forming an asymmetrical brain: genes, environment, and evolutionarily stable strategies

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 615-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
giorgio vallortigara ◽  
lesley j. rogers
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Brain Lateralization ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Evolutionary Account ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Alternative Hypotheses ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Present Response ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

the present response elaborates and defends the main theses advanced in the target article: namely, that in order to provide an evolutionary account of brain lateralization, we should consider advantages and disadvantages associated both with the individual possession of an asymmetrical brain and with the alignment of the direction of lateralization at the population level. we explain why we believe that the hypothesis that directional lateralization evolved as an evolutionarily stable strategy may provide a better account than alternative hypotheses. we also further our discussion of the influence of stimulation and experience in early life on lateralization, and thereby show that our hypothesis is not deterministic. we also consider some novel data and ideas in support of our main thesis.

scholarly journals Individual-Level and Population-Level Lateralization: Two Sides of the Same Coin

Symmetry ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 739 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisa Frasnelli ◽  
Giorgio Vallortigara
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Theoretical Point ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Functional Roles ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Social Species ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Lateralization, i.e., the different functional roles played by the left and right sides of the brain, is expressed in two main ways: (1) in single individuals, regardless of a common direction (bias) in the population (aka individual-level lateralization); or (2) in single individuals and in the same direction in most of them, so that the population is biased (aka population-level lateralization). Indeed, lateralization often occurs at the population-level, with 60–90% of individuals showing the same direction (right or left) of bias, depending on species and tasks. It is usually maintained that lateralization can increase the brain’s efficiency. However, this may explain individual-level lateralization, but not population-level lateralization, for individual brain efficiency is unrelated to the direction of the asymmetry in other individuals. From a theoretical point of view, a possible explanation for population-level lateralization is that it may reflect an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) that can develop when individually asymmetrical organisms are under specific selective pressures to coordinate their behavior with that of other asymmetrical organisms. This prediction has been sometimes misunderstood as it is equated with the idea that population-level lateralization should only be present in social species. However, population-level asymmetries have been observed in aggressive and mating displays in so-called “solitary” insects, suggesting that engagement in specific inter-individual interactions rather than “sociality” per se may promote population-level lateralization. Here, we clarify that the nature of inter-individuals interaction can generate evolutionarily stable strategies of lateralization at the individual- or population-level, depending on ecological contexts, showing that individual-level and population-level lateralization should be considered as two aspects of the same continuum.

scholarly journals Intraspecific competition and coordination in the evolution of lateralization

2008 ◽  
Vol 364 (1519) ◽  
pp. 861-866 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Ghirlanda ◽  
Elisa Frasnelli ◽  
Giorgio Vallortigara
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Neural Circuitry ◽  
Brain Lateralization ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Cooperative Interactions ◽  
Strategic Factors ◽  
Left And Right ◽  
Predator Interactions ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Recent studies have revealed a variety of left–right asymmetries among vertebrates and invertebrates. In many species, left- and right-lateralized individuals coexist, but in unequal numbers (‘population-level’ lateralization). It has been argued that brain lateralization increases individual efficiency (e.g. avoiding unnecessary duplication of neural circuitry and reducing interference between functions), thus counteracting the ecological disadvantages of lateral biases in behaviour (making individual behaviour more predictable to other organisms). However, individual efficiency does not require a definite proportion of left- and right-lateralized individuals. Thus, such arguments do not explain population-level lateralization. We have previously shown that, in the context of prey–predator interactions, population-level lateralization can arise as an evolutionarily stable strategy when individually asymmetrical organisms must coordinate their behaviour with that of other asymmetrical organisms. Here, we extend our model showing that populations consisting of left- and right-lateralized individuals in unequal numbers can be evolutionarily stable, based solely on strategic factors arising from the balance between antagonistic (competitive) and synergistic (cooperative) interactions.

A dynamic programming approach to evolutionarily stable strategy theory

1980 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Cannings ◽  
D. Gardiner
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Density Function ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Programming Approach ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
War Of Attrition ◽  
Dynamic Programming Approach ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In the war of attrition (wa), introduced by Maynard Smith (1974), two contestants play values from [0, ∞), the individual playing the longer value winning a fixed prize V, and both incurring a loss equal to the lesser of the two values. Thus the payoff, E(x, y) to an animal playing x against one playing y, is A more general form (Bishop and Cannings (1978)) has and it was demonstrated that with and there exists a unique evolutionarily stable strategy (ess), which is to choose a random value from a specified density function on [0, ∞). Results were also obtained for strategy spaces [0, s] and [0, s).

constraints from handedness on the evolution of brain lateralization

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 603-604 ◽  
Author(s):  
maryanne martin ◽  
gregory v. jones
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Brain Lateralization ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

can we understand brain lateralization in humans by analysis in terms of an evolutionarily stable strategy? the attempt to demonstrate a link between lateralization in humans and that in, for example, fish appears to hinge critically on whether the isomorphism is viewed as a matter of homology or homoplasy. consideration of human handedness presents a number of challenges to the proposed framework.

Joint Nesting in a Digger Wasp as an Evolutionarily Stable Preadaptation To Social Life

Behaviour ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 71 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 203-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Jane Brockmann ◽  
Richard Dawkins
Keyword(s):  
Social Life ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Group Living ◽  
Egg Laying ◽  
Brood Cell ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
A Cell ◽  
Insect Sociality ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

AbstractOne suggested evolutionary origin of insect sociality is joint nesting by females of the same generation. Long before selection favoured joint nesting itself, it might have favoured some other incidental preadaptation such as the habit of 'entering' abandoned burrows, found in the usually solitary wasp Splaex ichneumoneus. We have comprehensive economic records of individually marked wasps. There is little evidence of consistent individual variation in nesting success. Wasps often abandon the nests they have dug, and other individuals adopt or 'enter' these empty burrows. 'Dig/Enter' is a good candidate for a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy : digging and entering decisions are not characteristic of particular individuals; the probability of entering is not conditional upon whether it is early or late in the season; there is no correlation between an individual's size and her tendency to dig or enter; there is no correlation between an individual's egg-laying success and her tendency to dig or enter; individuals do not choose to dig or enter on the basis of immediate past success; individuals do not dig and enter in runs, nor do they alternate; wasps do not choose to dig or enter on the basis of how long they have been searching. At one study site digging and entering decisions are roughly equally successful, but at another entering decisions are perhaps slightly more successful. Entering wasps seem not to distinguish empty, abandoned burrows from burrows that are still occupied. As a consequence of indiscriminate entering, two females sometimes co-occupy the same burrow. Co-occupation should not be called 'communal' because the wasps usually share the same brood cell, not just the same burrow. One might expect that wasps would gain some benefit from co-occupying, but they do not, for a number of reasons: only one egg is laid in a shared cell, and obviously only one of the two wasps can lay it; two wasps together do not fetch noticeably more food than one alone; two wasps together are no quicker at provisioning a cell than one wasp alone; wasps sometimes duplicate each others' efforts when they co-occupy a nest; co-occupying wasps often have costly fights. About all that can be said for joint nesting is that it may reduce parasitism. The risk of joint nesting is the price wasps pay for the advantages of taking over an already dug and abandoned burrow. A mathematical model assuming 'dig/enter' as a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy has some predictive success. If the parameters changed quantitatively, the Sphex model could come to predict selection in favour of joint nesting as such. The selection pressures would have to be very strong to overcome the demonstrated disadvantages of co-occupying. Variants of the Sphex model may be applicable to other species, and may help our understanding of the evolution of group living. The theory of evolutionarily stable strategies is relevant not just to the maintenance of behaviour but to its evolutionary change.

Three characterizations of population strategy stability

1980 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. G. S. Hines
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamical Systems ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Standard Population ◽  
Population Strategy ◽  
Operative Strategies ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In addition to the concept of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), developed specifically for considering intraspecific conflicts, concepts such as the Nash equilibrium from game theory and the attractor or sink from dynamical systems theory appear relevant to the problem of characterizing populations of stable composition. The three concepts mentioned are discussed for one simple standard population model. It is found that evolutionarily stable strategies of one type are necessarily Nash equilibrium strategies, although the converse is not true. The dynamical systems characterization is found to provide a model for populations susceptible to invasion by ‘co-operative' strategies, but capable of evolving back in average to the original equilibrium.

Evolutionarily stable strategies in diploid populations with general inheritance patterns

1983 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. G. S. Hines ◽  
D. T. Bishop
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Selection ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Simple Argument ◽  
Sexual Population ◽  
Inheritance Patterns ◽  
The Mean ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Diploid Populations

A simple argument demonstrates that the mean strategy of a diploid sexual population at evolutionary equilibrium can be expected to be an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the formal sense. This result follows under a wide set of models of genetic inheritance of strategy (including sexual selection) provided that the ESS is both attainable and maintainable.

the trade-off between symmetry and asymmetry

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 594-595 ◽  
Author(s):  
michael c. corballis
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Bilateral Symmetry ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Directional Bias ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Balanced Polymorphism ◽  
Bias Stability ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

population-level asymmetry may be maintained, not by an “evolutionarily stable strategy” pitting a dominant bias against its nondominant opposite, but rather by a genetically based system pitting a directional bias against the absence of any such bias. stability is then achieved through a heterozygotic advantage, maintaining balanced polymorphism. this model may better capture the fundamental trade-off between lateralization and bilateral symmetry.

scholarly journals Evolutionarily stable strategies in stable and periodically fluctuating populations: The Rosenzweig–MacArthur predator–prey model

2021 ◽  
Vol 118 (4) ◽  
pp. e2017463118
Author(s):  
Katrin Grunert ◽  
Helge Holden ◽  
Espen R. Jakobsen ◽  
Nils Chr. Stenseth
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Strategy ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Stable Limit ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Predator Prey ◽  
Predator Prey Model ◽  
Prey Model ◽  
Fluctuating Populations ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an evolutionary strategy that, if adapted by a population, cannot be invaded by any deviating (mutant) strategy. The concept of ESS has been extensively studied and widely applied in ecology and evolutionary biology [M. Smith, On Evolution (1972)] but typically on the assumption that the system is ecologically stable. With reference to a Rosenzweig–MacArthur predator–prey model [M. Rosenzweig, R. MacArthur, Am. Nat. 97, 209–223 (1963)], we derive the mathematical conditions for the existence of an ESS when the ecological dynamics have asymptotically stable limit points as well as limit cycles. By extending the framework of Reed and Stenseth [J. Reed, N. C. Stenseth, J. Theoret. Biol. 108, 491–508 (1984)], we find that ESSs occur at values of the evolutionary strategies that are local optima of certain functions of the model parameters. These functions are identified and shown to have a similar form for both stable and fluctuating populations. We illustrate these results with a concrete example.

Algorithm for Evolutionarily Stable Strategies against Pure Mutations

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Ganzfried
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Positive Result ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Mutation Strategy ◽  
Important Solution ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an important solution concept in game theory which has been applied frequently to biology and even cancer. Finding such a strategy has been shown to be difficult from a theoretical complexity perspective. Informally an ESS is a strategy that if followed by the population cannot be taken over by a mutation strategy. We present an algorithm for the case where mutations are restricted to pure strategies. This is the first positive result for computation of ESS, as all prior results are computational hardness and no prior algorithms have been presented.

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