Islamist Mobilization during the Arab Uprisings

Islamists were the Arab Spring’s largest immediate beneficiaries, yet Islamist parties in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco played markedly different roles in the historic uprisings of 2011. Why was Islamist mobilization more visible in some cases than others? This chapter breaks down the question of Islamist mobilization on two levels, asking (1) to what extent Islamist parties served as “revolutionary organizations,” and (2) to what extent Islamist beliefs shaped individuals’ protest behavior. The chapter finds that Islamist parties responded strategically rather than ideologically to escalating protest movements in early 2011, reflecting each party’s experience of authoritarianism and its resulting expectations over the benefits of a democratic future. Islamist mobilization was highest where Islamists prior to 2011 occupied a “middle ground” between repressed outsider and regime insider. In Egypt, where the Muslim Brothers operated large networks of social service provision but were constrained from amassing electoral power, Brotherhood leaders organized their supporters to protest. In Morocco, where the PJD played the role of “loyal” parliamentary opposition, the party urged its followers not to protest. In Tunisia, where Harakat Ennahda was totally repressed, Islamist leaders were unable to play a large mobilizing role. Survey analyses show heterogeneous effects of Islamist beliefs on protest across countries, indicating that many Islamist individuals did follow their leaders’ edicts to either protest or abstain. Many others protested without formal Islamist leadership, galvanized by economic grievance. These results highlight the diversity of Islamist actors and the importance of studying Islamist politics on both organizational and individual levels.

Making a People: Turkey’s “Democracy Watches” and Gezi-Envy

This article investigates a surplus quality that a “politics out of doors” embodies. It argues that forms of mass appearance and protest manifest an aesthetic and affective making of a people—a people that enjoys its togetherness through visualized, vocalized, and performative expressions of its presence. Generating and generated by a collective desire, this figure of a people exceeds “the people” understood as a legally authorizing and legitimating entity. I contend that the excess of desire can make popular protest a source of “envy” for political authorities even at the height of their electoral power. In conversation with Melanie Klein and Joan Copjec’s accounts of “envy” and René Girard’s formulation of “mimetic desire,” I analyze the Turkish regime’s orchestration of the 2016 “Democracy Watches” as an attempt to create, harness, and appropriate a counter-equivalent desire to the 2013 antigovernment Gezi protests. In so doing, I reconceptualize peoplehood as the synergetic enjoyment of assembled collectivities.

Religious populism in Pakistani Punjab: How Khadim Rizvi’s Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan emerged

Khadim Rizvi’s open manifestation of religion helped him become one of the most popular leaders of Barelvi-Sunni Muslims in Pakistani Punjab. He emerged as the leader of a moral community during a crisis. After a series of protests and negotiated agreements with the federal and provincial governments, he was able to translate his support into electoral power. In the 2018 election, his TLP bagged 1.8 million votes (National Assembly seats) from Punjab. It was the first instance in recent political history when a newcomer religious party finished third in the province. No religious party had been able, in the last three elections (2008, 2013, 2018), to impact elections in Punjab as the TLP did in 2018.

Electoral Power Structure of Islamic Parties in Reform Era Indonesia

The Islamic political parties in the Reform era grew up exceeding the period of Parliamentary Democracy. In the electoral competition during the Reform era, Islamic political parties did not receive adequate votes. The votes won by Islamic parties tend to go down from election to election. There are several factors that have caused the Islamic party to fail to win the support of Muslim votes. First, Islamic parties are fragmented and internal conflict. Second, Muslim voters do a change in ideological orientation which no chooses an Islamic party but a nationalist party. Third, nationalist parties accommodate Muslim aspirations by forming Islamic organizations. Fourth, the crisis of leadership of the Islamic party. Fifth, the absence of a real party program. To improve the electoral, Islamic parties must concern on programs to improve people's welfare, democratization, eradicate corruption, and realize social justice. The leader of Islamic parties must be exemplary, visionary, integrity, and rooted in the community.

The Electoral College Exacerbates the Red–Blue Divide and Disenfranchises Ethnic Minorities

Because of increasingly skewed populations among the 50 United States, the Electoral College is increasingly more likely to produce a winner with a minority of the popular vote. Not only has the Electoral College become a less accurate reflection of the popular vote over time, but it also suppresses the voting power of racial and ethnic minorities in U.S. presidential elections. First, as a consequence of the winner-take-all Electoral College system, states with smaller populations are allotted disproportionately high weights, such that their per-capita voting power per electoral vote is substantially greater than that of states with larger populations. For example, in 2004, residents of the least-populous state, Wyoming (164,594 people per electoral vote), had over 3.74 times the electoral power of residents in the most-populous state, California (615,848 people per electoral vote). Second, states with larger populations have a larger percentage of ethnic minorities (r = .43, p = .002). Third, if one controls for population differences, the Whiter a state is, the more electoral votes it receives. Fourth, the Whiter a state is, the more electoral power it has in terms of a lower population-per-electoral-vote ratio (r = -.37, p = .008; r = -.52, p < .001 if outlier Hawaii, with only 23% non-Hispanic/Latino Whites, is excluded). Thus, the red-versus-blue dichotomy engendered by the winner-take-all Electoral College system not only disenfranchises opinion minorities, but also systemically disenfranchises racial and ethnic minorities seeking to stake a claim on the presidential political landscape. [Abstract written August 4, 2020.]

Homo Suffragator

This chapter briefly explores the scope and historical context of this book, introducing some key new concepts and their articulation with the existing concepts and literature of electoral behaviour. Homo Suffragator literally means ‘person who can vote’. What this power entails, what it changes with regard to man's condition and social interaction, and what the psychological mechanisms are that determine whether or not one exercises this power are all questions central to the puzzles the study aims to resolve. Throughout, the book explores the relationship between human nature, personality and morality variations, cognitive and emotional elements, and systemic choices and determinants which constrain and shape voters' electoral power. The chapter then highlights how one can borrow from the combination of physiological, anthropological, and psychological insights traditionally applied to understand the stages of human evolution similarly to comprehend the psychology, functioning, personal/societal relationships, and behaviour of Homo Suffragator.

Narrativas de la legalidad en el hiperpresidencialismo constitucionalizado ecuatoriano = Narratives of legality in the Ecuadorian constitutionalized hyper-presidentialism

Resumen: La llegada al poder de Rafael Correa en el 2007 supuso diversos cambios en Ecuador, no sólo ideológicos sino también políticos, canalizados a través de una Asamblea Constituyente con el fin de ajustarse a los preceptos de la llamada “Revolución Ciudadana”. La nueva Carta Magna estableció un mayor número de controles sobre el Ejecutivo y creó nuevas funciones, como el Poder Electoral y de Transparencia y Control Social, que también girarían en torno a las decisiones del presidente de turno. Esto, combinado con la personalidad de Correa, generó un escenario de hiperpresidencialismo, amparado por elecciones populares que legitiman los cambios realizados por el Gobierno. En el caso ecuatoriano, lo que sucedió fue una disolución de la legalidad mediante la acción mediática, en el que la palabra del presidente no sólo fue regla de conducta, sino también una percepción de que la actividad pública no puede ser discutida, rebasando sus competencias constitucionalmente establecidas. El presente texto, busca explorar los mecanismos de existencia de un discurso decisionista en el periodo de gobierno 2013-2017 y sus consecuencias en la gobernabilidad democrática, para demostrar que la existencia de una autoridad que escape del poder del Estado sólo puede ser contenida por la norma y la fortaleza de las instituciones democráticas, capaces de mejorar la intensidad de la ciudadanía.Palabras clave: Hiperpresidencialismo, Rafael Correa, Ecuador, legalidad.Abstract: The arrival to power of Rafael Correa in 2007 involved various changes not only ideological but also political, channeled through a Constituent Assembly to conform to the precepts of the so-called "Citizen Revolution". The new Magna Carta established a greater number of executive controls and created new functions, such as the Electoral Power and Transparency and Social Control, which would also revolve around the decisions of the incumbent president. This, combined with the personality of Correa, generated a scenario of hyper-presidentialism, supported by popular elections that legitimize the changes made by the government. In the Ecuadorian case, what happened was a dissolution of legality through media action, in which the president's word was not only a rule of conduct, but also a perception that public activity cannot be discussed, exceeding its Constitutionally established competences. The present text, seeks to explore the mechanisms of existence of a decisionist discourse in the period of government 2013-2017 and its consequences in democratic governance, to demonstrate that the existence of an authority that escapes the power of the State can only be contained by the norm and the strength of democratic institutions, capable of improving the intensity of citizenship.Keywords: Hyperpresidencialism, Rafael Correa, Ecuador, Constitution, legality.

Incapable of Self-Government

This chapter explains how Washingtonians, black and white, lost the right to vote in 1874. The success of biracial democracy during Reconstruction triggered a backlash from white conservatives and business leaders who persuaded Congress to retreat from the promise of biracial democracy, first by limiting electoral power in a territorial government in 1871 and then by eliminating self-government altogether in 1874. In the decades that followed, Washington rolled back Reconstruction-era racial progress, part of a region-wide effort to enforce white supremacy. When city commissioners compiled the District Code in 1901, they quietly dropped the local antidiscrimination laws from the books. The city continued to boast a diverse and growing black middle class, but black political power and aspirations withered. The door to biracial, cross-class democracy seemed to have been slammed shut.