scholarly journals Selfish strategies and honest signalling: reproductive conflicts in ant queen associations

2010 ◽  
Vol 277 (1690) ◽  
pp. 2007-2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke Holman ◽  
Stephanie Dreier ◽  
Patrizia d'Ettorre
2017 ◽  
Vol 372 (1724) ◽  
pp. 20160343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan J. Weaver ◽  
Rebecca E. Koch ◽  
Geoffrey E. Hill

Many of the colour displays of animals are proposed to have evolved in response to female mate choice for honest signals of quality, but such honest signalling requires mechanisms to prevent cheating. The most widely accepted and cited mechanisms for ensuring signal honesty are based on the costly signalling hypothesis, which posits that costs associated with ornamentation prevent low-quality males from being highly ornamented. Alternatively, by the index hypothesis, honesty can be achieved via cost-free mechanisms if ornament production is causally linked to core physiological pathways. In this essay, we review how a costly signalling framework has shaped empirical research in mate choice for colourful male ornaments and emphasize that alternative interpretations are plausible under an index signalling framework. We discuss the challenges in both empirically testing and distinguishing between the two hypotheses, noting that they need not be mutually exclusive. Finally, we advocate for a comprehensive approach to studies of colour signals that includes the explicit consideration of cost-free mechanisms for honesty. This article is part of the themed issue ‘Animal coloration: production, perception, function and application’.


2003 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 277-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madeleine Beekman ◽  
Jan Komdeur ◽  
Francis L.W. Ratnieks

Author(s):  
Junhui Wu ◽  
Szabolcs Számadó ◽  
Pat Barclay ◽  
Bianca Beersma ◽  
Terence D. Dores Cruz ◽  
...  

Gossip, or sharing information about absent others, has been identified as an effective solution to free rider problems in situations with conflicting interests. Yet, the information transmitted via gossip can be biased, because gossipers may send dishonest information about others for personal gains. Such dishonest gossip makes reputation-based cooperation more difficult to evolve. But when are people likely to share honest or dishonest gossip? We build formal models to provide the theoretical foundation for individuals' gossip strategies, taking into account the gossiper's fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target. Our models across four different games suggest a very simple rule: when there is a perfect match (mismatch) between fitness interdependence and the effect of honest gossip, the gossiper should always be honest (dishonest); however, in the case of a partial match, the gossiper should make a choice based on their fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target and the marginal cost/benefit in terms of pay-off differences caused by possible choices of the receiver and the target in the game. Moreover, gossipers can use this simple rule to make optimal decisions even under noise. We discuss empirical examples that support the predictions of our model and potential extensions. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulia Scarparo ◽  
Madison Sankovitz ◽  
Kevin J. Loope ◽  
Erin Wilson‐Rankin ◽  
Jessica Purcell

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 729-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Culum Brown ◽  
Martin P. Garwood ◽  
Jane E. Williamson

Signals in intraspecific communication should be inherently honest; otherwise the system is prone to collapse. Theory predicts, however, that honest signalling systems are susceptible to invasion by cheats, the extent of which is largely mediated by fear of reprisal. Cuttlefish facultatively change their shape and colour, an ability that evolved to avoid predators and capture prey. Here, we show that this ability is tactically employed by male mourning cuttlefish ( Sepia plangon ) to mislead conspecifics during courtship in a specific social context amenable to cheating 39 per cent of the time, while it was never employed in other social contexts. Males deceive rival males by displaying male courtship patterns to receptive females on one side of the body, and simultaneously displaying female patterns to a single rival male on the other, thus preventing the rival from disrupting courtship. The use of tactical deception in such a complex communication network indicates that sociality has played a key role in the cognitive evolution of cephalopods.


2014 ◽  
Vol 281 (1775) ◽  
pp. 20132496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Çağlar Akçay ◽  
S. Elizabeth Campbell ◽  
Michael D. Beecher

Research in the past decade has established the existence of consistent individual differences or ‘personality’ in animals and their important role in many aspects of animal behaviour. At the same time, research on honest signalling of aggression has revealed that while some of the putative aggression signals are reliable, they are only imperfectly so. This study asks whether a significant portion of the variance in the aggression-signal regression may be explained by individual differences in signalling strategies. Using the well-studied aggressive signalling system of song sparrows ( Melospiza melodia ), we carried out repeated assays to measure both aggressive behaviours and aggressive signalling of territorial males. Through these assays, we found that aggressive behaviours and aggressive signalling were both highly repeatable, and moreover that aggressive behaviours in 2009–2010 predicted whether the birds would attack a taxidermic mount over a year later. Most significantly, we found that residual variation in signalling behaviours, after controlling for aggressive behaviour, was individually consistent, suggesting there may be a second personality trait determining the level of aggressive signalling. We term this potential personality trait ‘communicativeness’ and discuss these results in the context of honest signalling theories and recent findings reporting prevalence of ‘under-signalling’.


2005 ◽  
Vol 272 (1570) ◽  
pp. 1339-1344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jürgen Liebig ◽  
Thibaud Monnin ◽  
Stefano Turillazzi

Assessing a conspecific's potential is often crucial to increase one's fitness, e.g. in female choice, contests with rivals or reproductive conflicts in animal societies. In the latter, helpers benefit from accurately assessing the fertility of the breeder as an indication of inclusive fitness. There is evidence that this can be achieved using chemical correlates of reproductive activity. Here, we show that queen quality can be assessed by directly monitoring her reproductive output. In the paper wasp Polistes dominulus , we mimicked a decrease in queen fertility by regularly removing brood. This triggered ovarian development and egg-laying by many workers, which strongly suggests that brood abundance is a reliable cue of queen quality. Brood abundance can be monitored when workers perform regular brood care in small size societies where each brood element is kept in a separate cell. Our results also show that although the queen was not manipulated, and thus remained healthy and fully fertile, she did not control worker egg-laying. Nevertheless, when workers laid eggs, the queen secured a near reproductive monopoly by selectively destroying these eggs, a mechanism known as ‘queen policing’. By contrast, workers destroyed comparatively few queen-laid eggs, but did destroy each other's eggs.


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