in spreading the awareness of the importance of “human rights” issues that might impact the corporation. Additionally, we propose the need for a change in corporate governance mechanisms to be more accountable towards human rights. Also, our analysis suggests that human rights disclosures impact the corporation’s image which in turn could be translated into increasing sales that would eventually influence the financial performance of the corporation. Therefore, this paper sheds the light on directions for future research that will explore the association between human rights disclosures and firm performance through incorporating corporate governance mechanisms.

scholarly journals The UK Non-Frustration Rule: Should it be Replaced with a US-inspired Approach?

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
Huanyang Ma
Keyword(s):  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Software Design ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Japanese Company ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Uk

Recently, Arm Holdings, the most successful semiconductor and software design company in the UK, has agreed to be sold to SoftBank, a Japanese company. This takeover case, along with the case that Cadbury was acquired by Kraft in 2010, has led to questions about the openness to foreign mergers and acquisitions.[1] The non-frustration rule plays an important role in the openness of the UK’s market for corporate control.[2] Therefore, it is time to rethink about the non-frustration rule. One of the most heated questions is whether the rule should be replaced with the US-inspired approach. This article argues that the US-inspired approach will not function as well in the UK as it does in the US. After all, the UK and the US differ a lot in corporate structures and company regulations which make the background of the non-frustration rule different in two countries. 

Tradeoffs in Corporate Governance: Evidence From Board Structures and Charter Provisions

2011 ◽  
Vol 01 (04) ◽  
pp. 667-705 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart L. Gillan ◽  
Jay C. Hartzell ◽  
Laura T. Starks
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
System Of Equations ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Monitoring Mechanism ◽  
Three Stage Least Squares

We provide arguments and present evidence that corporate governance structures are composed of interrelated mechanisms, which are in turn endogenous responses to the costs and benefits firms face when they choose those mechanisms. Examining board structures and the use of corporate charter provisions in a sample of more than 2,300 firms over a four-year period, we find that firms cluster in their use of governance mechanisms. In particular, the set of charter provisions that firms use, as measured by the Gompers et al. (2003) G Index, is associated with board structure, with the laws of the state in which the firm is incorporated, and with firm and industry characteristics. We also find that some governance structures appear to serve as substitutes. Specifically, firms that have powerful boards (as measured by board independence) also have the greatest number of charter provisions, suggesting that the market for corporate control is less effective as a monitoring mechanism for these firms. In contrast, firms that have less powerful boards tend to have few charter provisions, suggesting that the market for corporate control plays a greater monitoring role at such firms. To address potential endogeneity issues, we employ three-stage least squares analysis to estimate these relationships within a system of equations. Our results from this analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that powerful boards serve as a substitute for the market for corporate control. Finally, our findings suggest that causality runs from the board to the choice of charter provisions, but not vice versa.

scholarly journals Dividend Policy in Indonesian Companies: Does Corporate Governance Matter?

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2S9) ◽  
pp. 825-830
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Resource Dependence ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Resource Dependence Theory ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Finance Industry ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Uk

This study investigates whether corporate governance matters with regards to the dividend policy in Indonesian companies. Previous studies on this subject have mostly been done in developed countries, which have adopted the common law, such as in the US and the UK. This study uses 26 companies operating in the finance industry. Secondary data is used from several sources, such as the annual report and financial statement and related websites. This study uses an independent sample t-test to analyse the data. Corporate governance matters for dividend policy in Indonesian companies. It is evidenced by the fact that there is a significant differ ence in managerial ownership and board size between dividend paid and dividend not paid. Profitability also differs between dividend paid and dividend not paid companies; companies with higher profitability tend to pay dividend. This study provides empirical evidence that corporate governance matters for dividend policy in Indonesian companies. There are two contributions of this study: the result confirms the resource dependence theory and the convergence governance hypothesis.

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