scholarly journals New thinking, innateness and inherited representation

2012 ◽  
Vol 367 (1599) ◽  
pp. 2234-2244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Shea

The New Thinking contained in this volume rejects an Evolutionary Psychology that is committed to innate domain-specific psychological mechanisms: gene-based adaptations that are unlearnt, developmentally fixed and culturally universal. But the New Thinking does not simply deny the importance of innate psychological traits. The problem runs deeper: the concept of innateness is not suited to distinguishing between the New Thinking and Evolutionary Psychology. That points to a more serious problem with the concept of innateness as it is applied to human psychological phenotypes. This paper argues that the features of recent human evolution highlighted by the New Thinking imply that the concept of inherited representation , set out here, is a better tool for theorizing about human cognitive evolution.

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascal Boyer ◽  
Michael Bang Petersen

AbstractSpecific features of our evolved cognitive architecture explain why some aspects of the economy are “seen” and others are “not seen.” Drawing from the commentaries of economists, psychologists, and other social scientists on our original proposal, we propose a more precise model of the acquisition and spread of folk-beliefs about the economy. In particular, we try to provide a clearer delimitation of the field of folk-economic beliefs (sect. R2) and to dispel possible misunderstandings of the role of variation in evolutionary psychology (sect. R3). We also comment on the difficulty of explaining folk-economic beliefs in terms of domain-general processes or biases (sect. R4), as developmental studies show how encounters with specific environments calibrate domain-specific systems (sect. R5). We offer a more detailed description of the connections between economic beliefs and political psychology (sect. R6) and of the probable causes of individual variation in that domain (sect. R7). Taken together, these arguments point to a better integration or consilience between economics and human evolution (sect. R8).


2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles G. Leathers ◽  
J. Patrick Raines

Purpose – Because belief in a supernatural agent with extraordinary power is rooted in psychology, Veblen's instinct psychology was the essential basis for his evolutionary economics of religion. The innate behavioral traits that Veblen called instincts in human nature are now recognized in evolutionary psychology as domain-specific mechanism that evolved as adaptations to enable human survival and reproduction. The authors aim to explain how the modern evolutionary psychology of religion provides a modern psychological basis for Veblen's evolutionary economics of religion. Design/methodology/approach – First, the authors review how Veblen's theory of an evolved human nature of instincts was applied to explain the origins of religion in primitive societies and remained a resilient force despite evolutionary erosion of institutional religion as science advanced. Second, the authors note how evolutionary psychology explains the origins of religion in terms of the functioning of domain-specific psychological mechanisms that evolved as adaptations for purposes other than religion. Findings – The similarities between Veblen's instinct psychology and the explanation of religion as by-products of domain-specific psychological mechanisms are sufficient to allow the conclusion that the evolutionary psychology of religion provides a modern psychological basis for Veblen's evolutionary economics of religion. Originality/value – An evolutionary economics of religion has a great social value if it provides credible explanations of both the origins of religious belief and innate tendency for religious belief to continue even as science refutes elements of religious doctrines. With a modern psychological basis, Veblen's evolutionary economics of religion accomplishes that purpose.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 235-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taylor Davis

In the scientific literature on religious evolution, two competing theories appeal to group selection to explain the relationship between religious belief and altruism, or costly, prosocial behavior. Both theories agree that group selection plays an important role in cultural evolution, affecting psychological traits that individuals acquire through social learning. They disagree, however, about whether group selection has also played a role in genetic evolution, affecting traits that are inherited genetically. Recently, Jonathan Haidt has defended the most fully developed account based on genetic group selection, and I argue here that problems with this account reveal good reasons to doubt that genetic group selection has played any important role in human evolution at all. Thus, considering the role of group selection in religious evolution is important not just because of what it reveals about religious psychology and religious evolution, but also because of what it reveals about the role of group selection in human evolution more generally.


Author(s):  
Michael Bruter ◽  
Sarah Harrison

This chapter briefly explores the scope and historical context of this book, introducing some key new concepts and their articulation with the existing concepts and literature of electoral behaviour. Homo Suffragator literally means ‘person who can vote’. What this power entails, what it changes with regard to man's condition and social interaction, and what the psychological mechanisms are that determine whether or not one exercises this power are all questions central to the puzzles the study aims to resolve. Throughout, the book explores the relationship between human nature, personality and morality variations, cognitive and emotional elements, and systemic choices and determinants which constrain and shape voters' electoral power. The chapter then highlights how one can borrow from the combination of physiological, anthropological, and psychological insights traditionally applied to understand the stages of human evolution similarly to comprehend the psychology, functioning, personal/societal relationships, and behaviour of Homo Suffragator.


1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Buss ◽  
Joshua Duntley

We applaud Campbell's cogent arguments for the evolution of female survival mechanisms but take issue with several key conceptual claims: the treatment of patriarchy; the implicit assumption that women are passive pawns in a male game of media exploitation; and the neglect of the possibility that media images exploit existing evolved psychological mechanisms rather than create them.


Author(s):  
Aaron Kozbelt

This chapter reviews how expertise impacts aesthetic experience and cognition. It first lays out some well-established methods and findings from the extensive research literature on expertise and expert performance and discusses how these relate to empirical aesthetics. Next, it describes general psychological mechanisms and models of aesthetic processing, emphasizing the potential role of expertise in modulating aesthetic cognition within such models. Since expertise is highly domain-specific, the chapter then proceeds sequentially through a range of aesthetic domains: visual art, design, architecture, photography, music, dance, writing, acting, and film. In each case, behavioral measures (self-report and performance indices) and neuroscientific findings are considered where available. When possible, the chapter discusses not only aesthetic response but also performance and creativity as aspects vital for understanding expertise and its effects in aesthetic domains. After reviewing the aforementioned domains individually, the concluding section attempts to integrate these points by highlighting consistent patterns of results and by briefly considering a few unresolved conceptual issues.


2000 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 175-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamas Bereczkei

Evolutionary psychology (EP) presents a new, integrated approach to human behavior, by explaining how the mental programs, designed by evolutionary selection, guide our social behavior. It claims that cognitive and emotional processes—that is domain-specific algorithms—have been selected in our evolutionary environment as devices of solving particular adaptive problems faced by the Pleistocene hunter-gatherers. Evolutionary psychologists can develop testable explanations that focus on aspects and mechanisms of behavior that cannot readily be explained with current psychological theories. An adaptationist approach provides a powerful explanatory framework that helps us to eliminate the old dichotomies from our thinking, such as innate and learned, universality and diversity, etc. At the same time, however, evolutionary psychology implies several problems and difficulties that should be solved in the future in order to avoid useless confrontations with psychologists. The message of Darwinism to psychology is that the analysis of the evolution of mental capacities and the explanation of the adaptive mechanisms of behavior are crucial contributions to forming an integrated view of ourselves.


2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (23) ◽  
pp. 6348-6354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan L. MacLean

A satisfactory account of human cognitive evolution will explain not only the psychological mechanisms that make our species unique, but also how, when, and why these traits evolved. To date, researchers have made substantial progress toward defining uniquely human aspects of cognition, but considerably less effort has been devoted to questions about the evolutionary processes through which these traits have arisen. In this article, I aim to link these complementary aims by synthesizing recent advances in our understanding of what makes human cognition unique, with theory and data regarding the processes of cognitive evolution. I review evidence that uniquely human cognition depends on synergism between both representational and motivational factors and is unlikely to be accounted for by changes to any singular cognitive system. I argue that, whereas no nonhuman animal possesses the full constellation of traits that define the human mind, homologies and analogies of critical aspects of human psychology can be found in diverse nonhuman taxa. I suggest that phylogenetic approaches to the study of animal cognition—which can address questions about the selective pressures and proximate mechanisms driving cognitive change—have the potential to yield important insights regarding the processes through which the human cognitive phenotype evolved.


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