The Effect of Regulatory Constraints on Fund Performance: New Evidence from UCITS Hedge Funds*

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juha Joenväärä ◽  
Robert Kosowski
Keyword(s):  
Indirect Cost ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
Short Selling ◽  
Fund Manager ◽  
Management Company ◽  
Regulatory Constraints ◽  
Matching Estimator ◽  
Performance Results ◽  
New Evidence

Abstract This article examines the effect of regulatory constraints on fund performance and risk by comparing conventional and UCITS hedge funds. Using a matching estimator approach, we estimate the indirect cost of UCITS regulation to be between 1.06% and 4.05% per annum in terms of risk-adjusted returns. These performance differences are likely to stem from UCITS constraints such as those governing eligible assets, diversification, and short selling, and cannot be explained by differences in redemption terms or level of leverage. We confirm that our performance results are not driven by management company characteristics, fund manager characteristics, or unobserved confounder bias.

scholarly journals New Evidence On Hedge Fund Performance Measures

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Komlan Sedzro
Keyword(s):  
Data Envelopment Analysis ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
Sharpe Ratio ◽  
Data Envelopment ◽  
Sharpe Ratios ◽  
Hedge Fund Performance ◽  
New Evidence

Hedge funds are still relatively unfamiliar to most investors despite the intense popularity they have enjoyed in recent years. Measuring the performance of these financial instruments using traditional methods is, however, problematic, since their returns do not follow a normal distribution. In this study, we consider rankings obtained with the Stochastic Dominance (SD) method and compare them with ranks produced using Sharpe Ratios, Modified Sharpe Ratios, and Data Envelopment Analysis. We also explore the advantages highlighted by the literature of the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method in relation to traditional measures like Sharpe ratio and Modified Sharpe ratio. Our results show that classic performance measures are better correlated with SD than DEA results.

Financial Industry Affiliation and Hedge Fund Performance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lingling Zheng ◽  
Xuemin (Sterling) Yan
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Seasoned Equity Offerings ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
Internal Conflicts ◽  
Industry Affiliation ◽  
Hedge Fund Performance

Affiliation with a financial conglomerate may provide hedge funds with superior information about the conglomerate’s lending, investment banking, and brokerage clients; such affiliation can also lead to potential conflicts with the other units of the conglomerate and exacerbate the conflict between hedge fund companies and hedge fund investors. We find that affiliated funds significantly underperform unaffiliated funds. A difference-in-difference analysis confirms the negative relation between financial industry affiliation and hedge fund performance. Affiliated funds pursue asset-gathering strategies, overweight their conducted initial public offerings/seasoned equity offerings clients’ stocks, are more likely to commit legal and regulatory violations, and tend to exhibit a greater number of internal conflicts. Our results are consistent with conflict of interest exerting a negative impact on the performance of affiliated hedge funds. However, it is possible that lack of skill also contributes to the underperformance of affiliated funds. This paper was accepted by Karl Diether, finance.

Determinants of Hedge Fund Internal Controls and Fees

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 1887-1919 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Cassar ◽  
Joseph Gerakos
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Short Selling ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Asset Value ◽  
Net Asset Value ◽  
Financial Misstatements ◽  
Financial Misstatement

ABSTRACT: We investigate the determinants of hedge fund internal controls and their association with the fees that funds charge investors. Hedge funds are subject to minimal regulation. Hence, hedge fund managers voluntarily implement internal controls, and managers and investors freely contract on fees. We find that internal controls are stronger in funds with higher potential agency costs. Further, internal controls are stronger in funds domiciled in jurisdictions that provide investors with limited legal redress for fraud and financial misstatements. Short selling funds, however, are more likely to protect information about their investment positions by implementing weaker internal controls. With respect to fees, we find that the percentage of positive profits that the manager receives increases in the strength of the fund’s internal controls. Finally, removing the manager from setting and reporting the fund’s official net asset value, along with reputational incentives and monitoring by leverage providers, are all associated with lower likelihoods of future regulatory investigations of fraud and/or financial misstatement.

scholarly journals Hedge Fund Performance Using Scaled Sharpe And Treynor Measures

2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 1261
Author(s):  
Francois Van Dyk ◽  
Gary Van Vuuren ◽  
Andre Heymans
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Performance Metrics ◽  
Estimation Error ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
Performance Measure ◽  
Sharpe Ratio ◽  
Investment Funds ◽  
Additional Information

The Sharpe ratio is widely used as a performance measure for traditional (i.e., long only) investment funds, but because it is based on mean-variance theory, it only considers the first two moments of a return distribution. It is, therefore, not suited for evaluating funds characterised by complex, asymmetric, highly-skewed return distributions such as hedge funds. It is also susceptible to manipulation and estimation error. These drawbacks have demonstrated the need for new and additional fund performance metrics. The monthly returns of 184 international long/short (equity) hedge funds from four geographical investment mandates were examined over an 11-year period.This study contributes to recent research on alternative performance measures to the Sharpe ratio and specifically assesses whether a scaled-version of the classic Sharpe ratio should augment the use of the Sharpe ratio when evaluating hedge fund risk and in the investment decision-making process. A scaled Treynor ratio is also compared to the traditional Treynor ratio. The classic and scaled versions of the Sharpe and Treynor ratios were estimated on a 36-month rolling basis to ascertain whether the scaled ratios do indeed provide useful additional information to investors to that provided solely by the classic, non-scaled ratios.

scholarly journals Risk-adjusted return, fund manager efficacy, and fund characteristics – An inquiry

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Riyazahmed K
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Mutual Funds ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
Sharpe Ratio ◽  
Information Ratio ◽  
Fund Manager ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Dependent Variables ◽  
Corpus Size ◽  
The Impact

Abstract In this study, I examine the risk-adjusted return of mutual funds in India. A data set of 4220 mutual funds is used for the analysis. Sharpe ratio, a metric of risk-adjusted return (Sharpe, 1994) and Information ratio, a metric of outperformance than a fund’s benchmark (Goodwin, 1998) were analyzed. Regression analysis is used to estimate the impact of fund characteristics like fund category, fund type, fund access type, corpus size on the dependent variables i.e., Sharpe Ratio and the Information Ratio. All the funds underperformed in both the Sharpe ratio and Information ratio. Liquid funds found worst. Fund type and corpus size do not impact fund performance. Fund access type was found to be significant on fund performance. The results add to the literature by examining the post-pandemic period.

Style and Skill: Hedge Funds, Mutual Funds, and Momentum

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (12) ◽  
pp. 5505-5531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Grinblatt ◽  
Gergana Jostova ◽  
Lubomir Petrasek ◽  
Alexander Philipov
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Funds ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Mutual Fund ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
Short Sales ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Liquidity Provision ◽  
Stock Picking ◽  
Hedge Fund Performance

Classifying mandatory 13F stockholding filings by manager type reveals that hedge fund strategies are mostly contrarian, and mutual fund strategies are largely trend following. The only institutional performers—the two thirds of hedge fund managers that are contrarian—earn alpha of 2.4% per year. Contrarian hedge fund managers tend to trade profitably with all other manager types, especially when purchasing stocks from momentum-oriented hedge and mutual fund managers. Superior contrarian hedge fund performance exhibits persistence and stems from stock-picking ability rather than liquidity provision. Aggregate short sales further support these conclusions about the style and skill of various fund manager types. This paper was accepted by Tyler Shumway, finance.

Hedge Fund Due Diligence at Leman Alternative Asset Management Company

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Pedro Matos
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Equity Market ◽  
Return Volatility ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
Case Discussion ◽  
Management Company ◽  
Track Record ◽  
Monthly Return

In early January 2008, a senior VP with LAAMCO, a fund of hedge funds known for alternative investments, was conducting due diligence on an equity market-neutral hedge fund. The hedge fund used an option strategy known as a collar (also known as a bull spread or split-strike conversion). The track record of the hedge fund had been stellar. The fund's performance had not only beaten that of the S&P 500 Index over the same period but had done so with much lower monthly return volatility. As part of the due diligence, it was necessary to backtest the collar strategy and try to quantify how much value the manager, BLM Investment Securities, LLC, (BLM) had added. The case is a disguised representation of an actual hedge fund—the true identity of BLM is revealed to students at the end of the case discussion.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document