Grist and mills: on the cultural origins of cultural learning

Cumulative cultural evolution is what ‘makes us odd’; our capacity to learn facts and techniques from others, and to refine them over generations, plays a major role in making human minds and lives radically different from those of other animals. In this article, I discuss cognitive processes that are known collectively as ‘cultural learning’ because they enable cumulative cultural evolution. These cognitive processes include reading, social learning, imitation, teaching, social motivation and theory of mind. Taking the first of these three types of cultural learning as examples, I ask whether and to what extent these cognitive processes have been adapted genetically or culturally to enable cumulative cultural evolution. I find that recent empirical work in comparative psychology, developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience provides surprisingly little evidence of genetic adaptation, and ample evidence of cultural adaptation. This raises the possibility that it is not only ‘grist’ but also ‘mills’ that are culturally inherited; through social interaction in the course of development, we not only acquire facts about the world and how to deal with it (grist), we also build the cognitive processes that make ‘fact inheritance’ possible (mills).

Download Full-text

Psychological Mechanisms Forged by Cultural Evolution

Current Directions in Psychological Science ◽

10.1177/0963721420917736 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 29 (4) ◽

pp. 399-404 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Cecilia Heyes

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Neuroscience ◽

Cultural Evolution ◽

Developmental Psychology ◽

Comparative Psychology ◽

Human Mind ◽

Cultural Learning ◽

Cognitive Mechanisms ◽

Psychological Mechanisms ◽

Fit For Purpose ◽

Nature And Nurture

The adaptive features of cognitive mechanisms, the features that make them fit for purpose, have traditionally been explained by nature and nurture. In the last decade, evidence has emerged that distinctively human cognitive mechanisms are also, and predominantly, shaped by culture. Like physical technology, human cognitive mechanisms are inherited via social interaction and made fit for purpose by culture evolution. This article surveys evidence from developmental psychology, comparative psychology, and cognitive neuroscience indicating that imitation, mentalizing, and language are “cognitive gadgets” shaped predominantly by cultural evolution. This evidence does not imply that the minds of newborn babies are blank slates. Rather, it implies that genetic evolution has made subtle changes to the human mind, allowing us to construct cognitive gadgets in the course of childhood through cultural learning.

Download Full-text

Atheists

10.31234/osf.io/ryp6g ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Sarah R. Schiavone ◽

Will M Gervais

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Processes ◽

Scientific Progress ◽

Psychological Research ◽

Cultural Learning ◽

Negative Attitudes ◽

Complex Interactions ◽

Cultural Origins ◽

Made In ◽

Do So

Atheists represent an inconspicuous minority, identifiable only by their disbelief in God(s). Despite being highly stigmatized and disliked, until recent scientific endeavors, little has been known about this group including why they don’t believe, how many people are atheists, and why they trigger intense reactions. Thus, this paper aims to synthesize what is known about atheists (so far), and to help explain the widespread negative attitudes and prejudice towards atheists; the possible cognitive, motivational, and cultural origins of disbelief; and the unique challenges facing the study of religious disbelievers. To do so, we will explore current findings in psychological research on atheism by considering the complex interactions of cultural learning, motivations, and core cognitive processes. Although significant scientific progress has been made in understanding the factors underlying atheism, there remains much to be explored in the domain of religious disbelief.

Download Full-text

The cultural evolution of cultural evolution

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences ◽

10.1098/rstb.2020.0051 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 376 (1828) ◽

Author(s):

Jonathan Birch ◽

Cecilia Heyes

Keyword(s):

Cultural Evolution ◽

Self Assembly ◽

Cultural Learning ◽

Explicit Learning ◽

Knowledge And Skills ◽

Cultural Selection ◽

Evolutionary Account ◽

Learning Biases ◽

Cumulative Cultural Evolution ◽

Attentional Learning

What makes fast, cumulative cultural evolution work? Where did it come from? Why is it the sole preserve of humans? We set out a self-assembly hypothesis: cultural evolution evolved culturally. We present an evolutionary account that shows this hypothesis to be coherent, plausible, and worthy of further investigation. It has the following steps: (0) in common with other animals, early hominins had significant capacity for social learning; (1) knowledge and skills learned by offspring from their parents began to spread because bearers had more offspring, a process we call CS1 (or Cultural Selection 1); (2) CS1 shaped attentional learning biases; (3) these attentional biases were augmented by explicit learning biases (judgements about what should be copied from whom). Explicit learning biases enabled (4) the high-fidelity, exclusive copying required for fast cultural accumulation of knowledge and skills by a process we call CS2 (or Cultural Selection 2) and (5) the emergence of cognitive processes such as imitation, mindreading and metacognition—‘cognitive gadgets' specialized for cultural learning. This self-assembly hypothesis is consistent with archaeological evidence that the stone tools used by early hominins were not dependent on fast, cumulative cultural evolution, and suggests new priorities for research on ‘animal culture'. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Foundations of cultural evolution’.

Download Full-text

The cultural evolution of cultural evolution

10.31234/osf.io/nmuva ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Jonathan Birch ◽

cecilia heyes

Keyword(s):

Cultural Evolution ◽

Self Assembly ◽

Cultural Learning ◽

Explicit Learning ◽

Knowledge And Skills ◽

Cultural Selection ◽

Evolutionary Account ◽

Learning Biases ◽

Cumulative Cultural Evolution ◽

Attentional Learning

What makes fast, cumulative cultural evolution work? Where did it come from? Why is it the sole preserve of humans? We set out a self-assembly hypothesis: cultural evolution evolved culturally. We present an evolutionary account that shows this hypothesis to be coherent, plausible, and worthy of further investigation. It has the following steps: (0) in common with other animals, early hominins had significant capacity for social learning; (1) knowledge and skills learned by offspring from their parents began to spread because bearers had more offspring, a process we call CS1 (or Cultural Selection 1); (2) CS1 shaped attentional learning biases; (3) these attentional biases were augmented by explicit learning biases (judgements about what should be copied from whom). Explicit learning biases enabled (4) the high-fidelity, exclusive copying required for fast cultural accumulation of knowledge and skills by a process we call CS2 (or Cultural Selection 2), and (5) the emergence of cognitive processes such as imitation, mindreading and metacognition – ‘cognitive gadgets’ specialised for cultural learning. This self-assembly hypothesis is consistent with archaeological evidence that the stone tools used by early hominins were not dependent on fast, cumulative cultural evolution, and suggests new priorities for research on ‘animal culture’.

Download Full-text

Enquire within: cultural evolution and cognitive science

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences ◽

10.1098/rstb.2017.0051 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 373 (1743) ◽

pp. 20170051 ◽

Cited By ~ 20

Author(s):

Cecilia Heyes

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Science ◽

Learning Strategies ◽

Cognitive Processes ◽

Cultural Evolution ◽

Interdisciplinary Studies ◽

Darwinian Evolution ◽

Cultural Learning ◽

Third Way ◽

Cultural Selection ◽

Cultural Domain

Cultural evolution and cognitive science need each other. Cultural evolution needs cognitive science to find out whether the conditions necessary for Darwinian evolution are met in the cultural domain. Cognitive science needs cultural evolution to explain the origins of distinctively human cognitive processes. Focusing on the first question, I argue that cultural evolutionists can get empirical traction on third-way cultural selection by rooting the distinction between replication and reconstruction, two modes of cultural inheritance, in the distinction between System 1 and System 2 cognitive processes. This move suggests that cultural epidemiologists are right in thinking that replication has higher fidelity than reconstruction, and replication processes are not genetic adaptations for culture, but wrong to assume that replication is rare. If replication is not rare, an important requirement for third-way cultural selection, one-shot fidelity , is likely to be met. However, there are other requirements, overlooked by dual-inheritance theorists when they conflate strong (Darwinian) and weak (choice) senses of ‘cultural selection’, including dumb choices and recurrent fidelity . In a second excursion into cognitive science, I argue that these requirements can be met by metacognitive social learning strategies , and trace the origins of these distinctively human cognitive processes to cultural evolution. Like other forms of cultural learning, they are not cognitive instincts but cognitive gadgets. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Bridging cultural gaps: interdisciplinary studies in human cultural evolution’.

Download Full-text

Social Learning

10.23943/princeton/9780691150703.001.0001 ◽

2013 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

William Hoppitt ◽

Kevin N. Laland

Keyword(s):

Spatial Distribution ◽

Social Learning ◽

Learning Strategies ◽

Cognitive Neuroscience ◽

Cultural Evolution ◽

Experimental Psychology ◽

Academic Disciplines ◽

Mathematical Methods ◽

Indispensable Tool ◽

Social Learning Strategies

Many animals, including humans, acquire valuable skills and knowledge by copying others. Scientists refer to this as social learning. It is one of the most exciting and rapidly developing areas of behavioral research and sits at the interface of many academic disciplines, including biology, experimental psychology, economics, and cognitive neuroscience. This book provides a comprehensive, practical guide to the research methods of this important emerging field. It defines the mechanisms thought to underlie social learning and demonstrate how to distinguish them experimentally in the laboratory. It presents techniques for detecting and quantifying social learning in nature, including statistical modeling of the spatial distribution of behavior traits. It also describes the latest theory and empirical findings on social learning strategies, and introduces readers to mathematical methods and models used in the study of cultural evolution. This book is an indispensable tool for researchers and an essential primer for students.

Download Full-text

Analogy as a Catalyst for Cumulative Cultural Evolution

Trends in Cognitive Sciences ◽

10.1016/j.tics.2021.03.002 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

C.O. Brand ◽

A. Mesoudi ◽

P.E. Smaldino

Keyword(s):

Cultural Evolution ◽

Cumulative Cultural Evolution

Download Full-text

Copy the In-group: Group Membership Trumps Perceived Reliability, Warmth, and Competence in a Social-Learning Task

Psychological Science ◽

10.1177/09567976211032224 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 095679762110322

Author(s):

Marcel Montrey ◽

Thomas R. Shultz

Keyword(s):

Social Learning ◽

Cultural Evolution ◽

Learning Strategy ◽

Group Membership ◽

Social Groups ◽

Learning Task ◽

Minimal Group Paradigm ◽

Learning Game ◽

Group Members ◽

Cumulative Cultural Evolution

Surprisingly little is known about how social groups influence social learning. Although several studies have shown that people prefer to copy in-group members, these studies have failed to resolve whether group membership genuinely affects who is copied or whether group membership merely correlates with other known factors, such as similarity and familiarity. Using the minimal-group paradigm, we disentangled these effects in an online social-learning game. In a sample of 540 adults, we found a robust in-group-copying bias that (a) was bolstered by a preference for observing in-group members; (b) overrode perceived reliability, warmth, and competence; (c) grew stronger when social information was scarce; and (d) even caused cultural divergence between intermixed groups. These results suggest that people genuinely employ a copy-the-in-group social-learning strategy, which could help explain how inefficient behaviors spread through social learning and how humans maintain the cultural diversity needed for cumulative cultural evolution.

Download Full-text