Immanuel Kant: Aesthetics and Teleology

Philosophy ◽  
2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Guyer

The Critique of the Power of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft), published in 1790, was the last of the three critiques by Immanuel Kant (b. 1724–d. 1804). In the Introduction to the work, Kant argues that the gulf between the realms of the laws of nature and of freedom, or between theoretical and practical philosophy, needs to be bridged, and that the “reflecting” use of the faculty of judgment can do this while also taking us from the most general principles of natural science to empirical concepts and laws of nature. In the first main part of the work, the critique of the aesthetic power of judgment, Kant analyzes and defends our responses to, and judgments of, the beautiful in both nature and art and the sublime in nature; in the second main part, the critique of the teleological power of judgment, Kant defends our “regulative” rather than “constitutive” judgments of organisms as purposive systems within nature and of nature as a whole as a purposive system that has as its “final goal” (Endzweck) the development of the discipline necessary for the realization of human morality—although as a product of human freedom, morality can never, in Kant’s view, be achieved by merely natural means, only by an act of choice. Kant had been interested in reconciling a teleological outlook with the development of modern science since such early works as the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens of 1755 and The Only Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God of 1763. He had likewise long been interested in issues in aesthetics, having published a popular work of Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime in 1764. In addition, following the example of the textbooks by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten and Georg Friedrich Meier that he used for his courses on logic, metaphysics, and, beginning in 1772–1773, anthropology, he had touched upon aesthetics in all of those courses. But the idea of addressing aesthetics and teleology in a single book does not seem to have occurred to Kant before the end of 1787, after he had finished writing the Critique of Practical Reason, and he then wrote the third critique very quickly. His deepest reason for having written this book seems to have been his realization that both aesthetic and teleological judgment could support the human effort to be moral without sacrificing what is distinctive to them.

KronoScope ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Hervé Barreau

Abstract A metaphysical fact is a fact, clearly recognizable in the course of time, for which there is no scientific explanation, that is, no legal explanation or explanation deduced in the manner recommended by modern science. I contend that life’s emergence and human thought’s emergence are metaphysical facts in this sense. These emergences are not to be explained by Darwinian principles which themselves do not seem adequate to explain genetic evolutionism. But modern cosmology has given us leave to reflect on cosmic evolution in a manner which gives sense to overall finality. There is an anthropic principle which has two forms: in the weak form, it can help science discover new legal explanations; in the strong form, it offers a teleological explanation of the laws of nature. As F. Dyson noted, we have two styles of explanation: the one is scientific; the other is metascientific (or metaphysical). We have no reason to reject teleological explanations about ontological questions.


2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-44
Author(s):  
Eric Wilson

Saint Anselm’s Ontological Argument is perhaps the most intriguing of all the traditional speculative proofs for the existence of God. Yet, his argument has been rejected outright by many philosophers. Most challenges stem from the basic conviction that no amount of logical analysis of a concept that is limited to the bounds of the “understanding” will ever be able to “reason” the existence in “reality” of anything answering such a limited concept. However, it is not the intent of this paper to prove or disprove Anselm’s argument. Rather, in this paper we concern ourselves with arriving at a sound interpretation of Anselm’s leading critic—Immanuel Kant. Kant put forth perhaps the most vaunted criticism of Anselm’s argument. However, Kant has been perhaps the most misunderstood objector to Anselm’s argument. This paper confirms that charge, simultaneously offering what I believe to be a sound interpretation of Kant’s criticism.


Author(s):  
Vincenzo Ferrone

This chapter examines the change in science's image and the revelation of the philosophers of science's so-called epistemologia imaginabilis in the context of eighteenth-century science and philosophy. Many eminent scholars, from Thomas Hobbes to Denis Diderot, have engaged in the epistemological debate over extending the methods of the natural sciences to the study of human experience. The idea of the unity of knowledge across all disciplines on the basis of scientific methodology reached its peak with Immanuel Kant. Among the great historians, Marc Bloch was the one who best understood the role that a radically new conception of science could play in redefining and reviving the legitimacy of historical knowledge. The chapter considers the intense intellectual debate between historians of science and philosophers of science on the foundations of knowledge and how modern science acquired definitive legitimacy as a new form of knowledge over the course of the eighteenth century.


Author(s):  
John Scholar

Chapter 3, continuing Chapter 2’s intellectual history of the impression, begins by exploring British aestheticism and its roots in Kant and romanticism (Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde, Immanuel Kant, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Wordsworth). It then turns to twentieth-century theories of performativity, which, it argues, combine elements of the empiricist and the aesthetic (J. L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man, Judith Butler, J. Hillis Miller). James followed Pater in resurrecting the ‘impression’. Pater found in Hume’s impression a role for the imagination at the heart of consciousness. But the interpretive excesses of James’s protagonists’ cognitive impressions must also be understood alongside the more flamboyant aestheticism of Pater’s disciple Wilde, and his ‘critic as artist’. The most active of James’s impressions, however, are performative: they are impressions made, not received. Performativity helps frame an account of the impression that encompasses both the receiving and making of impressions, and the confusion between the two.


Author(s):  
Sandra G. Harding

Are there laws of nature that today’s modern sciences are ill-designed to discover? Does the universal use of these modern sciences require their value-neutrality, or are their social values and interests an important cause of their universality? What resources for scientific knowledge can other cultures’ science projects provide? Such questions are raised by recent postcolonial global histories that focus analyses on the role of European expansion in the advance of modern science and in the decline of other cultures’ science traditions. These accounts challenge philosophers to re-evaluate unsuspected strengths in other scientific traditions and identify modern science’s borrowings from them. They also identify European cultural features that have, for better and worse, constituted modern sciences and their representations of nature and thus seek to develop more realistic and useful accounts of the values, interests, methods, universality, objectivity and rationality of science.


1962 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 128-133
Author(s):  
T. J. Haarhoff

It has been said: ‘The Classics can be scrapped because of the advance of modern science.’ But, apart from the timeless values in the aesthetic and the moral spheres, we now have the amazing fact that in the realm of science itself, Nobel Prizewinners like Heisenberg and Schrödinger have been pleading for a return to the ancient Greeks; and that, too, in the most modern of scientific fields—atomic physics.


Author(s):  
Sheldon R. Smith

Throughout his career, Immanuel Kant was engaged rather closely with Newtonian science. Although Kant adopts many Newtonian principles, most obviously the Newtonian gravitational law, he is also critical of Newton for, among other things, not having provided “metaphysical foundations” for science. Kant’s own attempt to provide such foundations leads him to have a somewhat different picture of the physical world from Newton. This article describes why Kant thought that metaphysical foundations were required and some of the ways this requirement leads Kant toward non-Newtonian views. In particular, it compares and contrasts their views on the nature of matter, force, the laws of nature, and absolute space and absolute motion.


2006 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Harrison

Readers of the New Testament could be excused for thinking that there is little consistency in the manner in which miracles are represented in the Gospels. Those events typically identified as miracles are variously described as “signs” (semeia), “wonders” (terata), “mighty works” (dunameis), and, on occasion, simply “works” (erga). The absence of a distinct terminology for the miraculous suggests that the authors of the Gospels were not working with a formal conception of “miracle”—at least not in that Humean sense of a “contravention of the laws of nature,” familiar to modern readers. Neither is there a consistent position on the evidentiary role of these events. In the synoptic Gospels—Matthew, Mark, and Luke—Jesus performs miracles on account of the faith of his audience. In John's Gospel, however, it is the performance of miracles that elicits faith. Even in the fourth Gospel, moreover, the role of miracles as signs of Christ's divinity is not straightforward. Thus those who demand a miracle are castigated: “Unless you see signs and wonders you will not believe.” Finally, signs and wonders do not provide unambiguous evidence of the sanctity of the miracle worker or of the truth of their teachings. Accordingly, the faithful were warned (in the synoptic Gospels at least) that “false Christs and false prophets will rise and show signs and wonders [in order] to deceive.”


Author(s):  
Setyo Wibowo

<div><p><strong>Abstract :</strong> Faith becomes problematic in our modern world. In the age of secularization and emancipation man masters the Nature with his growing reason and ever developing technology. This new situation brings with itself a discredit toward faith and religion. Without refusing the existence of God, Immanuel Kant declares that theology is a paralogism (a fallacious reasoning). Auguste Comte corners the religion in the realm of infantile age to be overcomed by the progress of science. Meanwhile Friedrich Nietzsche, from his own view, analyses that the phenomenon of fanatism in religion hides the uncontrallble “need to believe” typically found among the weaks.The central critique of Martin Heidegger toward ontotheological metaphysics shows that theology defined as science does not think. Man of faith has already all the answer before a question is posed, therefore he cannot truly pariticipate in the question of Being. This article tries to consider these objections against faith. As an answer, this article offers to acknowledge “the act of believe” as an universal disposition in man. Much wider than his need to possess knowledge, man is driven by a desire for the infinite. Faith resumes this human desire for infinite.</p><p><em>Keywords : Emancipation, theology, metaphysics, faith, knowledge, way of belief, act of belief, passivity, infinite horizon, anthropological disposision.</em></p><p><em><br /></em></p><p><strong>Abstrak :</strong> Iman menjadi problem di dunia modern. Gerak sekularisasi dan emansipasi manusia berkat perkembangan rasionya, yang tampak dalam penguasaan manusia atas alam lewat teknologi, membuat keyakinan pada Tuhan dianggap ketinggalan roh jaman. Meskipun tidak menolak Tuhan, Immanuel Kant menganggap bahwa teologi adalah sebuah paralogisme. Auguste Comte tegas-tegas mengatakan bahwa jaman teologi dan agama adalah era kekanak-kanakan yang harus dilampaui demi kemajuan jaman. Friedrich Nietzsche memperingatkan bahwa fanatisme dalam agama adalah tanda besarnya kebutuhan manusia untuk percaya, yang tidak lain adalah kelemahan diri manusia. Kritikan besar Martin Heidegger kepada metafisika onto-teologis semakin menunjukkan inferioritas iman di depan pemikiran. Beriman artinya tidak bisa berpikir secara sungguh-sungguh. Artikel ini hendak menimbang keberatan-keberatan atas iman di atas dan sekaligus menawarkan bahwa “tindak percaya” adalah sesuatu yang secara antropologis menjadi disposisi setiap manusia. Lebih luas daripada obsesi pada “pengetahuan”, manusia memiliki hasrat akan ketakterbatasan yang menemukan ekspresinya dalam apa yang kita sebut sebagai iman.</p><p><em>Kata kunci : Emansipasi, teologi, metafisika, iman, pengetahuan, cara beriman, tindak percaya, pasitivitas, horison ketakterbatasan, disposisi antropologis.</em></p></div>


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