Coping with Value Conflicts in Interorganizational Collaborations

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 239-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen B Page ◽  
Melissa M Stone ◽  
John M Bryson ◽  
Barbara C Crosby
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosabelle Illes ◽  
Naomi Ellemers ◽  
Fieke Harinck
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 43-60
Author(s):  
Yan Liu

Based on Robbins' understanding that both Durkhcimian and Weberian approaches could help the study of social morality, this paper explores the dynamics of cultural reproduction and value conflicts in Chinese Christians' communication on the WcChat platform. It evaluates ten religious WeChat groups' norms and activities and categorizes them into four typologies according to their group inclusiveness and interactivity. It collects group chats from the WeChat platform and reveals the forming dynamics of group verbal abuse, and further explores the Chinese Christians' morally fraught experience in the virtual communities, ‘『his research shows that Christian values as an external force encourage Christians to fulfill their gospel mission and seek their group identity. Christians exhibit their discursive power through group norms and group behaviors. Cultural authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism arc the ideological factors that underline the exclusive group behaviors of the Christian virtual comm unities. The contradiction between exclusive and inclusive group cultures reflects the incompatibility between Chinese authoritarian tradition and the call for a more open society. Under the current social structure and cultural environment, particularistic ethics and exclusive practices would still be dominant in Chinese Christian virtual communities for a comparatively long time.


Author(s):  
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen

Evaluations about what is good (period) and what is good for someone shape much of ethics. The two value notions ‘good’ and ‘good for’ mark the deep-rooted divide between the impersonally and personally valuable—the value divide on which The Value Gap centres. Past and contemporary philosophers have argued it is a mistake to believe that these two value notions give rise to unresolvable value conflicts. This book argues that they are wrong. Part I considers two views to that effect, which share the idea that one of the two value notions is either flawed or at best conceptually dependent on the other notion. The views disagree, however, about whether it is good or good-for that is the flawed concept. These approaches deny the central idea of this work, namely that goodness and goodness-for are independent value notions that cannot be fully understood in terms of one another. Part II provides an analysis of impersonal and personal goodness in terms of a fitting-attitude analysis. By elaborating a more nuanced understanding of the analysis’ key elements—reasons and pro- and con-attitudes—the book challenges a common idea, namely that our beliefs about practical and moral dilemmas can be dismissed as being conceptually confused. The gap between favouring what is good and what is good for someone appears insurmountable.


2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (01) ◽  
pp. 18-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Vanderheiden

Scholars of justice theory often refuse to apply their principles to concrete social or political issues; instead, they develop those principles in abstraction from contemporary value conflicts or policy debates, preferring to remain silent on how justice might inform controversial political decisions. Rawls, for example, casts questions concerning the application of his “justice as fairness” conception across national, generational, and species boundaries as among the several “problems of extension” for which his theory may or may not be equipped, noting that “the idea of political justice does not cover everything, nor should we expect it to” (1993, 20–21). Even where he applies his justice theory to problems of international relations in hisThe Law of Peoples, Rawls describes its application as merely “an extension of a liberal conception of justice for a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples” (1999, 9), as though constructing and applying justice principles are entirely discrete steps, with its application to concrete social or political issues a unidirectional project of wielding static principles as practical tools, offering nothing of importance to a normative theory's development.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 861-879
Author(s):  
Francesco Bogliacino ◽  
Cristiano Codagnone ◽  
Giuseppe Alessandro Veltri

AbstractIn this paper, we develop a framework to analyze the relationship between evidence and policy. Postulating a normative criterion based on cost–benefit analysis and the value of a piece of information, as well as a topology of the policy space defined by three characteristics (epistemic uncertainty, interests, and the degree of value conflicts), we identify the (Nash) equilibria of an interaction between experts and citizens in providing information to a decision maker. In this setup, we study three institutional arrangements (evidence-based policy, deliberative governance, and negotiated conflict) that differ in terms of reliance on experts and citizens for providing information. We show that different degrees of uncertainty, interests, and value-relevance surrounding the issue at stake result in vastly different arrangement performances; hence, to foster efficiency, rules should be contingent.


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