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2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 209
Author(s):  
Dian Pertiwi

<p>Application of Mudharabah Muthlaqah on mudharabah deposits, the depositor or depositor acts as the owner of the funds (shahibul maal) and the bank acts as the manager of the funds (mudharib). The customer as the owner of the funds (shahibul maal) cannot provide certain limitations or requirements to the Islamic bank as the fund manager (mudharib) in managing their investment, whether related to the place, method or object of investment. Customers will get benefits in the form of profit sharing on deposits where the bank distributes profit sharing to customers with a ratio that has been agreed at the beginning and get results at maturity every month which goes directly to the customer's account. If there is a deposit payment before maturity, the bank will impose a fine on the customer in accordance with the bank's policy. Islamic banks have rights and freedoms in the mudharabah business. Profits from various sectors that are expected by Islamic banks to be profitable.<em> </em></p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Cookson ◽  
Tim Jenkinson ◽  
Howard Jones ◽  
Jose Vicente Martinez
Keyword(s):  

Investment consultants market their services by claiming their fund manager recommendations add significant value. Using nonpublic data sourced from investment consultants and the UK regulator, we find no such evidence, but identify several practices that explain their exaggerated claims: comparisons to benchmarks instead of peers, inclusion of simulated and backfilled returns, use of investment horizons that allow losers to be forgotten, and unexplained exclusions of products from the analysis. Consultants do not fully disclose their methodology to investors, who therefore cannot verify or reliably compare their performance. This paper was accepted by Haoxiang Zhu, finance.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Riyazahmed K

Abstract In this study, I examine the risk-adjusted return of mutual funds in India. A data set of 4220 mutual funds is used for the analysis. Sharpe ratio, a metric of risk-adjusted return (Sharpe, 1994) and Information ratio, a metric of outperformance than a fund’s benchmark (Goodwin, 1998) were analyzed. Regression analysis is used to estimate the impact of fund characteristics like fund category, fund type, fund access type, corpus size on the dependent variables i.e., Sharpe Ratio and the Information Ratio. All the funds underperformed in both the Sharpe ratio and Information ratio. Liquid funds found worst. Fund type and corpus size do not impact fund performance. Fund access type was found to be significant on fund performance. The results add to the literature by examining the post-pandemic period.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-211
Author(s):  
Muhammad Khozin Ahyar

Financing in Islamic banking can be regarded as an investment because Islamic banking is a fund manager (mudharib) from the owner of the funds (shahibul maal), namely the customer. This research aims to show that investment diversification can minimize risk and increase profitability in Islamic banking. This study uses a quantitative method with a multiple linear regression model with 14 independent and 2 dependent variables. The data used is secondary data obtained from the Islamic banking statistics of the Financial Services Authority. The result of this research is that diversification of financing based on the economic sector has no effect on profitability but affects risk in reducing default. This research has implications for reducing the risk of default in Islamic banking, marked by the performance and quality of Islamic banking financing getting better.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Avinash Ghalke ◽  
Shripad Kulkarni

PurposeWhen a fund manager leaves, the investment strategy of the fund changes or remains the same. The departing fund manager's resignation is either forced or voluntary. The study investigates the relationship between the portfolio manager's transition and the fund's investment strategy and how the change affects the mutual fund returns in the subsequent period.Design/methodology/approachThe authors examine 148 fund manager changes in India between April 2005–March 2018 using three performance measures: abnormal return (fund return minus benchmark return), Jensen's alpha and Carhart four-factor alpha. The analysis includes an event study methodology, followed by a two-step Fama–MacBeth regression approach.FindingsContrary to the previous studies conducted in the developed markets, the authors find that fund performance improves irrespective of whether the fund manager change is forced or voluntary. The outperformance after the fund manager's exit is significant for funds belonging to the larger fund families.Originality/valueIn the context of investment management, the authors provide a conceptual framework to understand the effect of fund manager exit on mutual fund performance. The authors substantiate their arguments with empirical evidence. To the best of the authors' understanding, this is the first research to examine the effect of changing mutual fund managers in an emerging market setting.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgia Bush ◽  
Carlos Cañon ◽  
Daniel Gray

Empleamos datos desagregados de las tenencias de los fondos de inversión globales para distinguir entre las dos razones por las que pueden cambiar las tenencias de bonos de economías de mercado emergentes (EMEs) por parte de los fondos: (i) el monto invertido en el fondo puede cambiar y (ii) el administrador del fondo puede modificar la asignación del portafolio. Encontramos que la respuesta de los fondos a las condiciones macroeconómicas globales, "push factors", se explica por las decisiones de los inversionistas del fondo. Por otro lado, la respuesta de los fondos a las condiciones macroeconómicas locales, "pull factors", se explica por las reasignaciones en las tenencias por cuenta de los administradores de los fondos. Adicionalmente, identificamos otros factores instituciones que impactan las decisiones de reasignación: cambios en el apalancamiento, su índice de referencia, y su apetito de riesgo (los fondos reasignan recursos hacia EMEs más seguros ante incrementos en factores globales de riesgo).


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Yanan Li ◽  
Chuanzheng Li

This paper considers the principle-agent conflict problem in a continuous-time delegated asset management model when the investor and the fund manager are all risk-averse with risk sensitivity coefficients γ f  and  γ m , respectively. Suppose that the investor entrusts his money to the fund manager. The return of the investment is determined by the manager’s effort level and incentive strategy, but the benefit belongs to the investor. In order to encourage the manager to work hard, the investor will determine the manager’s salary according to the terminal income. This is a stochastic differential game problem, and the distribution of income between the manager and the investor is a key point to be solved in the custody model. The uncertain form of the incentive strategy implies that the problem is different from the classical stochastic optimal control problem. In this paper, we first express the investor’s incentive strategy in term of two auxiliary processes and turn this problem into a classical one. Then, we employ the dynamic programming principle to solve the problem.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonia Tong

Compared to a Chinese investor, the U.S. investors invest in Fin-Tech evergreen fund is not astrange financial activity. In the fast-developing of different technology nowadays, the US. Fin-Techevergreen investors are always attempting to catch the wave of the opportunity to invest in new financialtechnology companies that will almost like investing in Apple, Microsoft, SpaceX, or Teslar twenty yearsago. This article intends to introduce, compare, and analyst the fin-tech evergreen development in boththe USA and China. Fin-Tech Evergreen financing is a concept used to describe the gradual infusion offunds into a fin-tech company. It is feasible to organize for the receipt of venture capital money inadvance. Nevertheless, with FinTech's evergreen investment, investors provide cash in incrementalpayments throughout the company's or product's development phase. It is a perpetual fund architecturewith no set end date. It frequently provides investors with the ability to exit their commitment and allowsthe fund manager to acquire additional cash. Investors are allowed to reinvest cash generated by realizedreturns, thus the term "evergreen." With a thorough explanation of the two most powerful economicpowers' investment direction of the evergreen fund, the general public will learn more about the evergreenfund's future and destiny.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Jung-Cheol Shin ◽  
Mun-Kyung Cheong ◽  
Yong-Hyeon Kim ◽  
Kyoung-Ha Kim

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