Kant’s Foundations for Newtonian Science

Author(s):  
Sheldon R. Smith

Throughout his career, Immanuel Kant was engaged rather closely with Newtonian science. Although Kant adopts many Newtonian principles, most obviously the Newtonian gravitational law, he is also critical of Newton for, among other things, not having provided “metaphysical foundations” for science. Kant’s own attempt to provide such foundations leads him to have a somewhat different picture of the physical world from Newton. This article describes why Kant thought that metaphysical foundations were required and some of the ways this requirement leads Kant toward non-Newtonian views. In particular, it compares and contrasts their views on the nature of matter, force, the laws of nature, and absolute space and absolute motion.

Author(s):  
Robert Rynasiewicz

In the Scholium to the Definitions at the beginning of the Principia, Newton distinguishes absolute time, space, place, and motion from their relative counterparts. He argues that they are indeed ontologically distinct, in that the absolute quantity cannot be reduced to some particular category of the relative, as Descartes had attempted by defining absolute motion to be relative motion with respect to immediately ambient bodies. Newton’s rotating bucket experiment, rather than attempting to show that absolute motion exists, is one of five arguments from the properties, causes, and effects of motion. These arguments attempt to show that no such program can succeed, and thus that true motion can be adequately analyzed only by invoking immovable places, that is, the parts of absolute space.


Author(s):  
Viktor S. Levytskyy ◽  

The subject of the article is the process of forming ideas about the world as reality, which is most accurately described by the word “invention”. The author, relying on classical texts in this respect (E. Husserl, M. Heidegger) and modern studies (A. Makushinsky, J.-F. Kurtin) substantiates the position according to which the idea of reality is not a cultural invariant. The notion that reality has always existed, and thanks to scientific reason has been most adequately reflected, understood and described, is a significant modernization. This has been evidenced by both the etymology of the concepts of “reality” and “reality”, which first appeared only in scholasticism (D. Scotus, M. Eckhart), and the process of their content filling, which is inextricably linked with the formation of scientific rationality. The article shows that both the scientific mind and the integral image of the world created by it, which we call reality, genetically date back to the Christian value-semantic universe. Initially, it was within the framework of the discourse of natural theology that the image of the autonomous world has been conceptualized, developing according to the universal principles established by God. In the first scientific programs (R. Descartes, G. Galilei, I. Newton), these ideas were continued, as a result of which the world began to be understood as an immanent reality that is subject to the laws of nature. The new ontological beliefs received the ultimate philosophical foundation in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, to whom the phenomenal world exhausts the reality available to man. Accordingly, the world turns into a one-dimensional detranscendentalized reality. This methodological approach allows the author to make the following conclusions: 1) the image of world “reality” is a rather modern “invention”, which was unknown in previous eras; 2) at the same time, it is genetically connected with the Christian semantic universe, outside of which it could not appear; 3) the world in it is understood as a one-dimensional immanent reality.


Philosophy ◽  
2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Guyer

The Critique of the Power of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft), published in 1790, was the last of the three critiques by Immanuel Kant (b. 1724–d. 1804). In the Introduction to the work, Kant argues that the gulf between the realms of the laws of nature and of freedom, or between theoretical and practical philosophy, needs to be bridged, and that the “reflecting” use of the faculty of judgment can do this while also taking us from the most general principles of natural science to empirical concepts and laws of nature. In the first main part of the work, the critique of the aesthetic power of judgment, Kant analyzes and defends our responses to, and judgments of, the beautiful in both nature and art and the sublime in nature; in the second main part, the critique of the teleological power of judgment, Kant defends our “regulative” rather than “constitutive” judgments of organisms as purposive systems within nature and of nature as a whole as a purposive system that has as its “final goal” (Endzweck) the development of the discipline necessary for the realization of human morality—although as a product of human freedom, morality can never, in Kant’s view, be achieved by merely natural means, only by an act of choice. Kant had been interested in reconciling a teleological outlook with the development of modern science since such early works as the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens of 1755 and The Only Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God of 1763. He had likewise long been interested in issues in aesthetics, having published a popular work of Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime in 1764. In addition, following the example of the textbooks by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten and Georg Friedrich Meier that he used for his courses on logic, metaphysics, and, beginning in 1772–1773, anthropology, he had touched upon aesthetics in all of those courses. But the idea of addressing aesthetics and teleology in a single book does not seem to have occurred to Kant before the end of 1787, after he had finished writing the Critique of Practical Reason, and he then wrote the third critique very quickly. His deepest reason for having written this book seems to have been his realization that both aesthetic and teleological judgment could support the human effort to be moral without sacrificing what is distinctive to them.


Metaphysica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-121
Author(s):  
Joël Dolbeault

Abstract The more science progresses, the more it is evident that the physical world presents regularities. This raises a metaphysical problem: why is the world so ordered? In the first part of the article, I attempt to clarify this problem and justify its relevance. In the following three parts, I analyze three hypotheses already formulated in philosophy in response to this problem: the hypothesis that the order of the world is explained 1) by laws of nature, 2) by dispositions of the fundamental physical entities, 3) or by a memory immanent to matter (a hypothesis developed by Peirce, Bergson and James). The third hypothesis may seem surprising. However, it can be shown that the three hypotheses have a psychomorphic dimension in the sense that they give to nature properties analogous to those of mind. In addition, this third hypothesis presents several interesting arguments.


Author(s):  
Melissa Frankel

Pleasures and pains play an important role for Berkeley, not just in motivating action, but also by providing knowledge of the physical world in which we act. This chapter considers the parallels that Berkeley draws between sensible quality perceptions and pleasures/pains. Importantly, Berkeley holds that we can have intuitive or demonstrative knowledge of the existence and nature of the physical world on the basis of our sensory perceptions. His parallel analysis of pleasures and pains thus surprisingly implies that these, too, can provide us with intuitive or demonstrative knowledge of the physical world. Taking pleasures and pains to have an epistemic and cognitive function allows us to reread certain Berkeleyan texts in ways that are illuminating. This includes texts on the laws of nature, which enable us to regulate actions precisely because knowledge of the natural laws involves generalizing over regularities of sensory perceptions, which include pleasures/pains.


Author(s):  
Douglas M. Jesseph

This article examines Berkeley’s responses to the mechanics and mathematics of Isaac Newton. After a brief section outlining some of the key elements of Berkeley’s idealistic metaphysics and empiricist epistemology, his criticisms of Newton are considered, as is his attempt to accommodate the success of Newtonian mechanics within the constraints of his own philosophy. In particular, investigations are made of Berkeley’s criticisms of absolute space and time, his proposal to expunge the notion of matter from natural philosophy, his claim that laws of nature are purely descriptive and do not identify genuine causes, and his instrumentalistic approach to the concept of force. Berkeley’s critique of the Newtonian calculus of fluxions in his 1734 treatise The Analyst is also investigated.


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