scholarly journals Honesty and dishonesty in gossip strategies: a fitness interdependence analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhui Wu ◽  
Szabolcs Számadó ◽  
Pat Barclay ◽  
Bianca Beersma ◽  
Terence D. Dores Cruz ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Perfect Match ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Simple Rule ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Partial Match ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Conflicting Interests

Gossip, or sharing information about absent others, has been identified as an effective solution to free rider problems in situations with conflicting interests. Yet, the information transmitted via gossip can be biased, because gossipers may send dishonest information about others for personal gains. Such dishonest gossip makes reputation-based cooperation more difficult to evolve. But when are people likely to share honest or dishonest gossip? We build formal models to provide the theoretical foundation for individuals' gossip strategies, taking into account the gossiper's fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target. Our models across four different games suggest a very simple rule: when there is a perfect match (mismatch) between fitness interdependence and the effect of honest gossip, the gossiper should always be honest (dishonest); however, in the case of a partial match, the gossiper should make a choice based on their fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target and the marginal cost/benefit in terms of pay-off differences caused by possible choices of the receiver and the target in the game. Moreover, gossipers can use this simple rule to make optimal decisions even under noise. We discuss empirical examples that support the predictions of our model and potential extensions. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

scholarly journals Adaptations for Sharing Honest and Dishonest Gossip: A Fitness Interdependence Analysis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhui Wu ◽  
Szabolcs Számadó ◽  
Pat Barclay ◽  
Bianca Beersma ◽  
Terence Daniel Dores Cruz ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Effective Solution ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Snowdrift Game ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Conflicting Interests ◽  
Game Type

Gossip, which involves sharing information about absent others, has been identified as an effective solution to free rider problems in situations with conflicting interests between self and others. Yet, the information transmitted via gossip can be biased, because gossipers may send dishonest information about others for personal gains. Such dishonest gossip makes reputation-based cooperation more difficult to evolve. In which situations are people likely to share honest or dishonest gossip? In this theoretical review, we use formal models to provide the theoretical foundation for individuals’ gossip strategies in situations where the gossiper has varying levels of fitness interdependence with the target and/or the recipient. Our models across four different games (i.e., stag-hunt game, snowdrift game, helping game, and punishment game) illustrate that the gossiper’s action will be determined by (a) the gossiper’s fitness interdependence with the recipient and the target, and (b) the marginal cost/benefit in terms of payoff differences between two possible game actions for the recipient and the target (i.e., game type). Our models suggest a simple rule that gossipers can use to make optimal decisions even under noise. We discuss empirical examples that support the predictions of our model and potential extensions.

Cost-Benefit Model for Risk-Based Design of a Typical Marine Platform in Mexico

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
David de Leon ◽  
Alfredo H.-S. Ang
Keyword(s):  
Social Issues ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Risk Assessments ◽  
Management Decision ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Oil Platforms ◽  
Structural Risk ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Marine Platform ◽  
Alternative Designs

A reliability-based cost-benefit model for the risk management of oil platforms in the formulation of optimal decisions based on life-cycle consideration is proposed. The model is based on structural risk assessments and the integration of social issues and economics into the management decision process. Structural risks result from the platform’s exposure to the random environmental loading associated with the offshore site where it is located. Several alternative designs of a typical platform are proposed and assessed from the cost-effectiveness viewpoint. This assessment is performed through the generation of cost/benefit relationships that are used, later on, to select the optimal design.

scholarly journals Representation through the eyes of the voter: a cost-benefit analysis of European integration

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-197
Author(s):  
Gabriela Borz
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Perfect Match ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
High Drive ◽  
European Parliament Elections ◽  
The Eu

This article explains variation in the quality of representation in the context of European Parliament elections. Specifically, it clarifies how voters relate to political parties on the issue of European integration and whether they are represented, misrepresented, or indifferent to this issue. The analysis shows that perceived benefits of European integration do drive a perfect voter-party match while perceived costs, when high, drive a perfect match between Eurosceptic voters and likeminded parties and make voters less indifferent. The analysis draws attention to the high number ofstatus quovoters who, in the absence of a party with similar views, could channel their vote towards a party promoting integration, but only if their knowledge about the EU and its benefits increases.

scholarly journals Law, evolution and the brain: applications and open questions

2004 ◽  
Vol 359 (1451) ◽  
pp. 1697-1707 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Zeki ◽  
O. R. Goodenough ◽  
Owen D. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Brain Function ◽  
Predictive Power ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Evolutionary Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Processes ◽  
Brain Science ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Legal Strategies ◽  
The Brain

This paper discusses several issues at the intersection of law and brain science. It focuses principally on ways in which an improved understanding of how evolutionary processes affect brain function and human behaviour may improve law's ability to regulate behaviour. It explores sample uses of such ‘evolutionary analysis in law’ and also raises questions about how that analysis might be improved in the future. Among the discussed uses are: (i) clarifying cost–benefit analyses; (ii) providing theoretical foundation and potential predictive power; (iii) assessing comparative effectiveness of legal strategies; and (iv) revealing deep patterns in legal architecture. Throughout, the paper emphasizes the extent to which effective law requires: (i) building effective behavioural models; (ii) integrating life–science perspectives with social–science perspectives; (iii) considering the effects of brain biology on behaviours that law seeks to regulate; and (iv) examining the effects of evolutionary processes on brain design.

scholarly journals Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Károly Takács ◽  
Jörg Gross ◽  
Martina Testori ◽  
Srebrenka Letina ◽  
Adam R. Kenny ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Identity Formation ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Field Studies ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Shared Information ◽  
Network Topologies

Reputation has been shown to provide an informal solution to the problem of cooperation in human societies. After reviewing models that connect reputations and cooperation, we address how reputation results from information exchange embedded in a social network that changes endogenously itself. Theoretical studies highlight that network topologies have different effects on the extent of cooperation, since they can foster or hinder the flow of reputational information. Subsequently, we review models and empirical studies that intend to grasp the coevolution of reputations, cooperation and social networks. We identify open questions in the literature concerning how networks affect the accuracy of reputations, the honesty of shared information and the spread of reputational information. Certain network topologies may facilitate biased beliefs and intergroup competition or in-group identity formation that could lead to high cooperation within but conflicts between different subgroups of a network. Our review covers theoretical, experimental and field studies across various disciplines that target these questions and could explain how the dynamics of interactions and reputations help or prevent the establishment and sustainability of cooperation in small- and large-scale societies. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

scholarly journals Gossip and competitive altruism support cooperation in a Public Good game

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Giardini ◽  
Daniele Vilone ◽  
Angel Sánchez ◽  
Alberto Antonioni
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Group Competition ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Competitive Altruism

When there is an opportunity to gain a positive reputation, individuals are more willing to sacrifice their immediate self-interest. Partner choice creates opportunities for competitive altruism, i.e. individuals compete to be regarded as more generous and to be chosen for future partnerships. Tests of the competitive altruism hypothesis have focused so far on reputation based on direct observation, whereas the role of gossip has not been theoretically and empirically addressed. Partner choice can create an incentive to cooperate and to send truthful messages, but it can also work in the opposite direction. In order to understand the consequences of partner choice on cooperation and gossip, we designed an experimental study in which participants played a sequence of Public Goods games and gossip rounds. In our two treatments, we observed that cooperation increased when there was an opportunity to be selected, but also that cooperators sent more honest messages than defectors, and that this strategy was prevalent in the treatment in which inter-group competition was implemented. We also found evidence that participants detached themselves from the information more often when lying. Taken together, our study fills a theoretical and empirical gap by showing that partner choice increases both cooperation and honesty of gossip. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

AKITA: A CAREER COUNSELING CASE FOR PRACTICE AND THEORETICAL REFLECTION

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (01n02) ◽  
pp. 51-66
Author(s):  
SHUI-WAI WONG
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Career Counseling ◽  
Perfect Match ◽  
Academic Major ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Directed Search ◽  
Partial Match ◽  
Career Assessment ◽  
Career Counsellor ◽  
Theoretical Reflection

A case in the Hong Kong Chinese context is presented in this paper to illustrate the use of both quantitative (Holland's SDS) and qualitative career assessment (Card Sorts) to help a 16-year-old girl overcome career indecision. Guided by both Holland's Hexagonal Career Types Theory and Socio-Cognitive Career Theory, a career counsellor can promote a client's positive changes after two counseling sessions. This case supports Tracey's (2002) and Nauta et al.'s (2002) postulated bidirectional causal path between self-efficacy and interests. In addition, it highlights that partial match instead of perfect match between Self-directed search (SDS) scores and choice of academic major is more pragmatic or effective while performing quantitative assessment. Finally, it points to the need for establishing local SDS norms, examining the Holland codes for occupations in Hong Kong, and researching the link between congruence and maximal career outcomes in future research.

scholarly journals Honest signalling of trustworthiness

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Honest Signal ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Simple Representation ◽  
Helping Behaviour ◽  
Conflicting Interests ◽  
Evolutionary Simulations ◽  
Reputation Building

AbstractTrust can transform conflicting interests into cooperation. But how can individuals know when to trust others? Here, I develop the theory that reputation building may signal cooperative intent, or ‘trustworthiness’. I model a simple representation of this theory in which individuals (1) optionally invest in a reputation by performing costly helpful behaviour (‘signalling’); (2) optionally use others’ reputations when choosing a partner; and (3) optionally cooperate with that partner. In evolutionary simulations, high levels of reputation building; of choosing partners based on reputation; and of cooperation within partnerships emerged. Costly helping behaviour evolved into an honest signal of trustworthiness when it was adaptive for cooperators, relative to defectors, to invest in the long-term benefits of a reputation for helping. I show using game theory that this occurs when cooperators gain larger marginal benefits from investing in signalling than do defectors. This happens without the usual costly signalling assumption that individuals are of two ‘types’ which differ in quality. Signalling of trustworthiness may help explain phenomena such as philanthropy, pro-sociality, collective action, punishment, and advertising in humans and may be particularly applicable to courtship in other animals.

Competitive gossip: the impact of domain, resource value, resource scarcity and coalitions

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole H. Hess ◽  
Edward H. Hagen
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Methods ◽  
Resource Scarcity ◽  
Social Resources ◽  
Social Competition ◽  
Resource Value ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Sorority Women ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Human Primate

Those with better reputations often obtain more resources than those with poorer reputations. Consequently, gossip might be an evolved strategy to compete for valuable and scarce material and social resources. Influenced by models of non-human primate competition, we test the hypotheses that gossip: (i) targets aspects of reputation relevant to the domain in which the competition is occurring, (ii) increases when contested resources are more valuable, and (iii) increases when resources are scarcer. We then test hypotheses derived from informational warfare theory, which proposes that coalitions strategically collect, analyse and disseminate gossip. Specifically, we test whether: (iv) coalitions deter negative gossip, and (v) whether they increase expectations of reputational harm to competitors. Using experimental methods in a Mechanical Turk sample ( n = 600), and survey and ego network analysis methods in a sample of California sorority women ( n = 74), we found that gossip content is specific to the context of the competition; that more valuable and scarcer resources cause gossip, particularly negative gossip, to intensify; and that allies deter negative gossip and increase expectations of reputational harm to an adversary. These results support social competition theories of gossip. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

Cooperating to show that you care: costly helping as an honest signal of fitness interdependence

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pat Barclay ◽  
Rebecca Bliege Bird ◽  
Gilbert Roberts ◽  
Szabolcs Számadó
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Honest Signal ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Know How ◽  
Honest Signals ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Helping Behaviour ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Signalling Systems

Social organisms often need to know how much to trust others to cooperate. Organisms can expect cooperation from another organism that depends on them (i.e. stake or fitness interdependence), but how do individuals assess fitness interdependence? Here, we extend fitness interdependence into a signalling context: costly helping behaviour can honestly signal one's stake in others, such that those who help are trusted more. We present a mathematical model in which agents help others based on their stake in the recipient's welfare, and recipients use that information to assess whom to trust. At equilibrium, helping is a costly signal of stake: helping is worthwhile for those who value the recipient (and thus will repay any trust), but is not worthwhile for those who do not value the recipient (and thus will betray the trust). Recipients demand signals when they value the signallers less and when the cost of betrayed trust is higher; signal costs are higher when signallers have more incentive to defect. Signalling systems are more likely when the trust games resemble Prisoner's Dilemmas, Stag Hunts or Harmony Games, and are less likely in Snowdrift Games. Furthermore, we find that honest signals need not benefit recipients and can even occur between hostile parties. By signalling their interdependence, organisms benefit from increased trust, even when no future interactions will occur. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

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